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Chapter 1
Introduction
This work is concerned with threshold public goods games1 in which a group of
players contributes jointly to a project of collective value. This “public good”
is provided only if a predefined minimum joint contribution is reached. In
the real world, such projects can entail anything from a few friends pooling
their money to host a party, which none of them could afford on their own, to
international efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions in order to keep global
warming below a critical level.
If said minimum contribution, referred to as the threshold value in the
following, is not reached, nothing of collective value is created, and each con-
tributing player may even lose his or her invested contribution, which therefore
involves a certain amount of risk. On the other hand, many more people may
benefit from the public good than those actually having to pay the cost. The
friends will likely invite additional guests to their party, who will also be al-
lowed to eat, drink, and be merry. Likewise, certain island nations with no
significant greenhouse-gas emissions to reduce will nevertheless be happy if the
sea level does not rise and flood their homes. Accordingly, the basic idea of this
game is very similar to a social dilemma: Each player in the group would be
better off individually, if somebody else provided the contribution (i.e., paid for
the party or took efforts to reduce emissions), because everyone in the group
can enjoy the benefits whether or not they have paid for them.
However, aside from being a type of social dilemma, threshold public goods
games – or “ThrPGs”, as I will call them throughout the rest of this work –
also have a few other interesting theoretical properties that have caused this
type of game to become the focus of my studies over the past three years:
1. On a more technical level, ThrPGs are different from other social dilem-
mas2 in that they permit the players to “rationally” contribute a socially
1This type of game is also discussed in the literature under the names “step-level public
good” or “provision point public good”, the latter being more applicable to games with some
form of rebate of contributions in case of overcontribution.
2Like, for example, the better known “linear” public goods games, which have been dis-
cussed extensively in the literature. See Ledyard (1995) for an overview.
1
2efficient amount to the project, depending on how much the other players
are willing to contribute. In fact, ThrPGs are more correctly classified as
coordination problems in which the players must decide between a safe,
but inefficient strategy of contributing nothing and a risky, but possibly
rewarding strategy of making a contribution to the public good while
hoping that enough other players do the same.
2. ThrPGs are similar to divide-the-pie bargaining games, like the famous
ultimatum game (Gu¨th et al., 1982), in the sense that the group mem-
bers must allocate the threshold value somehow among themselves, i.e.,
decide who carries which share of the cost burden (another coordination
problem), if they want to reach an efficient outcome. As such, ThrPGs
lend themselves to the discussion of research questions that involve dis-
tributive fairness.
3. Finally, if a player’s contribution decision is interpreted as his preference
for a collective outcome, like a particular way in which the threshold value
is allocated among the group members, the game corresponds to a (tacit)
collective decision. For this reason, ThrPGs can be very easily adapted
to study committee voting behavior. In fact, many voting procedures
themselves are ThrPGs of some kind, e.g., if a particular number of
votes is required for approval and therefore constitutes a threshold for
the political implementation of projects of (possible) public interest (cf.
Goeree and Holt, 2005).
All of these topics will be addressed to some extent in the following chap-
ters, but a brief overview is given for each of them in the remainder of this
introduction. First, however, a basic theoretical model of a ThrPG is presented
in the next section.
1.1 Theoretical model of a threshold public
goods game (ThrPG)
Although the general idea of ThrPGs has been around for a while, with
the first wave of studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Marwell and
Ames, 1979, 1980; van de Kragt et al., 1983; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984),3 a
standard notation for describing the elements of this game has yet to develop.
The notation I employ for this rather general model most closely resembles the
one used by Cadsby et al. (2008), taking the first letter of the parameter as
its designating variable (for example, e for “endowment”), with the exception
3For a literature review see Section 2.7 in Chapter 2, as well as Croson and Marks
(2000) and again Ledyard (1995). A review of “step-level public goods” from a psychological
perspective is provided by Abele et al. (2010).
3of q (for “quantity”) instead of c for contributions, which refers to marginal
contribution costs in my model.
1.1.1 Basic game
A ThrPG4 consists in a group defined by a set N that contains n individual
players. These players each simultaneously choose their individual contribu-
tions to a public account with a threshold value of T . Each player i “ 1, . . . , n
starts with an endowment ei ą 0 which can then be used to pay for his contribu-
tion qi P r0, q¯is to the public good. The marginal cost of contribution, meaning
the conversion rate from endowment to contribution, is given by ci ą 0.
If for any vector of individual contributions q “ pq1, . . . , qnq the resulting
total contribution Q “ řni“1 qi is equal to or exceeds the threshold value T ą 0,
i.e., if Q ě T , each player i receives a payoff equal to his individual valuation
vi ą 0 of the public good. Otherwise, the contributions are wasted and the
contribution costs are returned to each contributing player at a refund rate
of 0 ď r ď 1. This means that, if r “ 1, a full refund of contribution costs
is granted, similar to a money-back guarantee. Let q¯i ă T for all i, as well
as T ď řnj“1 q¯j, so that one player alone cannot reach the threshold, but the
entire group can.
A contribution vector is individually rational if @i : ciqi ď vi, meaning
that no player has contribution costs in excess of his valuation. Moreover, a
contribution vector is technologically possible if @i : qi ď q¯i, i.e. all players
contribute less than their maximum contribution. I will call a contribution
vector feasible if it is both individually rational and technologically possible.
Player i’s payoff piipqq is given by:
piipqq “
"
ei ´ ciqi ` vi if Q ě T
ei ´ p1´ rqciqi if Q ă T (1.1)
Two design elements deserve particular attention, because they have not
yet been discussed in the literature (at least as far as I know). The first is the
distinction between a player’s endowment ei and his maximum contribution
q¯i. Typically it is assumed that ei “ q¯i for all i, so that each player can
invest his entire endowment in the public good. What is usually a reasonable
simplification, becomes important if the model includes marginal contribution
costs ci, which is the second uncommon design element.
5 Now it becomes more
apparent that the (monetary) endowment and the contributions to the public
good are actually different quantities measured in different units. In a later
chapter (Ch. 4), I will argue that this distinction becomes the most relevant
4Parts of this section also appear in Feige, Ehrhart, and Kra¨mer (Unpublished).
5The idea of marginal contribution costs that are different for different players, has ac-
tually been modeled before by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991a) for binary ThrPGs, yet their
approach is more closely related to assuming heterogeneous endowments, because the au-
thors specify that each player “is endowed with one indivisible unit of input” (ibid., p.186)
which has a value of ci if the player does not contribute.
4if players are heterogeneous, because then it may matter if this heterogeneity
arises from a difference in wealth levels (endowments) or a difference in the
ability to contribute (maximum contributions).
Furthermore, although most of the literature on ThrPGs is concerned with
positive valuations or rewards earned from providing the public good, a major
part of this thesis assumes a different perspective, according to which providing
the public good instead prevents a damage payment di ą 0 for player i. This
damage payment has the same absolute value as vi (meaning di “ vi), but
is deducted from the player’s endowment if T is not reached. By defining
eˆi :“ ei ` vi and substituting di for vi, an equivalent representation of piipqiq
results:
piipqq “
"
eˆi ´ ciqi if Q ě T
eˆi ´ p1´ rqciqi ´ di if Q ă T (1.2)
1.1.2 Theoretical solutions
Any vector of individual contributions q “ pq1, . . . , qnq that is a feasible thresh-
old allocation, so that Q “ řni“1 qi “ T , is a Nash equilibrium of this game. If
any player i decreases his own contribution below this amount, the threshold
is missed and the player loses vi, which is more than the contribution costs
ciqi that he could save in the process. And by increasing this contribution
beyond qi, the same player only manages to further reduce his endowment to
no additional benefit.
Another equilibrium is constituted by the zero-contribution vector q0 “
p0, . . . , 0q, which arises from the assumption that no player alone can reach the
threshold and accordingly should not contribute, if he believes to be the only
contributor. Zero contributions is a strict equilibrium in the case of no or only
partial refund if the threshold is missed (r ă 1), but only a “weak” equilibrium,
in which all players play dominated strategies, if contribution costs are fully
refunded (r “ 1). In addition, a full refund establishes an entire set of such
“weak” Pareto inferior equilibria with a total contribution of Q ă T . Because
of the refund of contribution costs, a player is indifferent to changes of his
individual contribution at any of these points, since whatever he contributes,
the threshold will not be reached and his payoff will be the same.
So, in contrast with linear public goods games, contributing nothing is not
actually a strictly dominant strategy in ThrPGs, to be preferred independently
of what the other players are doing. Instead, ThrPGs usually also have a large
number of Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria6 in which the threshold value is met
exactly, meaning that they more properly belong to the class of coordination
games. And even completely rational and selfish players can be expected to
6All feasible threshold allocations are Pareto optimal, but there may be Pareto-optimal
threshold allocations that are not individually rational for some players and accordingly not
Nash equilibria. Although these players are better off reducing their contributions, the other
players are worse off because the good is no longer provided.
5reach an efficient outcome, in the sense of not only providing the project suc-
cessfully (i.e., by reaching the threshold), but also doing so at a minimal cost
to society. In theory, once the group decides on a particular way to share the
threshold contribution among its members, no overcontribution should occur;
no contributions should be wasted.
1.1.3 Sequential contributions
A variant of the ThrPG with sequential contributions is also frequently inves-
tigated in the experimental literature (e.g., Erev and Rapoport, 1990; Chen
et al., 1996; Coats and Neilson, 2005; Coats et al., 2009; Milinski et al., 2008).
However, this strand of the literature is only of tangential interest to the topics
discussed in this thesis and will therefore not be covered extensively. From the
perspective of equilibrium analysis, sequential contributions lead to a theoreti-
cal first-mover advantage and very asymmetric threshold allocations in equilib-
rium, because the last player(s) can rationally be expected to contribute a large
share of their endowment if this ensures that the threshold is reached. On the
other hand, zero contributions is not a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in
a ThrPG with sequential contributions. Experimentally, though, the efficient
outcome is rarely observed, possibly because the players have other-regarding
preferences which deter them from an asymmetric allocation of the thresh-
old (cf. Coats and Neilson, 2005). In any case, with a unique Pareto-optimal
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, there is no problem of equilibrium selection
in this variant, which is why I focus only on simultaneous contributions in this
thesis.
1.1.4 Finitely repeated ThrPGs
A common assumption in the experimental literature is that ThrPGs are played
repeatedly for a finite number of times. It is usually taken for granted that the
Nash equilibria of the one-shot basic game (or stage game) can be implemented
as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game, as well. While this
is indeed the case, many additional allocations can also be implemented as
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in the repeated game, namely as part of a
trigger strategy with q0 as a threat point.7 Accordingly, any allocation that
constitutes a Pareto improvement over q0 can be implemented as an equilib-
rium. Furthermore, even outcomes that are Pareto inferior to q0 can be played
in this way in some rounds, as long as every player’s cumulative payoff over all
rounds is still at least as high as he would earn by playing q0 throughout all
rounds.
7See Benoit and Krishna (1985) as well as Section 5.2.2 in Chapter 5 for more details.
61.2 Equilibrium selection and threshold public
goods games
Given that there are usually many feasible allocations of the threshold and
even more inefficient equilibria if the game is played repeatedly, the group may
have difficulties picking exactly one from all of the possible outcomes. At this
point, one can turn to theories of equilibrium selection, whose concepts do not
actually reduce the number of equilibria, but put a spotlight on only a few of
them, making them the prime candidates for the final outcome. Most notable
here are the works by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) on a selection algorithm
based in part on a risk-dominance ranking of multiple equilibria, Samuelson
(1997) on equilibrium selection via dynamic learning processes, and Schelling
(1980) on focal points. These concepts – some of which are normative and
state which equilibrium the players should select, while others are descriptive
and state which equilibrium the players will (likely) select – will be discussed
in more detail in Chapters 2 and 4. To begin with, Chapter 2 will provide a
theoretical model describing under which parameter settings a group is more
likely to attempt to reach the threshold, even at the risk of coordination failure
and the associated reduction of total earnings.
1.3 Distributive fairness and threshold public
goods games
The idea of achieving equilibrium selection by means of principles of distribu-
tive fairness that might apply in the context of a ThrPG is discussed mainly
in Chapter 4, but surfaces again in later chapters. Many of these fairness prin-
ciples single out a unique threshold allocation as a focal point in the sense of
Schelling (1980). For example, many people would probably agree that shar-
ing a cake equally, so that everybody receives a piece of equal size, is a fair
outcome, because everybody is treated the same.
If the group members are heterogeneous in some respect, however, fairness
considerations may lead to a variety of distinct outcomes. In the international
negotiations to prevent global warming, industrialized countries like Germany
or the U.S. can reduce their emissions only at relatively high marginal costs
compared to fast-growing developing countries like China and India (see, e.g.,
Duscha and Ehrhart, 2016). From a global perspective, convincing China and
India to contribute more, in exchange for Germany and the U.S. contribut-
ing less, would reduce global costs of emissions reduction and thus increase
global welfare. In that sense, this asymmetric contribution outcome could be
considered fairer than equal shares.
Obviously, though, the redistribution makes China and India worse off due
to their now higher cost burden. If these countries object to sacrificing their
personal wealth for the greater good, as it turns out to be the case both in
7real life8 and in my experimental investigation (see Chapters 4 and 6), an
equal-payoff allocation may be a very attractive compromise if a redistribution
of contributions can indeed reduce the global costs of emissions reduction,
as with the global warming example. However, this outcome is far from an
efficient, “welfare-maximizing” allocation in terms of reduction costs, which
assigns a contribution burden to players with low marginal costs that is as large
as possible. Chapter 5 therefore introduces the option of transfer payments,
making it possible to compensate players with low marginal contribution costs
for carrying the higher cost burden, so that overall the trade-off between welfare
maximization and payoff equalization can be overcome. Consequently, two
formerly distinct fairness principles can both be satisfied at the same time.
1.4 Voting and threshold public goods games
A major part of this thesis is concerned with cooperative approaches to ThrPGs
in the form of voting on the contributions to the public good. Although most
of the literature on ThrPGs focuses on individual voluntary contributions, i.e.,
a non-cooperative approach, projects of public interest obviously also fall into
the scope of political decision-making processes, like, for example, a committee
of community members discussing and then voting on different proposals for
funding such a project. In most situations, the political authority invested in
the community by a democratic election is sufficient to implement their choice
in a binding manner.
Following a theoretical discussion of voting in ThrPGs in Chapter 3, Chap-
ters 4 and 5 also describe experimental treatments which employ a unanimous
vote on contribution vectors, thereby extending the research questions investi-
gated in these chapters to a different, although still non-cooperative, decision
rule.
Chapter 4 furthermore discusses how various principles of distributive fair-
ness relate to the outcomes collectively chosen by a group of players in an
experimental setting. A complementary analysis comparing self-reported indi-
vidual fairness attitudes (based on individual responses to a series of question-
naire items) gives indication that this collective choice may not be related at
all to the questionnaire responses. Instead, the decision rule has a much larger
impact on the outcome, possibly because of strategic considerations in the ac-
tual game. So, despite its explanatory power with respect to focal outcomes,
distributive fairness in ThrPGs may be nothing more than an epiphenomenon,
a side-effect, likely brought about by the (still unidentified) true cause of this
procedure effect. Another interpretation of this result, in line with the distinc-
tion between normative and descriptive concepts of equilibrium selection, is to
8Neither China nor India, which are both Non-Annex I countries, have so far
agreed to legally binding targets for emissions reductions, although China has at
least made a tentative pledge to “peak CO2 emissions by 2030 at the latest” (see
www.climateactiontracker.org/countries.html, last accessed October 10, 2015).
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say that what should be implemented according to a more generally applica-
ble social norm is not necessarily what can be implemented under the specific
circumstances of a strategic interaction.
The final study of my thesis, presented in Chapter 6, discusses a variant vot-
ing procedure, called“top-down”voting, which, with the additional assumption
of a randomly distributed threshold value, is then employed to model the cli-
mate negotiations in particular and to derive political implications based on
these results.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
Building on the rough sketch presented above, the following chapters are struc-
tured as follows (see also Figure 1.1).
Chapter 2 gives a guided tour through the literature on experimental re-
search involving non-cooperative ThrPGs. Guidance is provided by a theo-
retical model predicting how particular design elements affect experimentally
observed success rates, i.e., the frequency with which the threshold is reached.
In a nutshell, the original ThrPG is simplified by assuming that the group has
already agreed on a particular allocation of the threshold, but must still decide
(each group member individually) to honor this agreement or to deviate from
9the agreement and contribute nothing, thus avoiding the risk of wasting their
contributions if any of the other players does not honor the agreement. The
model is tested in both a qualitative meta-analysis, comprising said literature
review, and a quantitative meta-analysis involving a comparison to a meta-
regression on experimental data from earlier studies conducted by Croson and
Marks (2000).
Chapter 3 expands the view to also include a cooperative-choice approach
to ThrPGs. This chapter contains a game-theoretical analysis of a ThrPG in
which contributions are decided by means of a unanimous vote. As the proce-
dure to replicate this voting rule in the experimental investigation presented
in the subsequent chapters is non-cooperative, this voting game must also be
solved theoretically for Nash equilibria. The theoretical analysis is comple-
mented by an additional literature survey of voting in public goods experi-
ments, providing an idea of what to expect from these theoretical predictions
in the laboratory.
Chapter 4 experimentally investigates equilibrium selection in ThrPGs un-
der both individual voluntary contributions and unanimous voting on contribu-
tion vectors, following the premise that the subjects will use fairness principles
as selection criteria. Chapter 5 builds on part of these findings by reconciling
the conflict between welfare maximization and payoff equalization for heteroge-
neous marginal contribution costs via optional transfer payments. In addition
to motivating the effectiveness of transfer payments theoretically, another ex-
perimental investigation extending the parameterization used in Chapter 4 also
establishes the empirical validity of this chapter’s findings.
Chapter 6, employing a different parameter setting than the experiments
described in the two preceding chapters, introduces threshold uncertainty and
top-down voting as two additional design elements. The result is a model
intended to simulate climate negotiations in a laboratory environment and
to investigate their efficiency in terms of contribution costs under different
decision rules as well as heterogeneity of marginal costs. Whereas Chapters
4 and 5 provide a full refund of contribution costs if the threshold is missed,
no such money-back guarantee exists in this scenario. In concordance with
the theoretical model for success rates in ThrPGs presented in Chapter 2, the
absence of a refund policy induces many subjects to rather contribute nothing
and incur a damage payment than risk losing their contribution costs as well,
because the threshold value is not reached.
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Chapter 2
Success rates in simplified
threshold public goods games:
a theoretical model
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned before, the general idea of a threshold public goods game
(ThrPG) is that a group of people needs to jointly provide a specified amount
of money to successfully fund a project of public interest. The problem is
that the group has to not only come to an agreement (whether tacit or overt)
on whether or not to provide this public good, but also on which player will
provide which share of the specified amount.
Roughly fifteen years ago, Croson and Marks (2000) published a meta-study
on success rates in ThrPGs, i.e., the probability of whether or not the group’s
total contribution exceeds a predefined threshold value, postulating the “step
return,” which refers to the ratio of total valuation from reaching the thresh-
old to the necessary threshold contribution, as one of the main explanatory
variables in this game. Nevertheless, this parameter alone, although found to
be significantly positively correlated with success rates by the same authors,
does not yet make a model that can predict, let alone explain, experimental
outcomes. What is worse, even at the same value of the step return, group
decisions vary widely. Several experimental studies (including Isaac et al.,
1989; Alberti et al., Unpublished) do not vary the valuations, the group size,
the threshold value, or in fact any part of the experimental design, but still
observe that some subject groups reach the threshold consistently, while other
groups appear to have no hope of ever reaching this goal, leading them to
converge on an outcome where nobody contributes anything.
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2.1.1 Descriptive vs. normative equilibrium selection
theories
In the present chapter,1 I will develop a descriptive model aiming to encom-
pass this variability of results, which however has its foundations in previous,
exclusively normative, work on equilibrium selection (Harsanyi and Selten,
1988; Harsanyi, 1995). The idea is that the players in a ThrPG concentrate
on the most salient or “focal” (in the sense of Schelling, 1980) allocation of
the threshold value in their group and then decide whether or not this risky
Nash equilibrium, in which the deviation of only a single player severely re-
duces all players’ payoffs, is to be preferred to the safe choice of contributing
nothing. Sometimes the decision is in favor of the risky, but efficient, outcome;
sometimes the group achieves a tacit agreement to “play it safe.” Normative
equilibrium selection theories2 convey the message that
Normative Statement A player that is a utility-maximizer should play equi-
librium strategy X under the specified game parameters (and nothing
else).
A descriptive (or empirical) approach3 instead would stipulate that
Descriptive Statement 1 If a player is a utility-maximizer, the player will
play equilibrium strategy X under the specified game parameters (and
nothing else).
Theories that rely on social norms or fairness principles for equilibrium se-
lection can be classified as either normative or descriptive, depending on how
their statements are phrased. This can be seen by substituting the phrase “is
a utility-maximizer” (which is nothing but the norm of maximizing one’s in-
dividual utility) in the two statements given above by “prefers outcomes with
equal payoffs for all players” for example. So even a descriptive statement can
have a normative component. Nevertheless, Schelling (1980) follows a descrip-
tive approach to equilibrium selection, because he starts with the empirical
observation that people are drawn to focal points, like symmetric outcomes,
when they face coordination problems in real life (see ibid, p. 56f., for several
examples). The decision is in fact not about what a player individually prefers
1Some of the following sections also appear in a paper titled “Success rates in simplified
threshold public goods games” (Feige, Unpublished).
2Besides Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Harsanyi (1995), whose methods will be dis-
cussed in the following, another notable normative approach by Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) involves a “global game” that includes an entire set of games similar to the one to be
analyzed, whose elements are attained by random payoff perturbations.
3Quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), impulse balance equilib-
rium (Ockenfels and Selten, 2005; Selten and Chmura, 2008), and stochastic stability (Kan-
dori et al., 1993; Samuelson, 1997; Peski, 2010) are all based on descriptive theories and
therefore can generate descriptive statements.
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according to his own notions of fairness, i.e., what he thinks he should choose.
It is about what the player believes is the prevalent social norm that everyone
else adheres to, i.e., an empirical observation. As Schelling states (ibid., p.
91), “. . . tradition points to the particular set that everyone can expect every-
one else to be conscious of as a conspicuous candidate for adoption; it wins by
default over those that cannot readily be identified by tacit consent.”4
The difference between a normative and a descriptive approach becomes
even more apparent if a player happens to not play strategy X, with the
consequence that the group also does not “select” the specified equilibrium.
Followers of the normative approach will argue that this individual player just
did not listen to them or did not follow their suggestion for some other rea-
son. The validity of their approach, the claim that here an equilibrium where
everybody plays X should be played by the group, is untouched.5 Followers of
the descriptive approach, on the other hand, would admit (albeit grudgingly)
that their stipulation might be false and then improve their theory to better fit
their empirical observations. For instance, they might adjust their statement
as follows:
Descriptive Statement 2 If a player maximizes his individual utility func-
tion, the player is likely to play equilibrium strategy X under the specified
game parameters.
As a consequence, the accordingly modified descriptive approach no longer
selects a unique equilibrium with certainty, but only assigns a positive proba-
bility to each of the equilibria. Of course, this more general theory still permits
the testing of deterministic hypotheses like the claim that an equilibrium in
which everybody plays X is indeed the only equilibrium that is observed, if
each individual player has a high probability p of playing X.6 Notwithstanding
that such hypotheses are obviously rejected if some groups tacitly coordinate
on a different equilibrium.
Although a probabilistic model already has a higher explanatory power than
a deterministic one, because the former incorporates the latter as a special
case, I submit the claim that the increased flexibility resulting from this gen-
eralization in fact improves its predictive accuracy. I therefore argue that
a probabilistic measure, namely the relative attractiveness of the most focal
threshold allocation compared to zero contributions, is the main determinant
4I will address this issue in more detail in Chapter 4.
5For example, Sugden (1995) argues that empirical evidence against his normatively mo-
tivated “collective rationality” criterion “may cast doubt on the general validity of collective
rationality as a component of a descriptive theory, but it need not undermine the normative
status of such a criterion” (ibid, p. 543).
6This corresponds to the concept of p-dominance (Morris et al., 1995) which Peski (2010)
uses to generalize risk dominance (or 12 -dominance). The “solution” to the problem of equi-
librium selection presented by Harsanyi (1995) also selects the equilibrium with the highest
theoretical probability of being played. Haruvy and Stahl (2007) furthermore discuss an
empirically motivated “selection probability.”
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in a class of ThrPGs that give no or only a partial refund of contributions if
the threshold is not reached. It is only indirectly, via this relation, that the
step return and other game parameters affect average success rates.
2.1.2 Previous work on predicting success rates in
ThrPGs
Admittedly, there have been a number of other attempts in the past to
theoretically predict contribution behavior in ThrPGs, but they all have their
limitations, if they make accurate predictions at all. A first attempt has been
made by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), who calculate the equilibria for binary
ThrPGs with and without a refund of contributions if the threshold is missed.
In binary ThrPGs, each player has only two pure strategies – contribute his
entire endowment or not contribute at all – which means that there is no
symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium that exactly reaches the threshold (unless
the threshold is equal to the total endowment of all players). Offerman et al.
(1998) calculate the quantal response equilibria (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995),
for this type of ThrPG, whereby they assume that the players make random
mistakes in the calculation of expected payoffs and consequently do not always
play their best response to other strategies. Goeree and Holt (2005) use a
similar approach and are even able to perform a comparative statics analysis
for success rates dependent on the number of players and the step return.
Yet despite the minimal strategy set, both models can provide only implicit
characterizations of the success rate, which could be taken to mean that an
explicit model for (binary) ThrPGs simply does not exist.
Recently, Alberti et al. (Unpublished) and Cartwright and Stepanova (Un-
published) have applied impulse balance theory to ThrPGs, theorizing that
the players learn from outcomes in previous rounds and experience a certain
drive (impulse) to adapt their contributions afterwards. Just like the quantal
response model, theirs yields only an implicit characterization of success rates,
albeit with a more general applicability to larger individual strategy sets.
What all of these models have in common, though, is that they ignore the
possibility of convergence to a pure-strategy equilibrium, i.e., of the idea that
the players learn to coordinate their behavior and then attain a stable out-
come in which everyone always makes the same contribution. Goeree and Holt
(2005) instead calculate the probability that the threshold is reached under the
assumption that the group plays the efficient symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium. In this (theoretically) stable outcome, the threshold is nevertheless
not reached with certainty, because each individual contributes his endowment
with a specific probability and makes this choice independently of the other
players. On some occasions, the group will accordingly contain too few con-
tributors to reach the threshold. Goeree and Holt (2005) simply calculate
the probability that enough players contribute given that their mixed-strategy
equilibrium is played and use this value as a predictor of success rates. Yet
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this approach is of little help if the players coordinate on a pure-strategy equi-
librium, because in this case all players can contribute a fixed share of the
threshold. No variation in individual contributions accordingly would mean
a success rate of 100%, which however is typically not the case. Similarly,
the corrections that impulse balance theory and quantal response equilibrium
make to mixed-strategy equilibria (see in particular Selten and Chmura, 2008)
can improve predictions for such a concept of success rates in binary ThrPGs.
Yet this reasoning cannot easily be transferred to the continuous game.
Apart from this problem, these studies have nevertheless also generated a
few valuable insights concerning equilibrium convergence in ThrPGs. Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984), for instance, mention that “the inefficient pure strategy
equilibria of the [game with refund rule] are weak” (ibid., p. 180) and therefore
inferior.7 McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) even give conditions under which the
quantal response equilibrium concept “implies a unique selection from the set
of Nash equilibria”, but the binary ThrPG studied by Offerman et al. (1998)
(see also Offerman et al., 1996, 2001) is ill-suited to observe convergence to an
efficient outcome, because this means choosing either one of several asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibria or a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. In
addition to that, the authors use a strangers procedure (i.e., randomly changing
group compositions) in their accompanying experimental study, presumably to
control for effects of learning through repeated interaction, making it even more
difficult for the subjects to coordinate their behavior and thus converge to an
equilibrium.
On the other hand, papers discussing convergence in ThrPGs (or its lack
thereof) frequently point out that equilibrium convergence is difficult to achieve
even in repeated games with a fixed group composition (partners procedure).
For instance, Cadsby and Maynes (1999) state that “14 periods did not ap-
pear to be sufficient in many cases for convergence to an equilibrium. [...] we
increase the number of periods to 25.” In contrast, other studies observe con-
vergence to zero contributions after only seven rounds (Guillen et al., 2006)
or ten rounds (Isaac et al., 1989). My own experimental research (see in par-
ticular the repeated-game (RG) treatments discussed in Chapter 6) provides
another example for such a quick coordination process. In the literature, the
convergence of total contributions to the threshold level is discussed on the ba-
sis of experimental data in several studies by Croson and Marks (1998, 1999),
as well as by Cadsby and Maynes (1999).
In addition, there are also at least two different theoretical approaches that
employ concepts of evolutionary game theory to model equilibrium conver-
gence in ThrPGs, both of which rely on a deterministic selection. The first,
by Myatt and Wallace (2008), is again restricted to binary ThrPGs and draws
on the above mentioned literature on quantal response equilibrium. The sec-
ond approach, initially brought fourth by Wang, Fu, Wu, and Wang (2009),
assumes a replicator dynamic in which only two strategies compete with each
7See also Bagnoli and Lipman (1989, 1992).
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other: a “cooperator” strategy that contributes an equal share of threshold and
a “defector” strategy that contributes nothing. By developing such a conver-
gence model, much can also be learned about success rates in ThrPGs, because
the one is contingent on the other: In order to converge to zero contributions,
a group must necessarily fail to reach the threshold.
A probabilistic model of equilibrium selection, like the one that I present
here, is even better suited to predict success rates, because one probability
(that of converging to zero contributions) can be related to another (that of
reaching the threshold). In other words, the lower the probability of conver-
gence to zero contributions, the higher the success rate. This is the general
principle behind the model of a “Simplified ThrPG” as it is presented in this
chapter. Just like Wang, Fu, Wu, and Wang (2009), only two contribution
strategies are matched against each other in the model, even though a large
set of (continuous) contribution strategies is assumed. Yet apart from that,
the model is probabilistic, assigning to each pure strategy equilibrium a pos-
itive (although possibly negligible) probability of being played. The resulting
“Simplified ThrPG” also provides a more general description of contribution
behavior, e.g., because it accounts for player heterogeneity.
Whereas the first half of the chapter is concerned with deriving this theo-
retical model and its implications, the second half contrasts these theoretical
findings with empirical observations in a guided tour through the experimental
literature on ThrPGs.
2.2 Risk dominance and the probability of play-
ing a particular equilibrium
Before discussing equilibrium convergence – which of necessity requires a dy-
namic perspective according to which a game is played repeatedly by members
of the same population of players, or even by the same (fixed) group of people
– it is helpful to start with equilibrium selection in a one-shot interaction. In
this situation, the best even a rational player can do is determine a probability
with which a particular equilibrium is played from the game’s payoff structure
(which is assumed to be common knowledge).
The theoretical work on equilibrium selection, like Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), rarely goes beyond discussing 2ˆ 2 normal-form games, clearly because
a generalized analysis of more complicated games is, well, too complicated to
be worthwhile. Having two players with two strategies each is sufficient to
create the fundamental part of this problem. Assuming Ai ą Bi ą Ci for
each player i “ 1, 2, the game shown in Figure 2.1 has two Nash equilibria in
pure strategies: (X, X), which is payoff dominant because it yields the highest
payoff Ai to each player i, and (Y, Y), which gives a lower payoff of Bi. How-
ever, this lower payoff is guaranteed to every player who chooses Y, no matter
what the other player does. This “safe” option becomes particularly attractive
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if 2Bi ą Ai ` Ci for all i, i.e., if (Y, Y) is risk dominant, which also means
that there is a conflict between these two dominance criteria in this case. The
game also has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, which figures prominently
in the subsequent theoretical analysis.
Player 1
Player 2
X Y
X A1, A2 C1, B2
Y B1, C2 B1, B2
Figure 2.1: A 2 ˆ 2 normal-form game with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria
(Ai ą Bi ą Ci for each player i “ 1, 2).
Whereas Harsanyi and Selten (1988) still make a normatively motivated
claim that the payoff-dominant equilibrium (X, X) should be selected even
if (Y, Y) is risk-dominant,8 Harsanyi (1995) places more importance on risk
dominance as selection criterion.9 He “propose[s] a mathematical model for
measuring the strength of the incentive that each player has to use any par-
ticular strategy, and then for employing these incentive measures to estimate
the theoretical probability that any given equilibrium will emerge as the actual
outcome of the game.“ (Harsanyi, 1995, p. 92, italics in original). With respect
to the model that Harsanyi subsequently develops, the incentive for a player i
to choose strategy X in the above defined coordination game depends on the
size of this strategy’s stability set, which refers to the set of mixed strategies
of the other player j against which this pure strategy is a best response for
player i. More precisely, the incentive of choosing X is the larger, the larger its
stability set, because X is then the best response in a larger number of possible
game situations.
A stability set is demarcated by points at which the player is indifferent be-
tween choosing this pure strategy and a different one. In the case of strategy
X and player i, this is a mixed strategy for player j which makes i indiffer-
ent between X and Y and is accordingly determined by i’s possible payoffs,
Ai, Bi, and Ci, from playing either of these strategies. But that a player is
made indifferent between all of his pure strategies by his opponent’s equilib-
rium mixed-strategy is also the condition for a mixed-strategy equilibrium. So
we can determine the incentive that i has to choose X by determining the
equilibrium mixed strategy of the other player j as this gives a measure of the
size of X’s stability set for player i.
Following the reasoning of Harsanyi (1995), the probability that (X, X),
i.e., the payoff-dominant equilibrium, results, then depends on the relative dis-
8This is mentioned only very briefly in the final chapter of their book (Harsanyi and
Selten, 1988, Section 10.11).
9Interestingly, this switch seems to be theoretically motivated (cf. Harsanyi, 1995, Sec-
tion 1.5) and not caused by the at that point steadily increasing empirical evidence that
experimental subjects select risk-dominant over payoff-dominant equilibria (e.g., van Huyck
et al., 1990).
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tance between this equilibrium and the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Figure 2.2
illustrates this reasoning for the game described above. Subfigure 2.2 a) shows
the strategy space of this game, whereby (X, X) and (Y, Y) refer to the two
pure-strategy equilibria and M denotes the mixed-strategy equilibrium. In
symmetric games the mixed-strategy equilibrium M is located on the straight
line from (X, X) to (Y, Y), but this need not be the case in a game with asym-
metric payoffs. The interior of the rectangle demarcated by the four points (X,
X), A1, M, and A2 contains all points of the strategy space, i.e., mixed-strategy
profiles, at which the mixed strategy played by one player is in the stability
set of strategy X for the respectively other player. Similarly, the interior of
the rectangle demarcated by the four points (Y, Y), B1, M, and B2 contains
all points of the strategy space, at which the mixed strategy played by one
player is in the stability set of strategy Y for the respectively other player. At
any point in either of the two sets, a player would prefer switching to a pure
strategy. Moreover, given that at any point in either of these two sets both
players would consider a switch to the same pure strategy, they should expect
to end up at the respective pure-strategy equilibrium. For this reason, I will
associate these two sets of points directly with the respective equilibrium in
the following, and speak of, e.g., “equilibrium (X, X)’s stability set” instead of
“the stability sets of players 1 and 2 with respect to pure strategy X.”
A closer look at Figure 2.2 shows that relative size of (X, X)’s and (Y, Y)’s
stability sets, shown dotted in Subfigure 2.2 a), can be approximated by the
relative position of M in the one-dimensional representation of the stability
sets shown in Subfigure 2.2 b), which is just the shortest distance from (X, X)
to (Y, Y) via M. On this one-dimensional representation, the mixed-strategy
equilibrium cleanly separates the stability set of equilibrium (X, X) from that
of equilibrium (Y, Y). At any point closer to (X, X) on the line, a player will
be better off switching to the pure strategy X. Similarly, at any point closer
to (Y, Y), a player will prefer switching to strategy Y.
Let σi denote the probability with which player i plays X in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium. The probability p that the associated pure-strategy equi-
librium X := (X, X) is played, is then equal to the distance between X and
M relative to the total distance between X and M as well as M and Y :=
(Y, Y):
p “ |ĘXM ||ĘXM | ` |ĚMY | “
ap1´ σ1q2 ` p1´ σ2q2ap1´ σ1q2 ` p1´ σ2q2 `aσ21 ` σ22 (2.1)
In a symmetric game with A “ A1 “ A2, B “ B1 “ B2, and C “ C1 “ C2,
the mixed-strategy probabilities in equilibrium play are the same for both
players. Accordingly, by letting σ “ σ1 “ σ2, Eq. (2.1) can be simplified to
p “ 1´ σ “ A´B
A´ C . (2.2)
If (X, X) is risk dominant in this symmetric game, it must be true that
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(X, X) 
M 
σ1 
1 – σ1 
1 – σ2 
M 
a) 
b) 
σ2 
(X, Y) 
(Y, X) (Y, Y) 
(X, X) (Y, Y) 
A1 B1 
A2 
B2 
Figure 2.2: Strategy space (a) and one-dimensional representation of stability
sets (b) of a 2 ˆ 2 normal-form game with two pure-strategy equilibria (X, X)
and (Y, Y) and a single mixed-strategy equilibrium M. The probability that
equilibrium (X, X) is played, is equal to the relative distance between (X, X)
and M.
2B ă A ` C. Eq. (2.2) then implies that p ą 0.5. Consequently, and as
Harsanyi (1995) suggests as well, the equilibrium with the highest theoretical
probability of being played is the risk-dominant outcome. Furthermore, the
model can be used to calculate, for example, how increasing any of the param-
eters, A,B or C, affects the players’ incentive to choose X and therefore the
probability that (X, X) results. In contrast, if payoff dominance were the more
important selection criterion, the absolute value of the parameters should not
matter at all, only that A is greater than both B and C.
Note, from Eq. (2.2), that p is equal to the weight placed on strategy Y (i.e.,
the other strategy) in this game’s unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
While this may appear a bit confusing at a first glance, it is actually correct
and consistent with Harsanyi’s “proportionality requirement” for unanimity
games10 (cf. Harsanyi, 1995, p. 106f., Lemmas I and II): The more weight
player i puts on strategy Y in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the greater is
this equilibrium’s geometrical distance from (X, X), the larger is X’s stability
10For more on unanimity games see Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 213ff).
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set, the higher is the incentive for a player to choose X over Y.11
The model readily extends to any “2 ˆ . . . ˆ 2” game with n P N players
that also has two Pareto-ranked pure-strategy equilibria, X and Y, in which
either all players choose X or all choose Y, respectively, and the fixed payoffs
Bi and Ci if not all players choose X are independent of the number of players
who do choose X. Kim (1996, Lemma 1) shows that such a game also has
a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium M.12 Furthermore, this game’s stability
sets can once again be represented in a single dimension, with M separating
the stability sets of the two pure-strategy equilibria on a line from X to Y. In
analogy to the above reasoning, the theoretical probability p that all players
choose X is therefore:
p “
ařn
i“1 p1´ σiq2ařn
i“1 p1´ σiq2 `
ařn
i“1 σ
2
i
(2.3)
At the mixed equilibrium M, player i is indifferent between the pure strate-
gies X and Y, but if any other player were to change his own mixed strategy
only slightly, either X or Y would immediately become a best response. Conse-
quently, assuming that all other players choose their strategies independently,
so that, e.g., player j plays X with probability σj, player i faces the following
decision problem:
pX : śjPN ztiu σj, Y : 1´śjPN ztiu σjq
X pśjPN ztiu σjqAi ` p1´śjPN ztiu σjqCi
Y Bi
The break-even point, for which X and Y yield the same expected payoff to
player i and which characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibrium, is given by
the following set of equations:
@i P N :
ź
jPN ztiu
σj “ Bi ´ Ci
Ai ´ Ci (2.4)
Solving this set of equations for an explicit expression for the mixed strategy
σi yields the following result:
11Harsanyi (1995) shows (Lemma I) that using the size of the stability set directly as a
proxy does not necessarily work if there are more than two available strategies, making this
round-about approach necessary.
12Technically, the game described here does not belong to the set of games Π to which
the lemma applies, since piHk “ piHk´1,@k ă n. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) show a similar
result (Proposition 10) for a binary ThrPG.
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Lemma 2.1. In the n-player two-strategy normal-form game defined above,
the equilibrium mixed strategy for player i is given by:
σi “ Ai ´ Ci
Bi ´ Ci
n´1
gffe nź
j“1
Bj ´ Cj
Aj ´ Cj (2.5)
Proof: For any two players i and j, divide the respective equations in
Eq. (2.4) by each other to receive a new equation containing only σi and σj.
Repeating the process for the same i, but in combination with other players,
yields n ´ 1 such two-variable equations. Substituting these equations back
into Eq. (2.4), namely into the equation generated from for player i’s choice
between X and Y, and solving for σi yields the above expression.
For the homogeneous case with n players we can use Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5)
to derive a theoretical probability p that all players choose X of
p “ 1´ σ “ 1´ n´1
c
B ´ C
A´ C . (2.6)
Consequently, p decreases in larger groups, approaching zero if n approaches
infinity, which conforms to the intuition that coordination is more difficult
with more players. In the geometric interpretation of the model, increasing
the number of players moves M closer to X, implying that, for any particular
player, Y’s stability set becomes increasingly larger relative to X, so that this
player has an increasingly lower incentive to choose X over Y.
This generalization to n players also yields a more general definition of risk
dominance based on the size the pure strategies’ stability sets:13 Even for more
than two players we can say that equilibrium X risk dominates equilibrium Y
if p ą 0.5, that is, if X has the larger stability set. For the game discussed
here, this is the case if
@i P N : Ai ` p2n´1 ´ 1qCi ą 2n´1Bi. (2.7)
2.3 The Simplified ThrPG
While this approach seems to work well for games with only two pure strategies,
this may still seem a long way away from a descriptive model for success rates
in ThrPGs with continuous contributions. However, I will argue that a model
based on a 2 ˆ 2 normal-form game is already rich enough to provide a basic
understanding of what goes on in even a complicated game like a ThrPG.
13This corresponds to one of the characterizations of n-player risk dominance given by Kim
(1996) which refers to the relative size of the pure-strategy equilibria’s basins of attraction.
Mailath (1998) (p. 1370) furthermore provides arguments to the effect that the basin of
attraction of Y increases with n. See also Section 2.5.
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Given that the general idea behind a ThrPG is very simple, it will be helpful
to look separately at the two main components of this game:
1. Does the group reach the threshold or not?
2. Among the large number of possible threshold allocations, which one (if
any) does the group choose?
You may notice that the first question is binary: the group either does or
does not reach the threshold. Assuming that“not reaching the threshold” is the
same as an overall and individual contribution of zero (so as not to waste any
contributions), this translates into the two strategies of Z (for “zero”), which is
to contribute zero (qi “ 0), and Qαi (to indicate a positive total contribution
“quantity”), which has a particular player i contribute his “fair” (or otherwise
assigned) share of the threshold, denoted by αi, so that qi “ αiT . If all
players contribute their assigned share, the threshold value is reached exactly.
However, different groups (or the same group at different points of time) may
give different answers to these two questions. Most importantly, we can only
expect that the threshold is reached with probability, and not with certainty,
especially if one or more groups are observed repeatedly.
Note that this reasoning transforms the predominantly normative and de-
terministic message from the preceding section, to wit,
Normative statement A utility-maximizing player should contribute zero
(and do nothing else) if this is his risk-dominant strategy.
to the following descriptive and probabilistic statements:
Descriptive Statement (individual) The probability that an individual
player contributes zero is positively correlated with the relative size of
Z’s stability set.
Descriptive Statement (group) The success rate, i.e., the observed fre-
quency with which the threshold is reached, is negatively correlated with
the relative size of the stability sets of the zero-contributions equilibrium.
There remains the problem that there are actually many threshold equilib-
ria, all of whose positions relative to zero contributions must be determined
in order to accurately predict success rates. However, if all players agree on
what a “fair share” is, we can restrict our analysis to a comparison of only this
threshold allocation with the zero-contributions equilibrium. To be true, this is
usually not the case in an experimental session where the group members have
just come together for the first time for an unfamiliar task. But theoretical
concepts like focal points (Schelling, 1980) or collective rationality (Sugden,
1995) as well as data from previous experimental studies can be used to single
out the threshold allocation(s) that will be the most attractive to experimental
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subjects. Chapter 4 will discuss in more detail how selection criteria based on
fairness principles can be used for this very purpose. For the moment, I simply
assume that any feasible threshold allocation, i.e., any efficient pure-strategy
equilibrium of the original ThrPG, is a possible candidate for a “fair” outcome.
This generalizes the approach by Wang, Fu, Wu, and Wang (2009) who only
consider an equal allocation of the threshold value in their symmetric game.14
Based on the general model of a ThrPG presented in Chapter 1, Section 1.1,
we can then specify a “Simplified ThrPG”15 for this particular threshold allo-
cation α “ pα1, . . . , αi, . . . , αnq, where 0 ă αi ă 1 is the relative share of the
threshold value provided by player i, resulting in a contribution of qi “ αiT .16
Obviously,
řn
i“1 αi “ 1. The payoff matrix of an individual player i playing
this Simplified ThrPG against the “rest of the group”, whose choices are repre-
sented by the total contribution Q´i :“ řjPN ztiu qj, is displayed in Figure 2.3.
Player i
Rest of the Group
Q´i “ T ´ αiT Q´i ă T ´ αiT
Qαipqi “ αiT q ei ´ ciαiT ` vi ei ´ p1´ rqciαiT
Z pqi “ 0q ei ei
Figure 2.3: A simplified threshold public goods game with two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. The matrix displays the payoffs for a typical player i given a
total contribution Q´i provided by the rest of the group.
Similar to the two-player game shown in Figure 2.1, each player i has a
safe strategy (Z), the payoff for which falls between the two possible outcomes
for player i’s other, risky, strategy Qαi : If ciαiT ă vi for all i P N and
r ă 1, Z yields a guaranteed payoff of ei to player i, whereas Qαi yields either
strictly more than ei if the rest of the group chooses the complement share
14Alternatively, a pairwise comparison of all threshold allocations with the zero-
contributions equilibrium, similar to the procedure described by Harsanyi and Selten (1988),
could be used to determine parameter settings under which zero contributions either risk-
dominates or is risk-dominated by all threshold allocations.
15This simplified game is not the same as the “reduced game” discussed by Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) and Harsanyi (1995) which eliminates only clearly non-essential game
components like dominated or duplicate strategies or players. However, there is a similarity
to the “simplified collective risk-dilemma” considered by Hilbe et al. (2013), who analyze a
game variant in which simultaneous individual contributions occur repeatedly over several
rounds and are accumulated towards a single threshold value at the end.
16Since no individual player can reach the threshold value on his own, αi “ 1 is ruled out
for any player i. Assigning to any particular player i a share of αi “ 0 is tantamount to
removing this player from the game and thus equivalent to reducing the number of players
by one to only those with strictly positive shares.
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Q´i “ T ´ αiT , which is only possible if every other player j plays his own
risky strategy Qαj , or strictly less than ei if even a single other player chooses
Z.17 The first qualifying assumption implies that the benefit from providing the
public good, vi, is strictly greater than the costs a player incurs by contributing
his share, ciαiT , which merely means that participation in this game must be
individually rational. In addition, if r “ 1, that is if a full refund is granted,
any player i always earns at least ei, even if he contributes and the others do
not, making this a riskless choice between Qαi and Z and thus a case to which
the model does not apply. For this reason, it is also assumed that r ă 1.
Accordingly, the here derived theoretical probability with which the thresh-
old in a public goods game is reached, i.e., its predicted success rate, likewise
depends on the stability sets of two pure strategies. The predicted (or theo-
retical) success rate then corresponds to the probability with which the pure-
strategy equilibrium associated with Qαi is played. For reasons of simplicity, I
will call the equilibria associated with these two pure strategies Z and Qα.
As before, we only need to determine the mixed-strategy equilibrium, Mα,
in order to calculate the theoretical probability pα that the associated pure-
strategy equilibrium Qα is played, which due to the impossibility of overcon-
tribution in this simplified game also equals the theoretical success rate. Let
σipαq denote the probability with which player i plays Qαi in the mixed equi-
librium Mα given a particular allocation α. The theoretical success rate pα is
then equal to the distance between Qα and Mα relative to the total distance
between Qα and Mα as well as Mα and Z:
pα “
ařn
i“1 p1´ σipαqq2ařn
i“1 p1´ σipαqq2 `
ařn
i“1 σ
2
i pαq
(2.8)
By letting Ai “ ei ´ ciαiT ` vi, Bi “ ei, and Ci “ ei ´ p1´ rqciαiT , we can
use Lemma 2.1 to derive the following:
Corollary 2.1. In a simplified ThrPG, the equilibrium mixed strategy for
player i is given by:
σipαq “ n´1
d
1´ rśn
j“1 r vjcjαjT ´ rs
„
vi
ciαiT
´ r

(2.9)
Although, strictly speaking, the model is not defined for the case of a full
refund, that is if r “ 1, taking the limit of Eq. (2.9) for r approaching 1
gives σipαq “ 0 and a success rate of pα “ 1. This means that Qα is the
only equilibrium predicted to occur by this theoretical approach in this special
17Here it becomes most apparent what is behind this simplification process, and what is
potentially lost in comparison to a more general analysis: In the original game, the threshold
can often still be reached if some players “free-ride” and contribute zero, namely if the other
players are able to increase their contributions to make up for the difference.
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case, because Mα moves closer and closer to Z as r approaches 1, being located
at the same point as Z in the limit. This is consistent with the fact that Z
is just a “weak” Nash equilibrium in this case and therefore presumably less
attractive than the strict equilibrium Qα, no matter how the game parameters
are chosen. Obviously, this establishes a limitation of this model to the class of
ThrPGs with no or only a partial refund. In Appendix 2.A.1, I will introduce
a possible work-around that involves a disutility from receiving a refund, e.g.,
in the form of a transaction cost that slightly reduces the refunded amount.
2.4 Success rates for homogeneous games
If the players are homogeneous, so that e “ ei “ ej, v “ vi “ vj, and c “ ci “ cj
for all players i and j, it is once again possible to simplify Eq. (2.8) further in
order to better identify the effects of the particular game elements on success
rates. Symmetry can then be used as a justification to also assume αi “ αj “
1{n as a (unique) focal allocation. Similar to the example in Section 2.2, the
mixed-strategy probabilities will consequently be the same for all players as
well, i.e., σ “ σi “ σj. Furthermore, the theoretical success rate is then given
by
p1{n “ 1´ σ “ 1´ n´1
d
1´ r
nv
cT
´ r . (2.10)
Realizing that nv{cT is the step return SR (Croson and Marks, 2000), the
theoretical success rate for a ThrPG with homogeneous players appears to
depend only on the step return, the number of players, and the refund rate:
p1{n “ 1´ n´1
c
1´ r
SR ´ r (2.11)
Alternatively, we can define ρ :“ T{ne as the proportion of total endowments
required to provide the public good,18 so that the success rate can also be
stated as
p1{n “ 1´ n´1
d
1´ r
ne¨v
T ¨ec ´ r
“ 1´ n´1
d
1´ r
1
ρ
¨ v
ce
´ r . (2.12)
The probability given in Eq. (2.11) also results by translating the “unanim-
ity rule” variant in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) into the notation used in this
thesis.19
18Since e ă T ď ne, we have 1{n ă ρ ď 1. In a linear public goods game, with T “ 0, ρ
would be equal to 0.
19Their model assumes that the valuation v is normalized to 1. If q “ σ, M “ n and
c “ 1{SR and no refund is granted (r “ 0), Eq. (2.11) is the same as the equation q “ c1{pM´1q
in Proposition 10 (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984, p. 185).
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2.5 Equilibrium convergence
In the introduction to this chapter, I have criticized previous theoretical ap-
proaches for ignoring the possibility of equilibrium convergence. At a first
glance, the model presented above is similarly flawed, because Harsanyi (1995)
only discusses one-shot (normal-form) games. However, there has been exten-
sive theoretical work in the literature on evolutionary game theory about the
relation between risk dominance according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and
stochastically stable strategies (e.g., Kandori et al., 1993; Kim, 1996; Samuel-
son, 1997; Peski, 2010).
This makes it possible to apply the Simplified ThrPG to a dynamic context.
More precisely, assume that the simplified (two-strategy) game describes the
stage game of the repeated interaction of a population or group of players. For
any selection dynamics modeling the behavior in the repeated game that has
stable stationary states at the stage game’s two pure-strategy Nash equilibria,
as well as an unstable stationary state in between, the relative position of these
three stationary states in the stage game’s strategy space yields a prediction
for the probability with which either of the stable states is attained. Kim
(1996) discusses several different selection dynamics – based on the dynamic
equilibrium selection concepts of Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), Kandori et al.
(1993), and Foster and Young (1990) – all of which generate different conditions
for when the payoff-dominant equilibrium can be expected to be played in
groups with more than two players. Similarly, all of these models could be used
to derive competing models of theoretical success rates in ThrPGs, whereby
the Kandori et al. (1993) dynamics yields the same prediction as the Simplified
ThrPG.20
The selection dynamics assumed by Kandori et al. (1993) models a learning
process in which the players react myopically, but not necessarily immediately
(the process has “inertia”), and on occasion even change their strategy at ran-
dom (cf. ibid., p. 30f.). This third property is referred to by the authors
as “mutation” or “experimentation.” The learning process occurs in a finite
population of size N , from which two21 players are selected at random in each
period t to play the stage game. If zt P t1, . . . , Nu players play strategy Q1{2
in period t, then the expected payoff for one of these players in a randomly
determined match with one other player from the population is
ErpiQ1{2pztqs “
zt ´ 1
N ´ 1pe´
T
2
` vq ` N ´ zt
N ´ 1 pe´
T
2
q, (2.13)
20To see that this is true for homogeneous game with no refund, use the condition [KMR]
given by Kim (1996, p. 215) to calculate SR ą 2pn´1q as a condition for selecting Q1{n over
Z. The same condition results from Eq. (2.11), by postulating p1{n ą 1{2 and then solving
for SR.
21Kim (1996) generalizes the model to n-player games, assuming in doing so that N is
divisible by n.
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compared to the expected payoff for a player playing strategy Z of
ErpiZpztqs “ e. (2.14)
Kandori et al. (1993) then define a Markov process which yields zt`1, i.e.,
the number of players who play Q1{2 in period t` 1, as follows:22
zt`1 “ bpztq ` xt ´ yt (2.15)
Here, bpztq is a best-response dynamics with three possible outcomes: 1)
if ErpiQ1{2pztqs ą ErpiZpztqs, all N members of the population switch to Q1{2
as this yields the higher expected payoff, 2) if ErpiQ1{2pztqs ă ErpiZpztqs, all
N members of the population switch to Z as this yields the higher expected
payoff, 3) if ErpiQ1{2pztqs “ ErpiZpztqs, the composition of the population re-
mains unchanged (zt`1 “ zt). However, the learning process is also randomly
perturbed by the two stochastic components xt and yt, both of which are bi-
nominally distributed:
xt „ BinpN ´ bpztq, q and yt „ Binpbpztq, q (2.16)
Accordingly, whenever the best-response dynamics requires a shift of the
entire population to strategy Z, each individual player instead shifts to (or
remains at) Q1{2 with probability , so that the overall number of players who
play Q1{2 (i.e., not Z) is still positive with some probability and takes on the
realization of the random variable xt, i.e., zt`1 “ xt. On the other hand,
whenever the best-response dynamics shifts the entire population to strategy
Q1{2, each individual player instead shifts to (or remains at) Z with probability
, so that the overall number of players who play Q1{2 is given by yt, i.e.,
zt`1 “ yt.
Kandori et al. (1993) also apply this stochastic dynamics directly to 2 ˆ 2
coordination games, where they state (ibid., p. 43f.) that the basins of at-
traction of the dynamics’ two stable states zt “ N and zt “ 0 are separated
at a critical value z˚, which for a ThrPG calculates as z˚ “ pN ´ 1qT{2V ` 1.
Furthermore, “z˚ corresponds to the mixed strategy equilibrium, which puts
probability [σ “ T{2v] on strategy [Q1{2],” (ibid., p. 44), just as the Simplified
ThrPG does.
Both Kandori et al. (1993) and Kim (1996) also repeatedly draw a con-
nection between the relative size of the pure-strategy equilibria’s basins of
attraction and the outcome of the selection process, which however is always
deterministic in the sense that the equilibrium with the larger basin of at-
traction is always selected with certainty. Note that the relevant theoretical
result – Theorem 3 in Kandori et al. (1993) – pertains even to small popu-
lations, including the case of N “ 2 where essentially the same group of two
22Apart from the application to a ThrPG, all of these results, including the notation, are
taking from (Kandori et al., 1993, p. 37ff.). See also (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, p. 142ff.).
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players meets in every period. A generalization of this result to games with n
players with asymmetric (but finite) strategy sets is derived by (Peski, 2010,
Section 3.3).23
These findings are reason enough to at least consider the relative location of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the stage game as a predictor of success rates
in repeated ThrPGs with fixed group compositions. All this final step seems
to require is that the players in the group hold a belief about the number of
contributors zt`1 in period t` 1 that does not completely reflect the observed
number of contributors zt in period t. And this is certainly the case, if some
players “experiment”, as Kandori et al. (1993) put it, and on occasion do not
select their best response. Peski (2010) even takes it as a given that the players
have “conjectures” about their fellow players’ strategy profiles, which assign a
probability of being played to every possible strategy.
How does the existing literature on evolutionary processes in threshold pub-
lic goods games fit into this? There are in fact a considerable number of
studies24 which are primarily concerned with the evolution of cooperation and
therefore look for parameter constellations and critical values for which Q1{n is
evolutionarily stable, though not necessarily the unique stable state.25
In the model by Wang, Fu, Wu, and Wang (2009), who investigate a ThrPG
in which damages from not reaching the threshold are calculated as a percent-
age of the remaining endowment (e ´ T{n), T{ne “: ρ constitutes a critical
point for this percentage, at which the “evolutionary dynamics transits from
the dominance of defectors [. . . ] to the bistability between defectors and fair
sharers . . . ” (ibid., p. 4). In other words, if the percentage of lost remaining
endowments is less than this value, zero contributions is the only evolutionarily
stable state, whereas both zero contributions and a successful allocation of the
threshold can result as stable states otherwise (cf. ibid, Table 1). Wang, Zhu,
Ren, and Wang (2009) show for the same game by means of replicator dynam-
ics that the main parameters (including n and T ) affect the size of the basin of
attraction of the “cooperative” strategy, but again relate these findings only to
the possible “emergence of cooperation” and not the probability with which an
efficient stable state is attained. Dragicevic and Engle-Warnick (Unpublished)
go as far as investigating “ambiguous survival” (cases in which both strategies,
Z and Q1{n, exist in the population), but stop at calculating the unstable state
of their replicator dynamics. Hilbe et al. (2013), who apply the (determin-
23An earlier result – Proposition 2 in Kim (1996) – only holds for sufficiently large popu-
lations.
24These include, but probably are not limited to Wang, Fu, Wu, and Wang (2009); Wang,
Zhu, Ren, and Wang (2009); Boza and Sza´mado´ (2010); Wang, Fu, and Wang (2010);
Abou Chakra and Traulsen (2012); Du, Wu, and Wang (2012); Archetti and Scheuring
(2013); Hilbe, Abou Chakra, Altrock, and Traulsen (2013); Va´sa´rhelyi and Scheuring (2013);
Vasconcelos, Santos, and Pacheco (2013); Pacheco, Vasconcelos, and Santos (2014); Sasaki
and Uchida (2014); Archetti, Ferraro, and Christofori (2015); Zhang, Zhang, and Cao (2015);
Dragicevic and Engle-Warnick (Unpublished).
25Similarly, the models by Offerman et al. (1998) and Alberti et al. (Unpublished) have
multiple theoretical solutions towards which gameplay can converge.
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istic) replicator dynamics to their more complicate sequential game (see also
Abou Chakra and Traulsen, 2012), even realize that which of their game’s evo-
lutionarily stable equilibria is selected “depends on the initial behavior of the
individuals: populations with a sufficient initial number of fair-sharers eventu-
ally succeed in coordinating on the beneficial fair-share equilibrium, whereas
populations mostly consisting of defectors [who contribute zero] end up in the
detrimental equilibrium.” (Hilbe et al., 2013, p. 2), but are only able to gain
rough estimates for the size of the basins of attraction by means of computer
simulations. The other studies are less closely related to the Simplified ThrPG
and in part deviate even more from the conception of a ThrPG that I assume
here.
I should also briefly mention the concept of a strategy’s “fixation proba-
bility” (e.g. Antal et al., 2009), which is the probability with which a single
representative of a strategy (a mutant) can take over a finite population of play-
ers. Theoretical biologists commonly employ this concept in situations with
“weak selection” (e.g. Nowak, 2006, Chapter 7), meaning that the stochastic
component of the evolutionary process, and not the selection component, is the
main determinant of the dynamics’ course. However, this is more applicable
to large populations, from which players are randomly drawn each period to
play the game that determines selection. If instead the same small group of
players interacts several times, selection should be strong and thus more likely
to immediately eliminate individual “mutants”. Still, connecting the theoreti-
cal success rate to the fixation probability of zero contributions in a suitable
learning process could yield interesting new insights for ThrPGs.
Apart from these various approaches to model the evolution of cooperation,
there exists also a more economically motivated study by Myatt and Wallace
(2008), who analyze a binary ThrPG with randomly distributed contribution
costs (cf. Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991a) and show that their Markov process
selects an efficient allocation of the threshold if and only if the most efficient
players can afford to reach the threshold, i.e., if their valuation of the public
good is higher than their contribution costs.
Returning to the static approach to equilibrium selection I have pursued in
the preceding sections, it appears that the stability sets of a pure strategy are
closely related to the respective equilibrium’s basin of attraction, meaning that
a measure of their size will also be a predictor of equilibrium convergence.26
In other words, if there is a high probability that equilibrium Q1{n is played in
initial rounds of the experiment, game-play will likely also converge to Q1{n in
the long run. Convergence to a threshold equilibrium may or may not increase
success rates, though, depending on the remaining volatility of total contribu-
tions. Even groups that are very efficient in terms of total contributions may
26In Figure 2.2, for example, the basin of attraction of equilibrium (X, X) corresponds to
the interior of the quadrangle demarcated by the four points (X, X), (X, Y), M, and (Y,
X), i.e., all mixed-strategy profiles, at which either player can increase his own payoff by
switching to the pure strategy X.
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have only low success rates, because the total contribution can just as likely be
marginally above or below the threshold. Similarly, some groups may converge
more quickly than others and therefore make fewer coordination errors, which
then also affects empirical success rates. The model presented here cannot
capture this kind of convergence behavior (and the associated effect on success
rates), because this behavior appears to be concerned with the coordination
process on how exactly the threshold should be allocated among the group
members. Convergence to zero contributions, on the other hand, is a clear
indicator for a collective unwillingness to take the risk involved in providing
the public good, and it will obviously lead to significantly lower success rates
than if game-play converges to the threshold.
In the original ThrPG, assuming that a suitable selection dynamics can be
defined to deal with a continuous strategy space, the basins of attraction of
the threshold equilibria should actually be infinitesimally small – even though
these equilibria are strict27 – because the set of threshold allocations is convex
and the next closest equilibrium is reached in just two infinitesimally small
steps.28 On the other hand, Z’s basin of attraction still has a strictly positive
volume (unless r “ 1), which again varies with the location of the symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium, suggesting this basin’s relative size as a suitable
measure for the predicted success rate, that is, the smaller the basin, the higher
the success rate.
2.6 Comparative statics
Is the theoretical success rate consistent with the results reported in the ex-
perimental literature? A first benchmark in this regard is the meta-study by
Croson and Marks (2000). Table 2.1 translates their main empirical findings29
into the notation used in this model, whereby ` and ´ denote, respectively, a
positive or negative effect on success rates and ˚ denotes statistical significance
(p ă 0.05).
Except for SR, n, and ρ, the independent variables in this meta-analysis are
dummies, indicating whether or not a particular treatment has this property.
“Binary” refers to treatments that allow only binary contributions. “Refund”
applies only to treatments with a full refund (r “ 1). “Rebate” refers to
a return on contributions beyond the required threshold value. Obviously,
“Homogeneous” indicates groups with homogeneous players. In the Croson and
Marks (2000) meta-study, “Communication” applies to any treatment in which
the groups have a face-to-face discussion about the individual contributions,
which at that point in time had only been done in two treatments from the
27Under the replicator dynamics strictness usually implies asymptotic stability (cf. Samuel-
son, 1997, Proposition 2.11 on p. 75).
28The first subtracts a negligible amount δ ą 0 from the contributions of player i, the
second adds the same amount δ to the contribution of any other player j.
29See Croson and Marks (2000, Table 2).
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Table 2.1: Empirical findings by Croson and Marks (2000).
SR n ρ Binary
Success rate `˚ ´˚ ´ ´˚
Refund (r) Rebate Homogeneous Communication
Success rate `˚ ` ` `˚
˚ denotes statistical significance (p ă 0.05)
study by van de Kragt et al. (1983), however.
As most of the literature is concerned with homogeneous groups (as well
as marginal costs of c “ 1), I shall restrict the comparative statics analysis to
this special case. In Eq. (2.11), the step return SR is in the denominator of a
negative term and therefore positively correlated with the success rate. Letting
the refund rate r approach 1 makes the fraction it is contained in converge to
0, so that the success rate converges to 1. In other words, the success rate
increases with r and the selection of a threshold allocation is guaranteed in the
case of a full refund.30
The effect of the number of players n is more difficult to determine, because
this is also a component of the step return. SR increases in n, because more
players receive the same valuation v at the same cost T . However, this upward
impulse on success rates is more than compensated in larger groups by the
increasing risk of coordination failure. Mathematically, the increasing power
of the root term means that the success rate ceteris paribus decreases in larger
groups, approaching 0 as n approaches infinity.
In order to determine the effect of the proportion of the threshold value to
total endowments ρ, we need to refer to Eq. (2.12) for p1{n. Realizing that ρ
is inversely proportional to the step return, but otherwise placed in a similar
position as SR is in Eq. (2.11), we should expect lower success rates if this
parameter is increased. In binary ThrPGs, equal contributions can only be
reached in mixed strategies, so that the Simplified ThrPG cannot be directly
applied to this case. However, the negative effect on success rates suggested
by the Croson and Marks (2000) meta-analysis could certainly be caused by a
higher variability of outcomes, associated with subjects attempting to alternate
their contributions in order to reach the threshold efficiently.
The results are accordingly quite consistent with the meta-study by Croson
and Marks (2000), as shown in Table 2.1. Only the effect of ρ is not statistically
significant, although it has the predicted sign. As Croson and Marks (2000)
30In Appendix 2.A.1, I will use a variation of the model to address the nevertheless reported
variability of observed success rates in experimental investigations, which can also be traced
back to variations of the number of players as well as the valuation from reaching the
threshold.
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include a large number of treatments in their sample that grant a full refund
(r “ 1), to which the model presented in this study does not apply, it is still
possible, though, that a significant effect of ρ on success rates appears in a
sub-sample of treatments with partial or no refund.
The other dummy variables included in the Croson and Marks (2000) analy-
sis are not fully accounted for in the simplified ThrPG. Simplifying the ThrPG
abstracts from any effects of a rebate rule on success rates, even if the Nash
equilibrium is unaffected, because overcontribution cannot occur. Homoge-
neous groups may have an advantage over heterogeneous groups playing a
simplified ThrPG as well, given that the only focal allocation in a symmetric
game is equal contributions, which is likely to have a comparatively high suc-
cess rate, because it spreads the contribution costs equally among all players.
Interestingly, though, the most frequent type of heterogeneity investigated in
the literature, heterogeneous endowments, leads to the same theoretical success
rate in the simplified ThrPG as the homogeneous case, provided that the play-
ers also coordinate on equal contributions, because the players’ endowments
prove irrelevant in the analysis. As experimental subjects often do not coordi-
nate on this allocation (see also the literature reviewed in Chapter 4, Section
4.2), the frequently observed lower success rates in heterogeneous groups are
in part compatible with the theoretical model, however.
2.7 Literature review
Given that Croson and Marks (2000) also include studies with a full refund
of contributions in their meta-study, it seems prudent to in addition consult
individual studies that specifically examine ceteris paribus variations for the
parameters and design elements that may affect success rates. This is the focus
of the following literature review, which examines the presumed explanatory
variables discussed in the previous section on a case-by-case basis. Table 2.2
summarizes the main findings from this literature review. Note that, for the
sake of completeness, the literature review also contains studies that grant a
full refund (r “ 1) even though the Simplified-ThrPG model does not apply
to this case. Some studies only find a tentative effect, which is indicated by
brackets. See the respective section for more details.
2.7.1 Step return and more general variations of payoff
stakes
The effect of varying payoff stakes has been analyzed by a large number of
studies. The step return, as a measure that normalizes the game parameters
in a way that allows for comparison of payoff stakes between different studies,
figures prominently in the meta-study by Croson and Marks (2000), who report
increasing success rates for higher step returns, albeit for only a small sample of
three treatments with four groups each. A concept similar to the step return,
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Table 2.2: Variables shown to affect success rates in a controlled variation. A
bracketed positive or negative effect, e.g., “p`q,” indicates an only tentative
effect (see text for more details).
Variable Refund rate r Observed effect Study
Step return
SR
0 ` Dawes et al. (1986)
0, 1 ` Isaac et al. (1989)
0 ` Offerman et al. (1996)
0 ` Cadsby and Maynes (1998a)
0, 1 ` Cadsby and Maynes (1999)
1 ` Croson and Marks (2000)
1 ` Cadsby et al. (2008)
0.5 ´ Czap et al. (2010)
Number of
players n
1 p´q Bagnoli and McKee (1991)
0 p`q Offerman et al. (1996)
0 ´ Feltovich and Grossman
(2015)
Proportion
threshold /
total
endowment ρ
0, 1 ´ Dawes et al. (1986)
0, 1 ´ Isaac et al. (1989)
0, 0.5, 1 ´ Rauchdobler et al. (2010)
1 U-shape Alberti and Cartwright (2015)
0 ´ Cartwright and Stepanova
(2015)
Refund rate r
0, 0.5, 1 ` Isaac et al. (1989)
0, 1 ` Rapoport and Eshed-Levy
(1989)
0, 1 p`q Cadsby and Maynes (1999)
0, 1 ` Coats et al. (2009)
0, 0.5, 1 ` Rauchdobler et al. (2010)
0, 1 p`q Cartwright and Stepanova
(2015)
Rebate rule (y/n) 1 o Marks and Croson (1998)
Homogeneous
players (y/n)
1 o Bagnoli and McKee (1991)
0 ` Suleiman and Rapoport
(1992); Rapoport and
Suleiman (1993)
1 o Croson and Marks (1999,
2001)
0 ` Bernard et al. (Unpublished)
1 p`q Alberti and Cartwright (2016)
Communication
(y/n)
0 ` van de Kragt et al. (1983)
0 o Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991a)
1 p`q Alberti and Cartwright (2016)
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the net reward (v´ T{n), is defined by Cadsby and Maynes (1999) for the same
purpose, but appears to have less predictive power than the step return, at
least on average over all rounds (Cadsby et al., 2008). Both Croson and Marks
(2000) and Cadsby et al. (2008) grant a full refund of contributions.
In an earlier study, Cadsby and Maynes (1998a) find a steady increase of
average success rates for increasing valuations in four different treatments with
no refund. Cadsby and Maynes (1999) offer mostly anecdotal evidence, because
the study investigates a total of thirty different parameter settings, each with
at most three groups. Nevertheless, the results once again support the idea
that higher payoff stakes (here in the form of higher valuations) increase the
likelihood of successful coordination. Moreover, Offerman et al. (1996) report
the same effect for binary contributions and a strangers matching.
Czap et al. (2010) combine an increase of the valuation with an increase
of the threshold value, for a net increase of the step return, in a game with
a partial refund rate (r “ 0.5). Interestingly, although the combined effect of
raised valuations leads to an increase of contributions as expected, the success
rates do not follow suit, but are actually higher in the treatment with lower
stakes. This result shows that the model does not yet cover all factors that are
relevant to success rates. It appears that the effect that changing the threshold
value has on the difficulty of coordinating on a focal threshold allocation may
be stronger than the effect of changing the payoff stakes, at least in this range
of parameters.
Other studies in which the variation of the payoff stakes is not central to
the research question are Dawes et al. (1986) and Isaac et al. (1989).
2.7.2 Number of players
That the coordination on a payoff-dominant, but risky outcome will become
more difficult, if more players are involved, seems to be a reasonable expecta-
tion, which has also been observed for other types of coordination games (e.g.,
van Huyck et al., 1991). Feltovich and Grossman (2015) have recently con-
ducted a systematic investigation of group-size effects in one-shot ThrPGs with
no refund that corroborates one of the predictions of the Simplified-ThrPG
model, namely that success rates are lower in larger groups if the step return
is held constant. As the authors achieve this in their binary contributions
game by setting the threshold equal to the players’ total endowment, their ex-
perimental design exactly matches the specifications of this theoretical model:
Each player has only two pure strategies, namely to contribute nothing or to
contribute an equal share of the threshold value. With group sizes ranging
from two to fifteen players, this has likely exhausted the spectrum that can be
investigated in a controlled laboratory environment.
However, Feltovich and Grossman (2015) cover by no means all aspects of
how the number of players affects success rates. This is because Offerman
et al. (1996), who do not keep the step return constant, report increasing
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success rates in larger groups in a binary game with a strangers procedure
and group sizes of either five or seven players. Yet the same authors state in a
later paper (Schram et al., 2008) that this is because the threshold remains the
same, making it easier for the larger groups to reach it. Ceteris paribus, larger
groups in fact have lower success rates in their setting, again corroborating the
Simplified-ThrPG model.
There is also still no systematic investigation of group-size effects in ThrPGs
with a full refund, apart from the two-vs.-two-group comparison in a setting
with full refund conducted by Bagnoli and McKee (1991). This study has two
groups of five and ten players, respectively, all of which manage to reach the
threshold efficiently by the final round, although average success rates up to
that point are slightly lower in the larger groups.
Considering that ThrPGs in real life can involve groups of several hundred
contributors (and conceivably even more inactive “players”), experimental re-
search still has a lot of room in the dimension of group size, as well. In addition
to the above-mentioned laboratory experiments, there also exist a few studies
to that effect, with very large groups outside of the controlled laboratory en-
vironment. For example, Rose et al. (2002) describe a class-room experiment
with one hundred student participants playing a one-shot binary ThrPG with
heterogeneous valuations, a full refund, and a utilization rebate (see Section
2.7.6 below). The valuations of sixty of the players are actually below or equal
to the contribution costs, meaning that these individuals should prefer not to
contribute. Accordingly, the threshold value of forty participants is set very
high, because this is exactly the number of players that benefit from providing
the public good. With an observed number of forty-seven contributors, the
experiment shows that successful public good provision is also possible in large
groups of simultaneous contributors. In an earlier study, Rondeau et al. (1999)
use a similar design with groups of forty-five players, but uncertain informa-
tion about the number of players or the threshold value, making it difficult to
compare the results to more “typical” ThrPGs.
Rose et al. (2002) also discuss a field experiment with a potentially much
larger group of players (1.2 million) asked to give a donation to a public project,
but are only able to contact roughly two hundred of these subjects directly in
a telephone survey (see also Poe et al., 2002). In addition to the difficulty of
keeping track of all of the participants’ decisions, field experiments involving
ThrPGs also cannot easily guarantee that contributions are chosen simulta-
neously. Most crowdfunding campaigns are in fact more similar to sequential
ThrPGs and therefore do not involve a coordination problem (see also Chap-
ter 1, Section 1.1.3).
Finally, Kerr (1989) examines how a player’s perceived “self-efficacy” (refer-
ring to the pivotalness in the provision of the public good) varies with group
size, providing arguments in favor of the hypothesis that contributions decrease
in larger groups as each individual player becomes less pivotal to reaching the
threshold. Although the study’s experimental investigation is difficult to com-
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pare to the other experiments discussed here (e.g., opponent choices in large
groups are determined at random; only one (randomly selected) subject of each
group receives a payoff from the game), it nevertheless provides an interest-
ing overview over psychological factors that could affect contribution behavior,
thus complementing the mainly strategic arguments given in this thesis.
2.7.3 Proportion of threshold value to total endowments
The proportion of the threshold value to the sum of all endowments is easily
calculated, and its effect on success rates is apparent in a large number of
studies. However, it is rarely the main focus of a single study, usually being
overshadowed by a variation of the threshold in order to affect payoff stakes
(i.e., the step return). The reason for this may be that the effect of this de-
sign element on success rates is difficult to analyze theoretically for ThrPGs in
general. Although the model presented in this chapter predicts a decrease of
success rates if a larger proportion of maximum contributions must be invested
to reach the threshold, this applies only to games that do not offer a full refund.
Furthermore, once the proportion approaches the permissible bounds, individ-
ual players become more pivotal in reaching the threshold, either because they
have to contribute at least part of their endowment so that the threshold can
be reached (ρ close to 1) or because they can reach the threshold on their own
or in cooperation with only a few number of players (ρ close to 1{n).31
Cartwright and Stepanova (2015) vary the players’ endowments in several
treatments with no refund, which leads to significant changes in success rates
that are not predicted by the model presented in this chapter. This again
indicates that the relative size of endowments compared to the threshold value
may affect the process of equilibrium convergence and, indirectly, the empirical
success rates. However, this effect is less clear for the remaining treatments
of this study, which all grant a full refund. Here the authors in fact establish
a U-shape relation for ρ, which fits with the notion of pivotalness described
above.
Dawes et al. (1986), employing a one-shot game with binary contributions,
report lower success rates for higher threshold values, for both a full and no
refund. Isaac et al. (1989) also observe lower success rates for higher threshold
values in the case of no refund, but slightly higher success rates with the
same parameter variation, if a money-back guarantee is given. The statistical
significance of these results is questionable, however, again due to the small
number of independent observations (six groups per treatment). A similar
pattern is also observed by Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) and Rapoport and
Suleiman (1993) (the latter involving heterogeneous endowments).
Rauchdobler et al. (2010) vary the threshold value exogenously and en-
dogenously (by means of a vote). By having their subjects make contribution
31The effect of pivotalness on contributions is also examined by McBride (2010), but in
the context of threshold uncertainty (see Section 2.7.9, as well as Chapter 6).
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choices for every possible threshold value, the authors are able to conduct a
within-group comparison. Again, average success rates display a significant
decrease for higher thresholds (from 75% to 17%) if there is no refund, but the
effect becomes less pronounced with an increasing refund rate: Groups with a
partial refund only drop from 73% to 27%; groups with full refund still have a
success rate of 55% for the highest threshold.
The extreme case of ρ “ 0 corresponds to a linear public goods game, which
does not have a threshold (or provision point). As reaching the threshold is
automatic in this case, speaking of success rates makes no sense. The respective
studies therefore focus on a comparison of total contributions. Marwell and
Ames (1979, 1980), describing one of the earliest ThrPG experiments, find
that including a provision point in their payoff table does not significantly
affect average contributions, probably because this “threshold” is not explicitly
advertised to the subjects and there is still a gradual payoff increase even for
contributions below this contribution level. In contrast, Isaac et al. (1989) find
higher contributions in their analysis for at least some of their provision-point
treatments. Not unexpectedly, this includes the treatments that grant a full
refund (money-back guarantee), but even without a refund, those groups that
converge on a threshold equilibrium contribute consistently more than groups
in the linear public goods game. Krishnamurthy (2001) reports similar findings
for “voluntary contribution mechanisms” targeted at different provision points.
2.7.4 Binary contributions and mixed-strategy focal al-
locations
To my knowledge, a systematic comparison of binary ThrPGs with games with
continuous or discrete contributions has not yet been attempted in an exper-
imental study, although Cadsby and Maynes (1999) provide some evidence
for the hypothesis that a restriction of the strategy set to binary contribu-
tions leads to lower success rates than discrete or continuous contributions
in the game parameter setting. A potential problem with their experimental
approach is in particular that the relevant sample of 28 groups ranges over
several treatment dimensions, including the refund rate, the valuation, and
the number of rounds. What appears as an overall significant difference in the
regression results reported in Tables 2 and 3 of this paper, is not always as
clear in a ceteris paribus comparison. For example, at a valuation of 20 and
a threshold of 50, the single group with continuous contributions that played
for 14 rounds is equally successful as the only comparison group with binary
contributions (namely in 3 of the 14 rounds). And the latter group is even suc-
cessful one more time in the last five rounds (to whose results the regression is
applied) and contributes marginally more on average in these rounds as well.
Asch et al. (1993) compare a binary ThrPG to a linear public goods game
with continuous contributions, finding no significant difference in average con-
tributions. However, the authors report a higher frequency of “free rides” (i.e.,
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instances of zero contribution) in the ThrPG, which is less surprising than the
study suggests, because after all the only feasible pure-strategy equilibria in
binary ThrPGs prescribe that a share of n´ T players does indeed contribute
zero.
Guillen et al. (2006) provide an example for a ThrPG with discrete con-
tributions, in which allocating the threshold value equally among all players
(the supposed focal point for homogeneous ThrPGs) is not feasible in pure
strategies. In their case, a group of five players must reach a threshold of
T “ 31, but each player can only contribute integer amounts, so that an equal
share of 6.2 for each player is not feasible. The authors indeed observe con-
vergence to zero contribution, and correspondingly low success rates, in their
“baseline” treatment. However, in the absence of a counterpart treatment with
a pure-strategy focal point, this result alone cannot corroborate the conjecture
that focal points in mixed-strategies are more difficult to obtain and therefore
involve reduced success rates.
2.7.5 Refund rate
The most critical parameter in the light of the previous theoretical analysis
seems to be the refund rule. Games with a full refund should be expected to
result in a completely different coordination behavior than those with no or
only a partial refund, because the zero-contribution equilibrium is evolution-
arily stable only in the latter two cases. The experimental literature is roughly
split in half into studies that grant a full refund and those that do not. But
also a controlled variation of the refund rate has been repeatedly investigated.
In a one-shot binary ThrPG, Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989) equate the
conditions of “no refund” and “full refund” with paradigms called “fear plus
greed” and “no fear”,32 appellations that perfectly characterize these two con-
ditions in the context of this chapter, which is concerned with the fear (or risk)
of wasting one’s contribution. In this study, the treatments with a refund rate
result in higher average success rates.
Isaac et al. (1989) make comparisons at different threshold values for a full,
a partial (r “ 0.5), and no refund. Although groups enjoying a full refund
of contribution costs display significantly higher average success rates than
those with no or only a partial refund, a partial refund does not appear to
result in higher success rates than no refund. However, the sample is very
small with respect to this last comparison, because the study includes only
two groups with a partial refund. Employing a repeated game with fixed
group compositions, Isaac et al. (1989) are able to observe convergence to zero
contributions under both a partial and no refund, but not in all groups. In
32The study also investigates a third, “no greed”, condition in which, if the threshold is
reached, everybody loses their remaining endowment, so that nobody has an incentive to
“hold back.” See also van de Kragt et al. (1983) and recently Cartwright and Stepanova
(Unpublished).
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contrast, a full refund never leads to zero convergence in this study, which
also supports the Simplified-ThrPG model. Similar results are also observed
by Cadsby and Maynes (1999) and, more recently, Rauchdobler et al. (2010).
Cartwright and Stepanova (2015) find that the effects of a refund rule on
success rates may actually interact with the difficulty of reaching the threshold.
More specifically, if the threshold is very easy to reach, as in their study if
endowments are relatively high, success rates are as high (or possibly even
higher) in groups with no refund as in those with full refund.
Coats et al. (2009) employ a strangers procedure, but are nevertheless able
to replicate the refund effect as well: Average success rates are significantly
lower, if no refund is granted. Interestingly, the authors also investigate a game
with sequential contributions, again with and without refund, but do not find
a difference here. This underlines the conjecture that the refund rate is of
special importance in the ThrPG, precisely because it makes contributing less
risky only if all players must act simultaneously. In the sequential game, there
is no risk of coordination failure, because the last player(s) know exactly what
the others have already contributed.
2.7.6 Rebate rule for excess contributions
Marks and Croson (1998) is currently the only study that directly compares
different rebate rules and it does so only for the case of a full refund. The
study discusses two variants of rebates in contrast with the classical“no rebate”
scenario: a proportional rebate, in which the excess contribution is returned
to the contributors in proportion to their contribution, and a “utilization”
rebate, in which the excess contribution is multiplied by a positive constant
w ă 1 and then redistributed equally among all players, independently of
their contribution.
None of these rules makes overcontribution individually optimal in the orig-
inal ThrPG, because the return on each additional contribution unit is always
less than the contribution costs for this extra unit. The two rebate rules differ
with respect to the socially optimal outcome, however, as well as with respect
to the possibility of welfare redistribution, although this is not discussed by
Marks and Croson (1998), because their experiment assumes homogeneous
players.
A proportional rebate neither increases nor decreases the group’s total pay-
off, which makes it superior to the welfare loss suffered through overcontribu-
tion if no rebate is granted. Moreover, only players with positive contributions
receive a rebate, which furthermore preserves the relative share of the contri-
bution burden. Accordingly, this rule can reduce the repercussions of over-
contribution and may increase success rates as a consequence. In any event,
the attractiveness of a focal threshold allocation is reduced by this rebate rule,
which constitutes a counter-effect to the expected increase in success rates due
to a reduced fear of overcontribution.
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Excess contributions under a utilization rebate work similarly to a linear
public goods game, meaning that the socially optimal outcome has all players
contribute their entire endowment. Apart from this possible welfare increase,
utilization also entails a (likely unwelcome) redistribution in the form of a
subsidization of players that contribute less than average or even nothing at
all. Overall, the attractiveness of a focal threshold allocation will be even
less than under a proportional rebate, although average total contributions
(and thus success rates) could turn out the highest under this rule, given the
experimental support for positive contributions in linear public goods games
(Ledyard, 1995).
In their experiment, Marks and Croson (1998) find no consistent effect on
success rates, a proportional rebate rule actually leading to lower average suc-
cess rates than no rebate, maybe due to the reduced incentive for norm com-
pliance. As expected, a utilization rebate results in significantly higher total
contributions and success rates. However, the variance of total contributions
is larger if the subjects can expect a return on contributions in excess of the
threshold value. This result conforms to the idea (also supported by impulse
balance theory, cf. in particular Alberti et al., Unpublished) that the rebate
rule may affect the speed with which equilibrium convergence is attained.
Isaac et al. (1989), Rose et al. (2002), Rauchdobler et al. (2010), and Corazz-
ini et al. (2015) also employ a utilization rebate.
2.7.7 Heterogeneity
Player heterogeneity in ThrPGs usually takes the form of heterogeneous en-
dowments, but can also refer to valuations and (marginal) contribution costs.
A direct comparison of heterogeneous and homogeneous treatments takes place
in the studies by Bagnoli and McKee (1991), Croson and Marks (1999, 2001),
and more recently Alberti and Cartwright (2016) and Bernard et al. (Unpub-
lished).
Even though Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) are concerned only with het-
erogeneous groups (with differing endowments), they relate their results to an
earlier study with a similar design but homogeneous players (Suleiman and
Rapoport, 1992). In all three treatment conditions (low, medium, and high
threshold values), they observe lower average success rates in heterogeneous
groups, although this difference is statistically significant only for the high
threshold value.
Croson and Marks (1999) (see also Croson and Marks, 2001) report slightly
higher average success rates in their homogeneous treatment (55.2% compared
to 48%), but this difference is not statistically significant. Yet the variance
of contributions is significantly higher in their treatment with heterogeneous
endowments. Bagnoli and McKee (1991) also cannot establish an advantage
of homogeneous groups in their small sample of groups with heterogeneous
endowments or valuations. All of these treatments grant a full refund of con-
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tributions, however.
In contrast, Bernard et al. (Unpublished) do not give a money-back guaran-
tee in their comparison of treatments with heterogeneous endowments and val-
uations, respectively, to the homogeneous baseline. Both heterogeneity treat-
ments, with average success rates of 55% for heterogeneous endowments and
53% for heterogeneous valuations, exhibit a significant drop in success rates
compared to the homogeneous treatment (78%).
Alberti and Cartwright (2016) conduct a within-group comparison in a
game with full refund by increasing the degree of endowment heterogeneity
in three stages from completely homogeneous groups via a medium degree of
heterogeneity to very asymmetric groups. The authors report varied effects of
heterogeneity on average success rates: While the groups with very different
endowments have the lowest average success rates, the highest average rates
are actually attained in groups with only a medium degree of heterogeneity.
The aspects of distributive fairness and focal allocations, which also figure
prominently in experiments with player heterogeneity, are discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4. Additional relevant studies here are Rapoport (1988), van
Dijk and Grodzka (1992), and van Dijk et al. (1999).
2.7.8 Communication and feedback
Communication in ThrPGs usually takes the form of pre-play signaling, for ex-
ample via proposed contribution targets (e.g., Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012,
2014). While communication is strictly controlled (computerized) in most con-
temporary studies, van de Kragt et al. (1983) allow a face-to-face discussion
about contributions. All of these methods have in common that the commu-
nication is “cheap-talk”, i.e., it has no direct influence on this game’s payoffs.
Nevertheless, pre-play signaling can be very effective in a coordination game
like the ThrPG, if it helps establish focal allocations and thus select particular
equilibria. Accordingly, communication can be expected to increase success
rates if players are undecided between several threshold allocations or between
zero contributions and a particular threshold allocation.
In the van de Kragt et al. (1983) study, a discussion before the contribu-
tion choice basically guarantees that the public good is provided successfully,
although in some cases there are more contributors than necessary in this bi-
nary ThrPG. Without discussion, average success rates range from 61% to
73%, depending on the threshold value.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991a) ask their subjects to send messages indicat-
ing their intent to contribute. In this binary ThrPG, messages of this form
conceivable facilitate the coordination on asymmetric threshold equilibria, in
which some players contribute and some do not. Although the authors do
not report success rates for their treatments, they do state that overall “effi-
ciency” is similar with and without communication, even though the players
apparently condition their contributions on the received signals.
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Croson and Marks (2001) give their subjects non-binding recommendations
on how to contribute. Although this “signal” is not provided by the players,
but the experimenters, the principle is the same: Suggesting a particular al-
location in advance should speed up the convergence process. In the Croson
and Marks (2001) study, this only marginally improves average success rates
in homogeneous groups, but significantly increases success rates in groups with
heterogeneous endowments.
Feltovich and Grossman (2015) find that the effectiveness of pre-play com-
munication or signaling decreases in larger groups, a result which leads them to
question the validity of experiments with small groups of communicating play-
ers in comparison to real-life communities, which have a much larger number
of members.
In a repeated game with fixed groups, contribution choices in early rounds
can also signal likely contribution behavior in later rounds. For this reason,
the amount of feedback given to the subjects after each round has a similar
impact on success rates as the opportunity for pre-play signaling.
Croson and Marks (1998) report for a game with a full refund that giving
the subjects information on individual contributions that cannot be associated
with particular players yields lower success rates than giving identifiable in-
formation or even only aggregate information. However, the low number of
independent observations in this study (only five groups per treatment) means
that these results provide an insufficient basis for claiming a general informa-
tion effect on success rates. In a similar study with multiple thresholds and no
refund, Hashim et al. (Unpublished) find that providing information only in
select cases, such as only to players contributing less than the group average,
increases average contributions compared to providing feedback randomly or
not at all.
Alberti and Cartwright (2016) are concerned with both signaling and feed-
back during the course of their experiment. The study compares two“standard”
treatments with and without feedback on individual contributions33 with two
treatments in which the players submit contribution vectors. In the first of
these treatments, only a player’s own individual contribution is relevant for
the calculation of payoffs – the values concerning the other players’ contri-
butions are “cheap talk.” The second, “full agreement,” treatment requires
that all players submit identical contribution vectors in order to successfully
contribute. In two variants to these two treatments, the players’ labels are
scrambled so that the suggested contributions cannot be addressed directly at
particular players. Although average success rates increase in this study in
groups given feedback, signaling provides less of an advantage and even seems
to be counterproductive in groups with heterogeneous endowments. Not un-
expectedly, the full agreement treatment results in the lowest average success
rates overall, even though it proves relatively successful after the players have
spent a few rounds coordinating their behavior. Scrambled labels have mixed
33The players are always told at least their group’s total contribution after every round.
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effects on success rates, but appear to be most helpful in the third part of
the experiments, either because endowments are very asymmetric or because
the groups have enough experience at this point to coordinate their behavior.
All of these treatments grant a full refund if the threshold is missed (or if no
agreement is reached).
Although the Simplified ThrPG does not explicitly account for the possibil-
ity of communication or the degree of feedback, these design elements appear
to affect the subject’s learning rate and consequently the speed of equilibrium
convergence. More communication and feedback makes coordination easier.
This also implies that increasing the time horizon should further facilitate
coordination if feedback is provided, which is why equilibrium play can be
expected in repeated games, but not in one-shot games. However, given the
possibility of coordination on zero contributions, an increased frequency of
equilibrium play does not necessarily lead to higher success rates.
The ultimate form of communication in a ThrPG is a collective decision
(usually by means of a vote). As this fundamentally changes the nature of
this game, the respective experimental literature will not be discussed here.
However, since voting on contributions to ThrPGs is a central feature of my
own experimental research, this discussion will simply be postponed to the
following chapters.
2.7.9 Other effects on success rates
A number of design elements that are not analyzed by Croson and Marks
(2000) have been shown experimentally to affect success rates as well:
Guillen et al. (2006) study a punishment mechanism according to which any
individual contribution below a specified value is sanctioned with a deduction
from this person’s payoff. The mechanism is either removed automatically
or by majority agreement after a few rounds. The threat of punishment is
sufficient to increase success rates in both situations compared to the con-
trol treatment. Interestingly, all groups that are given a choice, vote in favor
of abandoning the punishment mechanism, but then rapidly decrease their
contributions and ultimately converge to the zero contributions equilibrium.
Andreoni and Gee (2015) take a converse approach and exogeneously imple-
ment the punishment mechanism after the subjects have already played the
game without punishment for a number of rounds. The authors find a similarly
beneficial effect on success rates, even though they punish only the most severe
deviation from the specified contribution. However, a weaker form of punish-
ment targeting the lowest contributor only if the threshold is not reached does
not appear to significantly increase success rates.
Cadsby and Maynes (1998b) find that nurses have higher success rates in
a game with no refunds than economics and business students, because the
latter are more likely to converge to zero contributions in their study. The
observations by Cadsby and Maynes (1998a) suggest that women coordinate
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on an equilibrium more quickly than men, which as mentioned can also affect
success rates. Similarly, Cadsby et al. (2007) find that all-female Canadian
groups have the highest success rates in a comparison with all-male Canadian,
as well as either all-male or all-female Japanese groups. De Cremer and van
Vugt (1999) observe that selfish (“pro-self”) players contribute less frequently
than pro-social players,34 but only if these players have a low identification
with their group. Interestingly, selfish players who highly identify with their
group make average contributions near or even above what is necessary to
reach the threshold. All of these results show that differences in personality
(e.g., inclination towards pro-social behavior) and/or educational background
(e.g., mathematical knowledge) are also relevant to the outcomes of ThrPGs.
Normann and Rau (2015) vary the number of thresholds in a repeated two-
player game with strangers matching (there are either one or two thresholds),
but this change barely affects average success rates. A similar study, Hashim
et al. (Unpublished), also has multiple thresholds, but keeps these values con-
stant in all their treatments. Both studies do not grant a refund of contri-
butions if any of the thresholds are missed, although a combination of rebate
and refund would certainly be possible for total contributions between two
threshold values.
In the experiment by Corazzini et al. (2015) the subjects have a choice
between several public goods, each with a separate threshold value, but their
total endowment is sufficient to provide at most one of these public goods. The
players are homogeneous and the public goods differ only with respect to the
valuation (and this only in some treatments). No refund is granted, but there
is a rebate in case of overcontribution. Interestingly, the presence of multiple
public goods does not adversely affect the success rate (here of reaching at
least one of the thresholds).35 However, if the public goods are identical (and
therefore indistinguishable), success rates are significantly lower in the initial
rounds until the groups have coordinated on one particular public good.
Bchir and Willinger (2013) compare the typically studied case of a public
good, which benefits everyone in the group even non-contributing players, with
that of a “club good”, which benefits only those players whose contributions
exceed a specific “contribution fee”. The authors find that introducing such
an individual minimum contribution increases success rates significantly, unless
the threshold value is comparatively high, a result which is caused by a reduced
number of free-riders (who do not benefit from the club good).
Sonnemans et al. (1998) report a framing effect on success rates. In their
study, giving contributions to a common pool in order to earn a positive re-
ward leads to higher average success rates than taking contributions from a
similar pool with the risk of incurring a negative (damage) payment. However,
Kotani et al. (2014) replicate this study and find a higher propensity for co-
34Whether a player is pro-social or pro-self is determined by the authors by means of a
social value orientation measure conducted before the game is played.
35Compare Corazzini et al. (2015), Table E.5 in the online supplement.
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operative behavior under a negative framing. Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011),
who assume randomly determined endowments (their “contribution costs”) in
a binary ThrPG (see also Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991a), first theoretically
derive and then experimentally observe that the direction of the framing effect
depends on the the difficulty of reaching the threshold. Observed contributions
are higher under a “loss” framing for a high threshold value, but higher under a
“gain” framing for a low threshold value. See also Section 2.A.2, which extends
the Simplified ThrPG in a way that accounts for loss aversion.
Offerman et al. (2001) extend their earlier study involving a binary ThrPG
(Offerman et al., 1996) by conducting both strangers and partners treatments.
In a third treatment, the subjects face a randomly generated “group contri-
bution”, but do not directly interact with other players. Interestingly, con-
tribution behavior does not differ significantly among the three treatments.
Based on additional belief elicitation, the authors come to the conclusion that
the subjects do not employ sophisticated strategies, but rather decide myopi-
cally, consistent with Bayesian belief learning (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine,
1998). Accordingly, this study gives support to the idea that models based on
evolutionary dynamics, which also assume myopic “decision-making,” can ac-
curately predict experimental success rates.
Finally, the detrimental effect of being uncertain about the exact threshold
value on success rates is documented in several studies, including Suleiman
et al. (2001), McBride (2010), and Barrett and Dannenberg (2012, 2014). In-
complete information about other game parameters, like the valuation (Barrett
and Dannenberg, 2012) or the endowment of other players (Marks and Cro-
son, 1999) appears to have no clear effect on success rates. Additional studies
employ uncertainty or private information in all their treatments, including
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991a,b, 1994), Rondeau et al. (1999), and van Dijk
et al. (1999). Chapter 6 describes in more detail how threshold uncertainty
affects the equilibria of this game.
2.8 Conclusion
In summary, the main finding of this chapter is that success rates in ThrPGs
appear to be determined by three different major components:
1. the relative size of the basin of attraction of the zero contribution equi-
librium, or respectively this equilibrium’s stability sets
2. the selection process of a unique (focal) equilibrium from the set of
threshold equilibria
3. the convergence process (speed and volatility) towards coordination on
a specific equilibrium
The first of these components is analyzed in more detail, resulting in a model
that sets the most prominent parameters of the game in explicit relation to
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the success rate. As a secondary finding it follows that, in theory, granting a
full refund of contribution costs, if the threshold is not reached, removes the
possibility of convergence to zero contributions, suggesting that games with
this parameter setting should be treated as an altogether different type of
game and be investigated separately.
It should be pointed out that this mathematical model is nothing more
than an approximation, a factor that correlates with observed success rates,
but is not intended to provide a formula to directly calculate these rates (like a
physical model), let alone explain why some groups are successful, while others
are not. What it can do is give support for more general behavioral theories
which might predict that coordination is more difficult in larger groups or that
larger incentives increase the willingness to contribute, but do not exactly state
how these two factors will interact. As a consequence, this model may give rise
to additional experimental work, like examining the effect of the step return
in larger groups of, say, thirty or even forty players, or at least methodically
varying both the number of players and the step return in smaller groups.
Computer simulations, like those conducted by Wang, Fu, Wu, and Wang
(2009), can provide a test of the model under ideal circumstances, similar
to testing Galileo’s empirical model of falling bodies in a vacuum where air
resistance does not matter. Such a test could be used to measure the predictive
accuracy of the Simplified ThrPG in comparison to a model based on a more
precise measurement of the basins of attraction. If the simplification process
is shown to entail a too severe loss of predictive accuracy, however, this can
outweigh the gain from having a more easily applicable model.
Future work should also extend the model to cover the other two components
as well as other design variations. This extension is likely to create additional
“novel” predictions (cf. Lakatos, 1970) to be tested experimentally in order to
corroborate (or refute) the model. As this model assumes that a focal threshold
allocation can be reached by playing pure strategies, it complements the studies
by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), Offerman et al. (1998), and Goeree and Holt
(2005) who (at least implicitly) assume that the focal equilibrium can only be
attained by playing mixed strategies, a fact which makes it difficult for groups
to coordinate their behavior and reach the threshold.
2.A Extensions of the model
2.A.1 Full refund
This appendix discusses a possible extension of the Simplified ThrPG to include
a full refund of contributions of the threshold value is not reached, meaning
that r “ 1. In this case, Equation (2.9) yields a theoretical success rate of
pα “ 1 no matter how the other game parameters are chosen. This means that
Qα is the only equilibrium predicted to occur by this theoretical approach,
which is plausible, because Z is just a “weak” Nash equilibrium in this case
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and therefore presumably less attractive than the strict equilibrium Qα.
The difficulty of analyzing a ThrPG with a full refund with the Simplified-
ThrPG model arises from the tie with respect to payoffs that results among
the two candidate strategies (Z and Qαi) if the threshold is not reached. It
is this tie that makes Z a “weak” Nash equilibrium. However, resolving the
tie requires only a minute perturbation of payoffs which can tip the scale
to one of two possible sides. The first possibility is that contributing one’s
allocated share now becomes a strictly dominant strategy (as opposed to being
only weakly dominant), because the failure of reaching the threshold after
having contributed nevertheless comes with a minor positive utility (maybe the
satisfaction of having tried one’s best). The second possibility causes a slight
disutility from failing to reach the threshold, which could be attributed to
feelings of anger or frustration towards players who did not cooperate (cf. Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006, who expect reciprocal behavior to arise from this kind of
disutility). In this case, zero contributions becomes a strict Nash equilibrium,
even though a full refund of contribution costs is guaranteed. While the players
still do not fear a potential loss of their contributions, they may be averse to
becoming angry or frustrated, so that positive contributions entail a risk of
being disappointed. Contributing nothing, however, is a safe choice, because
in this case the expectations of other players are so low that they cannot
be disappointed. An alternative, and entirely unemotional, interpretation of
this disutility is that refunding the contribution incurs transaction costs which
reduce the payoff for this outcome.
Player i
Rest of the Group
Q´i “ T ´ Tn Q´i ă T ´ Tn
qi “ Tn e´ Tn ` v e´ δ
qi “ 0 e e
Figure 2.4: A simplified threshold public goods game with a full refund of
contributions, but small disutility δ ą 0 if contribution costs are refunded.
For the following analysis I assume that the players are homogeneous with
respect to all game parameters in order to reduce complexity. As shown in
Figure 2.4, the game with n players is again completely characterized by a
game matrix that displays only the payoffs of a single (prototypical) player
facing possible contributions of the rest of the group. Here δ ą 0 refers to a
small disutility that the players incur if their contribution costs are refunded.
This game’s theoretical success rate p1{npδq calculates as follows:
p 1
n
pδq “ 1´ n´1
d
δ
v ´ T
n
` δ “ 1´
n´1
c
δ
NR ` δ (2.17)
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The theoretical success rate decreases as the disutility from a refunded con-
tribution increases. Yet since δ is small, p1{npδq will be close to, but not equal
to, 1. Accordingly, the group is almost certain to be successful, but its actual
success now also varies in the valuation v and the number of players n. More
precisely, the success rate depends on the “net reward”NR :“ v ´ T{n, a con-
cept introduced by Cadsby and Maynes (1999) (see also Cadsby et al., 2008).
Just as in the case of r ă 1, the theoretical success rate is higher for a larger
valuation, but smaller in larger groups, meaning that this model’s predictions
are consistent with experimental observations (cf. the meta-study by Croson
and Marks, 2000, and the literature review in Section 2.7).36
There are also a number of ways in which such a disutility can be exoge-
nously imposed on the players:
• A contribution fee that is paid by anyone who contributes a positive
amount can be set off against the valuation if the threshold is reached
(so that the game above actually refers to the “net” valuation vˆ “ v´ δ),
but is perceived as a reduction of one’s endowment if the contribution
costs are refunded. This scenario applies mostly to“club goods”, of which
only a select group of players benefit, namely those who have paid the
fee.
• A lump-sum tax on contributions works in the same way as a contribution
fee, but such a tax will generally be collected for a more general reason
and is therefore more similar in function to (exogeneous) transaction
costs.
• A mandatory insurance against wasted contributions instead of a money-
back guarantee also results in the game described above.37
What all of these options have in common is that they turn Q1{n into a
risky strategy, which in turn results in Z becoming a strict equilibrium that is
a stable stationary state of a deterministic selection dynamic. Although the
possibility of convergence to this inefficient equilibrium is a potential downside
of these design elements, the large set of weak equilibria around zero contri-
butions is eliminated at the same time. As this equilibrium set can occupy a
36Although the observation that success rates depend on these parameters even if a full
refund is granted suggests that the players may have indeed incurred a disutility that the
experimenters did not account for, it is just as plausible to assume that both the valuation
and the number of players affect the success rates in ways that are not (yet) captured
by this very simple model. For example, both parameters should affect the time it takes
the group to coordinate on a threshold allocation – i.e., the group’s speed of equilibrium
convergence, which in turn should be positively correlated with the group’s success rate – in
just the same way: larger groups take longer to coordinate, whereas larger incentives speed
up coordination.
37The effects of a voluntary insurance on “altruistic provision in threshold public goods
games” have been investigated by Zhang et al. (2015), whose computer simulations indicate
that this option can increase contribution levels.
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considerable fraction of the strategy space – whose size can be shown to depend
on the number of players n as well as either the Step Return SR or the term
ne{T “ 1{ρ, called “Endowment Multiple” by Cartwright and Stepanova (2015)38
– its removal can increase the relative size of the basin of attraction of a focal
threshold allocation and therefore conceivably increase the theoretical success
rate as well.
2.A.2 Framing and loss aversion
This section extends the Simplified ThrPG model in several ways. The first
extension takes up the negative framing introduced in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.
In this framing the players avoid damages, if the threshold is reached, instead
of earning valuations. By drawing on the concept of loss aversion (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), it can be shown that the theoretical success rate is the
same, independently of the framing. As this analysis makes use of reference-
dependent equilibrium concepts, referring mostly to loss aversion equilibrium
(Shalev, 2000), but also to the more general approach by Ko¨szegi and Rabin
(2006), it also suggests that these concepts may be applicable in a dynamical
context of learning or cultural evolution, as well.
Recalling Section 1.1 in Chapter 1 and assuming for reasons of simplicity
that the players are homogeneous and have costs c “ 1 as well as that r “ 0
(no refund), the payoff of a particular player i in a ThrPG can be defined in
the following two ways (with d “ v and eˆ “ e` v):
piipqq “
"
e´ qi ` v if Q ě T
e´ qi if Q ă T (2.18)
piipqq “
"
eˆ´ qi if Q ě T
eˆ´ qi ´ d if Q ă T (2.19)
Now, following Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), assume that the players are sen-
sitive to gains and losses. This means that each player i compares his payoff pii
to a specific reference point R. If pii ą R, the player enjoys an additional gain
utility of ηppii ´Rq, where η ě 0 is the player’s sensitivity to gains and losses.
If pii ă R, the player instead suffers a disutility of ´ηλpR ´ piiq, where λ ě 1
is the player’s extent of loss aversion. The utility ui of a particular player i is
therefore given by:39
uippiiq “
"
pii ` ηppii ´Rq if pii ě R
pii ´ ηλpR ´ piiq if pii ă R (2.20)
38Cartwright and Stepanova (2015) also report a correlation between the Endowment
Multiple and the success rate in their experimental investigation of games with a full refund.
39I here assume that all players have the same utility function, represented by η and λ. A
generalization to individual differences in preferences should not change the results, however,
just make their presentation more complicated.
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As this utility function preserves the players’ ordinal preference ranking, the
set of pure-strategy equilibria of a ThrPG is unchanged. This allows us to sim-
plify the game as before – to only the two most focal pure-strategy equilibria,
namely zero contributions (Z; for all i: qi “ 0) and equal contributions (Q; for
all i: qi “ T{n) – and then determine the theoretical success rate. Figure 2.5
shows this game with both a positive (gain) and negative (loss) framing (Sub-
figures a) and b)). First note that the “safe” payoff generated by strategy Z
is the reference point of the simplified game, R “ e “ eˆ ´ d, because this is
equal to the payoff achieved in the game’s mixed-strategy equilibrium, which
is therefore a “myopic loss aversion equilibrium” (Shalev, 2000). Any positive
contribution, including qi “ T{n, is a risky strategy, because this only leads
to a higher payoff than e if the public good is provided, combined with the
joy about this success. Otherwise, the player suffers a relative loss, combined
with an additional disutility. The risk involved in a positive contribution is
the reason why reference-dependent preferences can be applied to this game in
the first place. However, we keep the argumentation simple by assuming that
all players are risk neutral.
a) Player i
Rest of the Group
Q´i “ T ´ Tn Q´i ă T ´ Tn
qi “ Tn e´ Tn ` v ` ηpv ´ Tn q e´ Tn ´ ηλTn
qi “ 0 e e
b) Player i
Rest of the Group
Q´i “ T ´ Tn Q´i ă T ´ Tn
qi “ Tn eˆ´ Tn ` ηpd´ Tn q eˆ´ d´ Tn ´ ηλTn
qi “ 0 eˆ´ d eˆ´ d
Figure 2.5: A simplified threshold public goods game with two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria if the players have reference-dependent utilities – a) positive
(gain) framing, b) negative (loss) framing.
Under either framing the following theoretical success rate results in the
n-player case:
p 1
n
“ 1´ σ “ 1´ n´1
d
1` ηλ
nv
T
p1` ηq ` ηpλ´ 1q . (2.21)
Since this establishes that a mere redefinition of the payoff functions should
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not affect the contribution behavior even of loss-averse players,40 it only re-
mains to investigate how players that are sensitive to gains and losses compare
to players without reference-dependent preferences (i.e., for which η “ 0).
Because the success rate depends on the players’ equilibrium mixed-strategies,
such an analysis can become quite complicated if a group contains players with
different utility functions. For this reason, I will only compare a group con-
sisting of entirely loss-averse players (all with the same η and λ) with a group
consisting of entirely loss-neutral players (all λ “ 1). The model then predicts
that groups are less successful the greater the extent of loss aversion λ, because
the larger λ, the greater the weight that these players place on strategy Q1{n
in the mixed-strategy equilibrium. As a consequence, this equilibrium is closer
to equilibrium Q than if λ “ 1, which in turn means that this equilibrium’s
basin of attraction is smaller if the players are loss averse. Interestingly, the
same comparison between gain-and-loss-sensitive groups η ą 0 and insensitive
groups η “ 0 yields a similar, but weaker effect. The higher η, the lower
also the success rate, but with a lower limit of 1´ n´1aλ{nv
T
`λ´1. Accordingly,
the extent of loss aversion λ is more important for the success rate than the
sensitive to gains and losses η.
40Although Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) manage to derive such a framing effect, their
result hinges on the assumption that the player’s contribution costs in their binary ThrPG
are randomly distributed and that the players furthermore have a bias with respect to how
they weight the probabilities of possible cost values – another component of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Another possible explanation of different behavior under
positive and negative framing is that the reference point is different in the each frame for
some reason, which in turn might also cause a difference in the theoretical success rate.
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Chapter 3
Interlude –
Voting on contributions to a
threshold public goods game
This chapter serves as an additional introduction for the three chapters that
follow, which are all to some extent concerned with voting on contributions to
ThrPGs. First will be the definition of the unanimous voting procedure that
is employed in all of these experimental studies and its theoretical solution for
a general parameter setting. Moreover, the literature that is relevant to all of
this experimental research is reviewed only once at the end of this chapter.1
3.1 Voting and coordination
As discussed in the previous chapter, ThrPGs essentially involve a coordination
problem of agreeing on any one feasible threshold allocation. A number of
experimental studies on ThrPGs, starting with van de Kragt et al. (1983)
suggest that a good way to resolve this coordination problem is communication
among the involved players. Communication will quickly lead to bargaining,
however, if the players have conflicting benefits from a number of otherwise
equally reasonable outcomes (like in the battle of the sexes game in Figure 3.1).
In binary ThrPGs like van de Kragt et al. (1983), there are usually even more
equally reasonable outcomes, in which some players pick the short straw and
must contribute, while others can “free-ride.” Even if there is no such conflict,
as is the case if the equilibria are Pareto-ranked with one being more efficient
than the other(s), but there is a chance that the same (or a similar) problem
will arise again in the future, spending some time to negotiate now to agree on
some kind of behavioral norm may make coordination quicker and potentially
1Most of what is discussed here, in particular the voting procedure and its theoretical
solution, has already been presented in condensed form in Feige, Ehrhart, and Kra¨mer
(Unpublished).
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less costly in the future because there will be fewer instances of coordination
failure.
Player 1
Player 2
X Y
X 0, 0 A,B
Y B,A 0, 0
Figure 3.1: Battle of the sexes (A ą B ą 0).
As an example, think of the traffic law which requires all cars to drive
on the same side of the road (the right side in most countries). This law
has likely been implemented at some point in the past2 in order to prevent
accidents (coordination errors), caused by two drivers disagreeing on how to
pass each other.3 Yet (at least in democratic countries) a law is preceded by
a negotiation at some point, which in politics usually ends with some kind of
vote. Voting on contributions to a ThrPG can similarly establish a behavioral
norm specifying how much to contribute. The procedure can furthermore be
used to immediately implement the allocation implied by this norm. Chapter 4
will say more about which behavioral norms are applicable in the context of a
ThrPG and how voting helps in the implementation of these norms.
3.2 Unanimous decisions in ThrPGs
While the negotiation process for resolving a coordination problem can take
many forms, unanimous decisions are of particular interest in the context of a
ThrPG for two reasons:
1. Unanimity has the property of favoring Pareto-optimal outcomes, in fact,
given a particular status quo, only Pareto improvements to this outcome
can be implemented unanimously.
2. If contributions to a ThrPG are chosen with a unanimity rule, Pareto-
optimal contribution vectors that can be implemented as (subgame-
perfect) Nash equilibria in the standard ThrPG can also be implemented
as (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibria in this voting game.
These points will be further illustrated below. First, however, we need to
define exactly how unanimous decisions are reached in the following analysis.
2And before that may have already been a societal convention, as suggeted for example
by Guala and Mittone (2010).
3You will probably have encountered a similar problem on a lesser scale: Have you ever
tried to walk through a narrow door at the same time as somebody else?
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Figure 3.2: Voting procedure
3.2.1 The voting procedure
In the experiments described in the following chapters, the voting procedure
consists of up to ten voting rounds, but similar arguments apply for a different
(finite) maximum amount of rounds. The procedure for a particular voting
round is described in Figure 3.2. In each round, every player makes a single
proposal for a (technologically possible) contribution vector q “ pq1, . . . , qnq.
These proposals are made simultaneously and without communication with
other group members. If there are identical proposals, then these are com-
bined and their votes are added up. Votes are also cast simultaneously, with
every player having exactly one vote for one particular proposal. If all players
vote for the same proposal (unanimous decision), this choice is implemented
immediately, meaning that the players are required to make their contributions
as specified in the proposed contribution vector. At that point the procedure
draws on the original ThrPG for the calculation of payoffs (see Section 1.1 in
Chapter 1), so that a total contribution below the threshold value can still
mean that the contribution costs are refunded, if the original game offers a
money-back guarantee.
However, if there is no unanimous agreement in a particular voting round,
the game is played for another round with new proposals and new votes. More-
over, if the specified number of ten voting rounds pass without agreement, the
game ends and the zero-contribution vector q0 “ p0, . . . , 0q is used as the
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group’s choice. With q0 as a fallback outcome, the negotiations return to the
status quo, to the point where they originally started. This status quo outcome
is also always added as an additional proposal.4
3.2.2 Voting equilibria
By applying the concept of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium to this voting
game, we find a large set of “voting equilibria,” because if for any player i
piipqˆq ě piipq0q, then voting for outcome qˆ is the best response for that player
under the expectation that all other players vote for outcome qˆ as well.
Proposition 3.1. Under a unanimous voting scheme, every technologically
possible contribution vector qˆ that weakly Pareto dominates the status quo q0
can be implemented as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof: In the last stage of the game, if all other players are already decided
on qˆ, any particular player i can only agree and implement qˆ or disagree and
thereby implement q0, the status quo. Voting for qˆ is therefore advantageous
to player i if and only if piipqˆq ě piipq0q. If at least one player strictly prefers qˆ
over q0 and all other players weakly prefer qˆ over q0, i.e., if qˆ weakly Pareto
dominates q0, then the group will unanimously vote for qˆ if this contribution
vector is proposed as an alternative to q0. But a proposal of qˆ is advantageous
to any player i for whom piipqˆq ą piipq0q, of which there is at least one. Fur-
thermore, if player i expects all other players to vote for qˆ and at least one of
these players to propose qˆ, he cannot change the outcome by proposing any
other contribution vector. Accordingly, proposing and then voting for qˆ is a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Note that equilibrium play involves only a single voting round because the
group immediately proposes qˆ and then unanimously votes to implement this
contribution vector. Further note that all feasible threshold allocations (Q “
T ) can be implemented as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, but the equilibrium
set also accesses a large number of contribution vectors with lower social welfare
in which the group makes inefficiently high contributions (Q ą T ). Finally the
status quo, q0, can also be implemented as an equilibrium, but note that voting
for zero contributions is not a strictly best response in this game.
4The idea of including the status quo among the list of proposals originally came about in
an attempt to mirror sequential voting by veto (Mueller, 1978). This procedure is intended to
replicate the efficiency of (potentially open-ended) unanimous decisions, while guaranteeing
an agreement after a much shorter time, to wit n ` 1 voting rounds, where n is again
the number of players in the group. Although this feature does not affect the theoretical
solution of the voting procedure described here, it gives the players the option to signal their
unwillingness to achieve agreement in direct reaction to a set of unacceptable proposals.
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3.3 Literature review: voting and public goods
To my knowledge, besides the experiments described in the following chapters,
there is as yet no experimental study concerned with voting on contributions
to a ThrPG. However, a small number of studies have their subjects vote
on contributions (or their equivalent) in other types of social dilemmas, most
notably Walker et al. (2000), Margreiter et al. (2005), and Bernard et al.
(2013), in a common-pool resource game and Kroll et al. (2007) in a linear
public goods game. Furthermore, Alberti and Cartwright (2016) employ a
“full agreement” procedure in a ThrPG which, apart from the framing as a
coordination game, works just like a unanimous vote on contributions. In
addition, voting procedures have been used in several studies to endogenously
determine game parameters or design elements in both linear public goods
games and ThrPGs, including the threshold value itself (Rauchdobler et al.,
2010). All of these studies will be discussed briefly in the following.
3.3.1 Voting on contributions
The closest study to the voting procedure investigated here is Alberti and
Cartwright (2016) who conduct a “full agreement” treatment in a ThrPG set-
ting with a full refund as well as heterogeneous endowments (in later stages of
the experiment). Instead of a prolonged negotiation about contributions to a
ThrPG that is essentially one-shot, the subjects in this study face a repeated
game of a series of distinct contribution decisions. In all of these distinct
rounds, the players can make one proposal each and then cast one vote each,
just like in my experiments, but payoffs are then calculated immediately based
on this vote, whether or not agreement is reached. This procedure, too, pre-
scribes a status quo of zero contributions, meaning here that the players keep
their endowments, but miss out on the reward payment. Interestingly, the
success rates in this treatment are lower than in the control treatments with
voluntary individual contributions, although the groups become more success-
ful in later rounds.
A similar repeated-game design has also been employed in an earlier study
by Walker et al. (2000), which compares unanimity voting and majority voting
in a repeated common-pool resource problem with a benchmark situation of
the game without voting. Both voting rules apparently work quite well in this
framework, since they manage to increase efficiency compared to the voluntary-
contribution benchmark. Although the groups only come to an agreement in
50.5% and 60% of all cases, respectively in the majority and unanimity treat-
ments, the threat point of no agreement – which consists in having to make
individual contributions without a vote and accordingly corresponds to the
decision in the voluntary-contributions treatment – might not be too hard a
fall to make consensus all that important. Margreiter et al. (2005) extend the
results reported by Walker et al. (2000) for homogeneous groups to groups
with heterogeneous marginal costs, but study only majority voting. The au-
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thors find no difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups in the
case of individual contributions, but a decrease in efficiency for heterogeneous
groups if a voting rule is introduced.
Bernard et al. (2013), who also investigate a common-pool resource game,
use a slightly different voting rule than Walker et al. (2000), by which the
median of all proposals is implemented, thus ensuring automatic agreement
in their exclusively homogeneous groups. As expected by the authors, this
binding voting rule significantly increases efficiency levels compared to a non-
cooperative benchmark. Furthermore, without the possibility of negotiation
failure, all voting groups select the socially optimal outcome, although usually
without reaching unanimous agreement.
In a linear public goods game, Kroll et al. (2007) focus on a combination
of voting and a punishment rule in order to point out that the result of a
vote may not be enforceable without a sanctioning mechanism. The authors
report only a slight increase in contributions over a baseline treatment with
individual voluntary contributions if this contribution decision is preceded by a
non-binding majority vote. Moreover – just as in the baseline treatments – con-
tributions decrease in later periods. In contrast, both a binding vote – in which
the agreed upon contribution vectors are immediately implemented, using the
baseline treatment (“operational game”) for cases of disagreement – and a non-
binding vote combined with an option to punish voluntary contributions that
violate the agreement, lead to significantly higher group contributions. Note,
however, that the superiority of the binding vote in this experiment can be
explained by game-theoretical differences between the treatments, because the
stage game in the voting treatment has multiple Nash equilibria in addition to
zero contributions, which is a dominant strategy in the other three treatments.
Another study by Fre´chette et al. (2012) does not include a control treat-
ment without voting. Here, the contributions are selected in a “legislative pro-
cedure” similar to the bargaining rule discussed in Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
meaning that in every voting round only a single, randomly selected proposal
is subjected to a majority decision and the payoffs are depreciated at a rate
of δ for each round of non-agreement. Not unexpectedly, most groups require
only a single voting round to reach an agreement, which favors the proposing
player, but not as strongly as the theory predicts.
Finally, in another linear public goods game, Banks et al. (1988) merely
ask their subjects to vote after the voluntary contribution decision on whether
their group’s previously pledged individual contributions should be realized
or instead discarded in favor of a status quo situation in which nobody con-
tributes. In comparison to a direct contribution treatment without a vote,
the authors report that the presence of a unanimous voting rule increases the
sum of pledged contributions, but lowers overall efficiency, because the groups
rarely reach agreement. Fischer and Nicklisch (2007) conduct a similar exper-
iment with both majority and unanimity rules. Again a higher contribution
average in the unanimity treatments goes hand in hand with a low acceptance
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rate, resulting in the lowest average overall efficiency of all investigated treat-
ments. In a recent study by le Sage and van der Heijden (Unpublished), the
subsequent vote is not directly concerned with the implementation of contribu-
tions to the public good, but with destroying any remaining endowments, i.e.,
unrealized contributions. Here the authors report that requiring a majority (2
out of 3) or unanimous (3 out of 3) decision in favor of saving any uninvested
endowments increases average contributions to the public good.
3.3.2 Voting on parameters and design elements
In applying the collective decision not to the contribution choice itself, but to
game elements that only indirectly affect contributions, many studies seemingly
attempt to reduce the theoretical complexity of the investigated game. While
a binding vote on contributions may turn a single-equilibrium social dilemma
like a linear public goods game into a multi-equilibria coordination game (e.g.,
Kroll et al., 2007), a binding vote on the implementation or the abolition of a
sanctioning mechanism (Guillen et al., 2006; Putterman et al., 2011) or on a
particular burden-sharing rule in a voluntary contributions mechanism (Gallier
et al., forthcoming) are not expected to change the original game’s equilibrium
set.
In a one-shot ThrPG with groups of three players and a utilization rebate,
Rauchdobler et al. (2010) employ a sequence of pairwise majority comparisons
between possible threshold values in order to determine the exact value of
the threshold. The subjects make contribution decisions for all possible vot-
ing outcomes before they are told which threshold has been selected. For a
partial refund (r “ 0.5) or no refund, the lowest positive threshold proves to
be the collectively preferred outcome, whereas a full refund induces groups
to agree on the highest possible threshold. As the authors state, this choice
shows that the subjects are conscious of the risk of coordination failure under
no or only a partial refund. However, although voters that prefer a particular
threshold value contribute more (if this is indeed the outcome) than those that
vote against it, voting appears to have no significant effect on aggregate con-
tributions compared to the baseline treatments with exogenously determined
threshold values.
Guillen et al. (2006) investigate the effect of a sanctioning scheme on con-
tributions in a ThrPG. In one of their treatments, the groups can collectively
decide to abolish this sanctioning scheme after the first half of the game, which
all of the groups do, in another the sanctioning scheme is removed automati-
cally. In both cases, average contribution levels fall below the threshold value
after the sanctioning scheme is removed. However, the decrease is more pro-
nounced in the voting treatment, although average contributions here are still
higher than in the baseline treatment without sanctions. Accordingly, the pos-
itive effect on contributions may be more the result of the sanctions than the
collective decision. Studies that investigate voting on sanction schemes in the
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context of linear public goods games, like e.g. Putterman et al. (2011), find a
similar increase of contribution levels, which again is more likely caused by the
threat of sanctions than the vote. See also Chapter 5 for additional literature
on sanctioning in public goods games.
Balafoutas et al. (2013) model a cooperative redistribution decision in a lin-
ear public goods game with heterogeneous endowments. In their experiment,
the players can vote on the share of the public good that is to be divided equally
among all players, independently of their contributions. The remaining share
is returned to the contributors in proportion to their original contribution. The
authors report a predominant (and self-serving) preference for proportional re-
turns among voters with high or medium endowments, whereas voters with low
endowments more frequently vote for equal returns, which would also benefit
these players the most. Observed contribution levels, however, are the higher
the more of the public good is reallocated in proportion to contributions, which
is consistent with the authors’ theoretical predictions.
The study by Dannenberg et al. (2014) involves a collective decision on a
binding minimum individual contribution to a public good. This is conducted
by simply asking the subjects for contribution pledges and then setting the
binding minimum equal to the lowest of these pledges under the assumption
that this is the common denominator. Although strategically comparable to
a linear public goods game without a contribution constraint, this “minimum
contribution mechanism” results in significantly higher average contributions
than the unconstrained baseline and even a very unusual increase of contribu-
tion levels over time.
Building on this experimental design, the subjects in Gallier et al. (forth-
coming) propose minimum total contributions, the lowest of which is again
binding for the subsequent contribution decision. In order to derive individual
constraints from this goal for total contributions, the authors employ several
burden-sharing rules, which are either exogenously imposed on the groups or
endogenously chosen by vote. Here, the authors contrast majority and una-
nimity rules, with the standard (unconstrained) linear public goods game as
a fallback outcome if there is no agreement. The burden-sharing rules make
use of the player heterogeneity with respect to endowments, so that one rule
prescribes contribution in proportion to endowments, while an “equal-payoff
scheme” involves contribution shares that result in equal payoffs to all players.
A third rule simple divides the total contribution equally among all players,
similar to the case studied in Dannenberg et al. (2014). Gallier et al. (forth-
coming) again find that unanimous decisions are harder to attain than only a
majority agreement, which is particular relevant to this study, because groups
that fail to reach agreement consistently contribute less than in the baseline
VCM treatment. Accordingly, it seems likely that the subjects react adversely
to a failed agreement.
With respect to the choice of burden-sharing rule in groups that reach agree-
ment, the study by Gallier et al. (forthcoming) foreshadows the results of my
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own voting experiments presented in the following chapters: Almost two-thirds
of all groups in the majority treatment and more than half of those in the una-
nimity treatment agree on an “equal-payoff scheme,” which then also leads to
the highest average contributions. However, the study leaves unresolved if this
result is due to an actual aversion against unequal earnings, as postulated for
example by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), or rather caused simply by strategic be-
havior on behalf of the subjects, given that two of the three player types benefit
the most from this “fair” contribution scheme. This problem will be discussed
in more detail in the following chapter, which is concerned with similar contri-
bution norms in a ThrPG with heterogeneous players who must either reach
a unanimous decision on contribution vectors or coordinate their individual
contribution choices by repeatedly interacting in the same group of players.
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Chapter 4
Fairness and equilibrium
selection in threshold public
goods games
4.1 Introduction
The Simplified ThrPG presented in Chapter 2 shows how game parameters af-
fect the selection between one particular threshold equilibrium and the Pareto
inferior zero-contributions equilibrium. However, the model leaves unresolved,
how this particular threshold equilibrium is selected from an uncountable num-
ber of feasible threshold allocations. In other words, we have treated the se-
lection from among two Pareto-ranked equilibria, but still need to discuss the
case in which no such ranking exists.
Nevertheless, the experimental literature, both on ThrPGs and coordination
games in general, reports that subjects frequently manage to coordinate their
behavior in a way that indicates that there is an underlying systematic in this
selection process, as well (e.g., Isoni et al., 2013). More specifically, many
authors state that the subjects appear to follow a social norm or a principle of
distributive fairness. For example, norms applicable to a ThrPG can prescribe
equality – of contributions (observed, e.g., by Alberti and Cartwright, 2016) or
of payoffs – or proportionality, for example in the sense that contributions are
made in proportion to endowments (observed, e.g., by Rapoport and Suleiman,
1993; Bernard et al., Unpublished). In the latter example, the norm only
makes sense if there is some kind of difference among the players with respect
to endowments, because otherwise this norm would simply prescribe equality
of contributions as well. Accordingly, in order to properly discuss a variety of
social norms we need to assume player heterogeneity of some kind.
Yet, although it appears reasonable to infer from the experimental data
from coordination games that the subjects have other-regarding preferences
– i.e., they ascribe a higher utility to outcomes that they deem fairer, even
if their individual payoff is the same – this reasoning is actually flawed. All
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that we can learn from a ThrPG experiment by itself, for example, is that
the group has coordinated on a particular threshold equilibrium – which is
something of which completely selfish players should be capable, too.1 In fact,
an application of the Simplified ThrPG model to a group of players with Fehr-
Schmidt preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) suggests that other-regarding
preferences can actually make the efficient and“fair”outcome less likely than in
a group of selfish players, because inequality-averse players suffer more strongly
if they are the only ones that contribute (see Section 4.A.2).
Selfish players may not care about the payoffs of the other group members,
but, being rational, they certainly realize the problem of selecting one from
several efficient equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, they may also realize that
symmetric outcomes are especially interesting; not because they are “fair”, but
because they are displayed in a particularly striking manner.2 I grant that if
all the players in a ThrPG have similar other-regarding preferences, then this
creates a Pareto ranking of the threshold allocations that may resolve the equi-
librium selection problem.3 But even in this special case we cannot be certain
that this form of preferences is the only reason, or even the main reason, why
a group then actually coordinates on a particular equilibrium. Instead, strate-
gic considerations, of which the tendency to play the risk-dominant strategy
is just one component, may have a much larger impact on the final outcome
than what the players think is fair. Fairness is then just a side-effect, an
epiphenomenon, of what is actually strategic behavior.
In the present chapter, I will do nothing more (and nothing less) than argue
that strategic considerations do indeed play a role in selecting one particu-
lar threshold equilibrium and that they are possibly even strong enough to
overrule individual fairness preferences. I will do this by varying only the
decision-making procedure that the groups employ to coordinate their contri-
butions to the underlying ThrPG. The first procedure, the “Repeated game,”
involves playing the underlying game ten times in a row with the same group
composition. The second procedure, the (unanimous) “Vote” discussed previ-
ously in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, is essentially a one-shot ThrPG in which
the group needs to reach unanimous agreement on its vector of contributions,
although the players can negotiate repeatedly, for up to ten rounds, if this is
necessary to reach agreement.
Both procedures are coordination games, which furthermore implement the
same sets of threshold allocations as Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria.4 Accordingly, if individual fairness preferences are the only deter-
minant for how allocations are selected from this equilibrium set, we should
1Especially given the findings by de Cremer and van Vugt (1999) in whose study pro-
social and “pro-self” players make similar average contributions to the public good.
2See, for example, Schelling (1980, p. 60ff.) for a series of examples to that effect.
3See Section 4.A.1 for an example assuming Fehr-Schmidt preferences, which also shows
the limitations of this approach.
4This follows from Proposition 3.1 from Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 in combination with the
results from Chapter 1, Section 1.1.2.
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expect the same (distribution of) focal point(s) to emerge under both proce-
dures.
However, this turns out not to be the case. Players with heterogeneous
endowments predominantly coordinate on equal contributions in the repeated
game, but almost exclusively select an allocation that results in equal payoffs
under a unanimous vote. Even though homogeneous players, who almost ex-
clusively select equal contributions, and players with heterogeneous marginal
contribution costs, who predominantly select equal payoffs, are not significantly
influenced by the decision-making procedure, these results show that fairness
principles – whether normatively motivated by an ethical theory, like Rawlsian
maxi-min (Rawls, 1971) or the equity principle (Adams, 1965), or empirically
motivated by results from previous experiments (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
– are only unreliable predictors of equilibrium selection.
To be true, procedure effects in connection with distributive fairness are
not unknown in experimental economics. However, these studies, like, e.g.,
Bolton et al. (2005) for ultimatum bargaining and a sequential form of the
battle-of-the-sexes game, seem more concerned with violations of a unique
behavioral norm, like equality of payoffs, that has been observed consistently
before the change in procedure. Yet I am unaware of any studies in which such
a procedural difference causes a switch from one behavioral norm to another.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. After briefly relat-
ing this work to experiments on committee voting and on heterogeneity in
ThrPGs (Section 4.2), equilibrium selection by means of fairness principles is
discussed (Section 4.3), followed by a description of the experimental design
and procedure (Section 4.4). Section 4.5 presents the results of this exper-
imental investigation, an explanation of which is subsequently attempted in
Section 4.6. Section 4.7 compares the results to related studies. Section 4.8
concludes with suggestions for future research.
4.2 Literature review
To a reader familiar with the literature on committee voting experiments (re-
viewed, e.g., by Palfrey, 2006) it may be no surprise that groups required to
come to a unanimous agreement will reach some kind of compromise. In do-
ing so, they give up part of their individual goals, which may also include
conformity to fairness principles, in order to achieve an agreement that still
serves them better than reaching no agreement at all. While it is therefore
unlikely in a ThrPG that any single player will reach his “ideal point,” every-
body is probably at least closer to this ideal than if the group fails to reach
the threshold.
Voting experiments, like those by Eavey and Miller (1984), indicate that
we can expect outcomes to reside in or near the core set5 associated with
5In a nutshell, the core set contains every allocation that maximizes group payoffs and is
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a particular decision-making rule, although fairness considerations may draw
the agreement away from this set. However, in the experiments presented in
this chapter, the core set of the two decision-making procedures is identical,
because all welfare-maximizing outcomes are threshold allocations.
Most of the experimental studies involving heterogeneity in threshold public
goods games, all using the “repeated game” decision procedure, seem to agree
that contributions indeed follow a pattern consistent with a small number of
fairness principles. Van Dijk et al. (1999) explicitly look for predominant “co-
ordination rules” and find a preference for contributions that are proportional
to endowments, but do not involve equal payoffs. Rapoport and Suleiman
(1993) only state that contributions in their ThrPG are proportional to en-
dowments, but do not report any further details. In more recent experimental
studies, Bernard et al. (Unpublished) again report preferences for proportional
contributions rather than equal contributions or payoffs, whereas Alberti and
Cartwright (2016) predominantly observe outcomes with equal contributions.
Other studies involving heterogeneous players in ThrPGs include Croson and
Marks (1999, 2001), Marks and Croson (1999), Bagnoli and McKee (1991),
and van Dijk and Grodzka (1992).
Yet procedural details may have a larger impact on the outcome than is
realized by these authors. For example, the findings by van Dijk and Grodzka
(1992) indicate that the amount of information given to the subjects affects
the set of allocations that are perceived as focal.6 Obviously, if the players
do not know about the heterogeneity of their group, they cannot condition
their actions on this circumstance. Brekke et al. (Unpublished) find that it
makes a difference if contributions are framed in absolute or relative amounts.7
More precisely, in groups with heterogeneous endowments, the contributions of
players with low endowments are significantly higher if the players make mon-
etary contributions than if they contribute proportions of their endowment.
This difference is also reflected in individual fairness preferences reported in a
post-experimental questionnaire, which appear to also be correlated with the
contribution decision in the experiment. However, the use of a rebate com-
bined with a non-standard procedure that terminates the experiment as soon
as the threshold is reached, makes it impossible to investigate a framing effect
on equilibrium selection.
More obvious procedural effects on how the threshold is allocated among
the players have been demonstrated by contrasting simultaneous and sequential
ThrPGs. For example, Hsu (2008) finds that in the sequential ThrPG equal
contributions are less frequent than in the simultaneous game, but this not
surprising given that equal contributions is a Nash equilibrium in the latter
stable in the sense that no coalition that does not include every single player in the group
has an incentive to deviate from this allocation. See also Moulin (1988, p. 87ff.).
6These and similar results are also discussed in Abele et al. (2010).
7Compare Konow (1996), who reports that context can affect self-reported fairness pref-
erences.
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case, but not a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the former case. Moreover, I
am unaware of any studies involving sequential contributions in which there is
also player heterogeneity and accordingly a reason to assume more than one
focal threshold allocation.
Studies from the public-choice literature convey the idea that the choice of
decision rule may be much more important to the final outcome than the in-
dividual player’s preferences. A textbook example (e.g., Mueller, 2003, Ch. 4)
is the distinction between unanimity and majority rule, which is also promi-
nently discussed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Nevertheless, the experi-
mental literature on committee voting appears to have shown little interest (or
success) in replicating such a procedure effect. For instance, Margreiter et al.
(2005) study the effects of heterogeneous marginal costs in a common-resource
problem in which contributions are decided by a majority vote, but do not
comment on fairness principles, let alone draw a comparison between these re-
sults and their “fallback” procedure (individual contributions) if no agreement
is reached. Frohlich et al. (1987a,b) and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990)
have their subjects vote unanimously to implement one of several distribution
principles, finding a preference for maximizing average outcomes (with a con-
straint for the minimum outcome) over maximizing the minimum outcome, i.e.,
essentially a preference for utilitarianism over the maxi-min principle (Rawls,
1971). Again, the authors do not vary the decision-making procedure.
There are also mixed results on focal points in bargaining games, starting
with Binmore et al. (1993), who are able to condition their subjects on partic-
ular focal points in a variant of Nash’s bargaining problem (Nash, 1950), only
some of which then prove to be stable when the subjects subsequently play the
game. Some studies find that the subjects in bargaining games agree on focal
points (e.g., Janssen, 2006; Isoni et al., 2013), others report that this need not
be the case (e.g., Crawford et al., 2008). Binmore and Samuelson (2006) even
give an evolutionary motivation for the prevalence of focal points, although
their model is only concerned with the labeling of strategies, not preferences
over other players’ payoffs.
In summary, while there is abundant theoretical evidence that supports the
expectation of a procedure effect in committee voting in general, it is still
unclear if this effect applies to ThrPGs or bargaining games as well or if – as
the variety of results in previous experiments indicates – individual fairness
preferences have a stronger impact on the group’s choice in these contexts.
4.3 Equilibrium selection and fairness princi-
ples
The underlying model in the subsequently described experiment is a special
case of the one described in Chapter 1, Section 1.1. Half of the treatments
in this experiment play this game repeatedly, the other half make use of the
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voting procedure discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1. All of the treatments
assume a damage payment d, which is the same for all players, if the threshold
is missed (instead of a reward for reaching the threshold), but grant a full
refund of contribution costs in this case. There may be player heterogeneity
with respect to endowments, ei, or marginal costs of contribution, ci, or not at
all so that players are homogeneous. Furthermore, the maximum contribution
q¯ is the same for all players, so that the set of available actions is the same.8
In any case, a group contains at most two different player types: a “good”
type, G, with a high endowment or low marginal contribution costs, and a
“bad” type, B, with a low endowment or high marginal contribution costs. For
convenience, I assume that the threshold value can be reached by a coalition
of all players of type G.
Accordingly, the decision procedures discussed in the previous chapters do
not change the theoretical solutions of this game, because the refund ensures
that zero contributions is not implemented as a strict equilibrium under either
a unanimous vote or a repeated game with individual voluntary contributions.
Considering, moreover, that all of the threshold allocations in this ThrPG differ
only in the way in which the contribution burden is distributed among the
individual players, we have no reason to assume that strategic considerations
favor one particular allocation.
This setup should therefore provide a controlled environment to study the
relevance of fairness concepts relating to distributive justice. There are two
ways in which these concepts can come into play. In the first scenario, the
players adhere to a social norm applicable to real-life interactions of this kind,
which then quickly resolves the coordination problem if all players adhere to
this norm. In the second scenario, no such social norm exists. It must first
develop in the process of the game. In either scenario it is reasonable to assume
that differences in individually preferred distribution norms will reflect in an
equal variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even if the players in a group do not
initially agree on a particular distribution norm, their final choice should still
reflect these initial differences and thus depend on individual fairness prefer-
ences. This yields the following hypotheses for the experiment:
Hypothesis 4.1. The decision-making procedure (vote or repeated game) has
no significant effect on the threshold allocation(s) selected on average by the
groups.
Hypothesis 4.2. Individual players with the same individual fairness prefer-
ences attempt to coordinate a) on the same threshold allocation independently
of the decision rule and b) on a threshold allocation consistent with these pref-
erences under different kinds of player heterogeneity.
8Without this assumption, it may be impossible to implement certain principles, like
equality of contributions, if the endowment of some players is too low to contribute an equal
share of the threshold.
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In order to shed some light on which particular threshold allocations might
be preferred by the subjects, I will now draw on several principles of distributive
justice that apply to the case at hand:9 utilitarian welfare maximization (Ben-
tham, 1789), Rawlsian maxi-min (Rawls, 1971), as well as notions of equity
(Adams, 1965) and equality (Dworkin, 1981). Even though these principles
are normative, specifying which allocation should be chosen, the experimental
literature cited in the previous section also provides evidence of these principles
being employed in collective decision-making. In addition, Loewenstein et al.
(1989), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as well as several others10 develop empirical
models claiming that people prefer equal payoffs under more general circum-
stances.11 As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1, an experimental study
can only challenge descriptive empirical models, not normative moral theories.
However, I believe that it is nevertheless interesting to test if (and to what
extent) such morally recommended behavior is actually observed in practice.
4.3.1 Utilitarianism
A utilitarian like Bentham (1789) is concerned only with the group’s total pay-
off, which is the same for all threshold allocations, unless marginal contribu-
tion costs are heterogeneous. In this case the players with the lowest marginal
costs should provide the threshold on their own in order to maximize welfare.
Assuming that players of the same type make the same contribution, this rea-
soning can accordingly reduce the set of “fair” equilibria to a single outcome,
namely that in which only player with marginal costs of cG make contributions,
which however involves very asymmetric contributions and payoffs.
In order to calculate this welfare-maximizing (WM) outcome,12 assume that
a group of n players maximize their welfare (or total payoff), given by Πpqq “řn
i“1 piipqq, with a vector of contributions qWM “ pqWM1 , . . . , qWMn q. We call
this vector qWM the social optimum and refer to QWM “ řni“1 qWMi as the
socially optimal total contribution. Similarly, ΠWM :“ ΠpqWMq denotes the
welfare-maximizing total payoff. In our model we obviously have QWM “ T ,
meaning that it is both socially and individually optimal for the players to
reach the threshold value. In order to find qWM, we consider the optimal way of
allocating T among the individual players. If the marginal costs of contribution
are homogeneous (c “ cG “ cB), any allocation of T leads to the same total
costs of contribution cT and, consequently, the same total payoff. In contrast,
if the marginal costs are heterogeneous, total costs are minimized if only players
9These principles as well as a few others are discussed in more detail by Konow (2003).
10E.g., Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Cappelen et al. (2007).
11Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 819) even mention the possibility that the “economic en-
vironment” can affect equilibrium play, but are more concerned with out-of-equilibrium
behavior (like positive contributions in linear public goods games) than the selection from
among several Nash equilibria.
12This paragraph is adapted from a similar passage in Feige et al. (Unpublished), see also
Section 6.3.2 in Chapter 6.
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with marginal costs of cG, the low-cost players, make contributions. The low-
cost players should therefore provide T in its entirety, although they can still
distribute the contribution burden among themselves in various ways. As
for this reason there is rarely a unique welfare-maximizing allocation, it is
convenient to let qWM refer to only the type-symmetric welfare-maximizing
threshold allocation, which is indeed unique.
4.3.2 Rawlsian maxi-min
In contrast to utilitarianism, the maxi-min criterion or “difference principle”
(Rawls, 1971) focuses on individual payoffs, not just total payoffs, recommend-
ing the allocation in which the lowest payoff of any member of the group is
maximized.13 It is easy to see that this is only possible if all group mem-
bers receive equal payoffs. This in turn requires asymmetric contributions,
if the players are heterogeneous,14 but not to such a strong degree as in the
welfare-maximizing outcome.
4.3.3 Equity principle
The equity principle, according to which inputs and outputs should be balanced
(e.g., Adams, 1965), leaves some room for interpretation, depending on how
“inputs” and “outputs” are defined in this context. If inputs are taken to mean
“costs incurred through contribution,” while outputs refer to “payoffs gained
from reaching the threshold,” then endowments are irrelevant to finding the
“fair” allocation. All players should then incur the same contribution costs,
i.e., ciqi “ cjqj for all i, j,15 which reduces to the case of equal contributions
if marginal costs are homogeneous. Groups with heterogeneous endowments
(but homogeneous costs) consequently should select equal contributions, but
unequal payoffs, because the payoff differences are not a direct result of the
contribution decision. The potential vagueness of the equity principle can be
seen in the study by Bernard et al. (Unpublished), who contrast “proportional
sacrifice” if the players have heterogeneous endowments with “proportional
benefit” if the players have heterogeneous valuations. Both principles can be
derived from equity theory by redefining inputs or outputs.
13For more information about the motivation of this fairness principle, as well as its merits
and demerits, see also Rawls (1974) and Mueller (2003, Ch. 25).
14To be true, as the model contains two kinds of heterogeneity, it is conceivably possible,
but extremely unlikely, that the two differences cancel each other out, so that equal payoffs
coincide with equal contributions. However, because both kinds do not occur at the same
time in the experiment, this special case can be ruled out here.
15To see this, note that each player i avoids the same damage payment d when reaching
the threshold, but incurs differing costs of ciqi. This leads to a payoff improvement of d´ciqi
when reaching the threshold, which must be proportional to the invested costs ciqi for all
players.
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4.3.4 Equality principle
Finally, equality (Dworkin, 1981), as probably the most basic notion of fairness,
simply stipulates a symmetric outcome of some kind, which in this context can
mean either equal contributions or equal payoffs. Although equality’s undis-
criminating stance in the view of player heterogeneity makes it less appealing
as a“fairness”principle, it is nevertheless a good rule of thumb if the differences
between the players are difficult to identify (as with van Dijk and Grodzka,
1992). Equality is also often proscribed by anti-discrimination laws, meaning
that a moral principle recommends to ignore a dimension of heterogeneity (like
gender) in the contribution decision.
4.3.5 Implications for the experiment
In summary, equal contributions (EC) and equal payoffs (EP) are the out-
comes most frequently recommended by various fairness principles, although
other allocations can certainly be similarly justified under more specific circum-
stances.16 Furthermore, the contribution vectors qEP and qEC associated with
these outcomes are both feasible and unique in all the heterogeneity treatments
described below, which is why the following experimental investigation focuses
on these two distribution norms. The other two predominant fairness princi-
ples, namely welfare maximization (WM) and proportionality of contributions
to endowments (PC), are less suitable for this particular investigation17 and
are therefore only discussed tangentially in the following, in order to relate to
other results from the literature. Accordingly, Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 can be
rephrased to pinpoint the focus of the following experimental investigation:
Hypothesis 4.3. The frequency of equal-contribution (EC) and equal-payoff
(EP) outcomes is the same a) under both the “Vote” and the “Repeated Game”
procedure and b) independently of the kind of heterogeneity, i.e., endowments,
marginal costs, or none.
However, the equilibrium sets of the decision-making procedures investi-
gated here specifically include all the morally recommended allocations, i.e.,
equal contributions (EC), equal payoffs (EP), proportional contributions (PC),
and welfare maximization (WM). As such, the procedures do not favor any
particular distribution norm. Note that the Simplified ThrPG from Chapter 2
does not predict any differences either, because a full refund is granted and
the model accordingly does not apply.
16Schelling (1980, p. 62ff.) gives a nice example of how a “house rule” can be used to
basically specify any possible division of a sum of money between two persons A and B,
of which A originally lost the money and B now intends to return it minus his finder’s fee.
Such is the ambiguity of what is morally right.
17Welfare maximization does not prescribe a unique allocation of the threshold in the
case of homogeneous groups or those with heterogeneous endowments. Proportionality of
contributions to endowments is indistinguishable from equal contributions unless there is
heterogeneity with respect to endowments.
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Table 4.1: Parameter combinations used in the experiment.
eG eB cB cG
Homogeneous 30 ExCU 30 ExCU 1.5 ExCU per CU 1.5 ExCU per CU
Heterogeneous
marginal costs
30 ExCU 30 ExCU 3 ExCU per CU 1 ExCU per CU
Heterogeneous
endowments
33 ExCU 27 ExCU 1.5 ExCU per CU 1.5 ExCU per CU
4.4 Experimental design and procedure
Based on the preceding theoretical sections, the following experimental design
is used:
A group consists of four players, each endowed with an amount of “Experi-
mental Currency Units” (ExCU). Every player can convert his endowment into
up to q¯ “ 10 “Contribution Units” (CU) at a particular rate of ExCU per CU.
These Contribution Units are then collected in a public account (a common
project).
Three parameter combinations are considered, each associated with a dif-
ferent kind of heterogeneity (see Table 4.1). In treatments with heterogeneous
marginal contribution costs, all four players have the same endowment of 30
ExCU, but two players have low costs of 1 ExCU per CU, whereas the other
two players have high costs of 3 ExCU per CU. In treatments with heteroge-
neous endowments, all four players have the same marginal contribution costs
of 1.5 ExCU per CU, but two players have a high endowment of 33 ExCU,
whereas the other two players have a low endowment of 27 ExCU. In homoge-
neous treatments, all four players have the same endowment of 30 ExCU and
the same marginal contribution costs of 1.5 ExCU per CU.
In total, this setup results in six treatments which differ with respect to the
decision rule (unanimous vote (V) vs. repeated game (R)) and with respect to
the kind of heterogeneity (marginal costs of contribution (COST) vs. endow-
ments (END) vs. none (HOM)), as displayed in Table 4.2.18 Contributions
can be made in steps of 0.01 CU, and costs are rounded to 0.01 ExCU. Unless
the sum of contributions reaches a threshold value T “ 16 CU, a penalty of
d “ 25 ExCU is deducted from each player’s payoff instead of the contribution
costs. This means that for players with costs of 3 ExCU per CU a contribution
of at most 25{3 CU « 8.33 CU is individually rational.
Proposals, votes, and individual contributions are all publicly displayed im-
mediately after the choice has been made, together with the IDs of the associ-
ated players (e.g., “Player C”). Furthermore, after the first round the subjects
18The names used for the individual treatments in the following are simply a combination
of these acronyms, for example RHOM for “repeated game, homogeneous players”. The two
COST treatments are taken from Feige and Ehrhart (Unpublished). The instructions to all
treatments are included in Appendix A.1.
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Table 4.2: Investigated treatments. For each treatment the number of inde-
pendent observations (groups) is given in brackets.
Heterogeneity
Decision rule
Vote (V) Repeated Game (R)
Homogeneous (HOM) VHOM (n = 8) RHOM (n = 9)
Het. Endowments (END) VEND (n = 9) REND (n = 9)
Het. Costs (COST) VCOST (n = 9) RCOST (n = 9)
can call up the results from past rounds whenever they have to make a decision.
During the experiment, the subjects are asked not to talk to each other
and to turn off their cell phones. They are seated at computers, which are
screened off from the other subjects by plastic dividers. The instructions to
the experiment are handed out to the subjects in written form as well as read
aloud at the beginning of the experiment. Every subject has to complete a
comprehension test consisting of 9 to 12 questions depending on the treatment.
The experiment does not start until everybody has answered every question
correctly.
Every treatment is followed by a questionnaire containing items on distribu-
tive justice (adapted from Konow, 1996, items 1I, 2B, and 5) and procedural
justice (partially adapted from Folger and Konovsky, 1989, Table 1) for the
purpose of eliciting the subjects’ fairness preferences in a more neutral context.
This serves as a control for the premise that the subjects do not have ideologi-
cal differences that could possibly drive preferences for different allocations in
different treatments. The questionnaire also includes items related to general
personal data (age, gender, experience with experiments).19
In line with the theory presented above, all treatments are expected to lead
to the same socially optimal total contribution ofQWM “ T “ 16 CU. Table 4.3
contains the numerical predictions for individual contributions by player type
(high or low) for the four predominant distribution norms – equal contributions
(EC), equal payoffs (EP), contributions in proportion to endowment (PC),
and welfare-maximizing contributions (WM) – as well as the associated total
group payoffs.20 Hypothesis 4.1 predicts that the same frequency of EC, EP,
PC, and WM outcomes is observed in R and V treatments, which is narrowed
down in Hypothesis 4.3a to a prediction that the observed frequencies of EC
and EP are the same under both procedures. Hypothesis 4.2 predicts that the
players’ individual fairness preferences are reflected in the collectively selected
allocation, meaning for example that an individual preference for equal-payoff
19The complete questionnaire is found in Appendix 4.B. The items concerned with proce-
dural justice and personal data showed no treatment differences and are therefore omitted
from the analysis.
20Technically, this is an expected value for the repeated game where only a single randomly
chosen round is paid, although there is no theoretical reason to assume any variability among
choices in different rounds.
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Table 4.3: Expected outcomes for individual contributions qG, qB in CU and
total group payoffs Πpqq in ExCU by player type (G or B) and distribution
norm (EC, EP, PC, WM). In HOM and END treatments, WM outcomes ex-
tend over a range of threshold allocations indicated by a parameter k P r0, 8s.
HOM (V, R) END (V, R) COST (V, R)
EC qG 4 CU 4 CU 4 CU
qB 4 CU 4 CU 4 CU
piG 24 ExCU 27 ExCU 26 ExCU
piB 24 ExCU 21 ExCU 18 ExCU
ΠpqECq 96 ExCU 96 ExCU 88 ExCU
EP qG 4 CU 6 CU 6 CU
qB 4 CU 2 CU 2 CU
piG 24 ExCU 24 ExCU 24 ExCU
piB 24 ExCU 24 ExCU 24 ExCU
ΠpqEPq 96 ExCU 96 ExCU 96 ExCU
PC qG 4 CU 4.4 CU 4 CU
qB 4 CU 3.6 CU 4 CU
piG 24 ExCU 26.4 ExCU 26 ExCU
piB 24 ExCU 21.6 ExCU 18 ExCU
ΠpqPCq 96 ExCU 96 ExCU 88 ExCU
WM qG k CU k CU 8 CU
qB 8´ k CU 8´ k CU 0 CU
piG 30´ k ¨ 1.5 ExCU 33´ k ¨ 1.5 ExCU 22 ExCU
piB 18` k ¨ 1.5 ExCU 15` k ¨ 1.5 ExCU 30 ExCU
ΠpqWMq 96 ExCU 96 ExCU 104 ExCU
outcomes should lead to a collectively selected allocation of qG “ 6 CU and
qB “ 2 CU under heterogeneous endowments or marginal contribution costs,
but qB “ qG “ 4 CU in homogeneous groups (cf. Hypothesis 4.3b).
4.5 Results
A total of 212 subjects (5 x 9 groups and 1 x 8 groups with four members
each) were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a student pool at the
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. The COST sessions took place in December
2013, the other sessions in June and July 2014. The computerized experiment
was conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Including a show-up fee of e5
(e3 for the COST treatments), the subjects earned on average e15.53 (roughly
US$21 at the time of the experiment) in all six treatments. Table 4.4 shows
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Table 4.4: Average subject payoffs by investigated treatment in ExCU (ex-
change rate: 2 ExCU = e1) and cluster-robust standard errors (in brackets)
by player type.
Player type Vote (V) Repeated (R) All
(only rounds paid)
HOM 21.63 (2.24) 22.34 (0.91) 22.00 (1.19)
END
both 24.00 (0.00) 23.20 (0.63) 23.60 (0.33)
eG “ 33 ExCU 24.17 (0.16) 24.99 (1.14) 24.58 (0.59)
eB “ 27 ExCU 23.83 (0.16) 21.41 (0.36) 22.62 (0.35)
COST
both 24.00 (0.00) 19.20 (1.72) 21.60 (1.05)
cG “ 1 ExCUCU 24.00 (0.00) 19.32 (1.82) 21.66 (1.07)
cB “ 3 ExCUCU 24.00 (0.00) 19.06 (2.26) 21.53 (1.28)
All 23.27 (0.72) 21.58 (0.76) 22.41 (0.54)
the average payoffs (excluding the show-up fee) by treatment in ExCU (with
an exchange rate of 2 ExCU = e1). The subjects spent between one hour and
one and a half hours in the laboratory.
The analysis of the experimental results proceeds as follows: First, it is
shown that neither total contributions nor success rates, i.e., the frequency with
which groups contribute enough to reach the threshold value, differ significantly
among treatments, eliminating this dimension as a possible confounding factor
for allocation choices. As a next step, treatment differences with respect to
this allocation choice are identified on the aggregate and the individual level.
Finally, the questionnaire data are evaluated, indicating that there are no
significant differences between the subjects’ individual fairness preferences in
the different treatments that could account for this treatment effect.
4.5.1 Total contributions, allocations, and success rates
The comparison of total contributions is based on the total contribution that
the groups have agreed on in the voting treatments. For the groups in the
repeated game, the results from the end of the experiment (Round 10) are the
most interesting for the analysis, because at this point the groups have had
the highest number of interactions, so that it is the most likely that they have
selected a particular equilibrium. Accordingly, this round’s results are used
for the comparison with the voting treatments. Where applicable, data for
Round 1 as well as averages over all ten rounds are provided as well.
Figure 4.1 shows the development of average total contributions in the re-
peated game (R) treatments. Treatment averages are close to the threshold in
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Figure 4.1: Average total contributions of groups in the repeated game treat-
ments (R). The threshold value of 16 CU is included for reference.
all three cases, with no statistical difference between the treatments.21 When
comparing the number of groups that exactly match the threshold value to-
wards the end of the experiment, there appears a clear advantage for voting
groups. All but one voting group (which did not come to an agreement) man-
age to reach the threshold value of 16 CU exactly. Nevertheless, an overall
statistical comparison among all treatments (using Round 10 results for the
repeated game treatments) finds no significant differences.22
When looking at final contribution outcomes (Round 10 contributions for
the repeated game, final agreements for the unanimous vote) with respect to
the distribution norms that groups employ (as shown in Table 4.5), we observe
a strong difference due to the decision rule for both kinds of heterogeneity.23
21Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations ranks test comparing all six treatments with re-
spect to the total contribution of each group:
Round 1 – chi-squared with ties = 0.196 (2 d.f.), p “ 0.9066
Round 10 – chi-squared with ties = 0.287 (2 d.f.), p “ 0.8665
Group average over all rounds – chi-squared with ties = 0.291 (2 d.f.), p “ 0.8646.
22Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations ranks test comparing all six treatments with re-
spect to the number of groups with a final total contribution of exactly Q “ 16 CU:
Chi-squared with ties = 3.392 (5 d.f.), p “ 0.6397.
23Fisher’s exact test comparing the frequencies of allocation types in each treatment:
p “ 0.002 (VEND vs. REND), p “ 0.009 (VCOST vs. RCOST), but p “ 1.000 (VHOM
vs. RHOM). The large number of ties in the data makes it necessary to use a categorical
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Table 4.5: Absolute frequency of equal contribution (EC) and equal payoff
(EP) outcomes, as well as of successful provision of the public good (last col-
umn, relative frequencies in brackets). For voting treatments the respective
group’s final agreement is used.
EC EP EC and EP Other Unsuccessful Success rates
VHOM n.a. n.a. 6 1 1 7 of 8 (87.5%)
VEND 0 8 n.a. 1 0 9 of 9 (100%)
VCOST 0 9 n.a. 0 0 9 of 9 (100%)
RHOM
Rd 1 n.a. n.a. 2 6 1 8 of 9 (88.9%)
Rd 10 n.a. n.a. 7 1 1 8 of 9 (88.9%)
All Rds n.a. n.a. 59 24 7 83 of 90 (92.2%)
REND
Rd 1 1 0 n.a. 6 2 7 of 9 (77.8%)
Rd 10 5 1 n.a. 3 0 9 of 9 (100%)
All Rds 40 5 n.a. 35 10 80 of 90 (88.9%)
RCOST
Rd 1 0 1 n.a. 6 2 7 of 9 (77.8%)
Rd 10 0 3 n.a. 4 2 7 of 9 (77.8%)
All Rds 0 23 n.a. 49 18 72 of 90 (80.0%)
In the case of heterogeneous costs, this is obviously because of the higher
variance of results in the repeated game, as the modal choice is equal payoffs
both under a unanimous vote and in the repeated game and (as mentioned
above) average total contributions are not significantly different. However,
in the case of heterogeneous endowments (END), the groups actually apply
different fairness principles, to wit, predominantly equal payoffs when voting
and predominantly equal contributions in the repeated game. This allows us to
reject Hypothesis 4.3a. Furthermore, groups in the repeated game are equally
successful in reaching the threshold as the voting groups at this point of the
game (success rates are at 100% in both treatments, see also Table 4.5). This
seems to indicate that the groups in the repeated game are indeed satisfied with
this outcome and do not try to change it (which would involve coordination
failure and thus lower success rates).
4.5.2 Individual contributions and distribution norms
Although the aggregate data from Table 4.5 have already established an im-
pact of the decision rule for the case of heterogeneous endowments, we can
learn more about what happened by looking at the individual choices differ-
entiated by player type. By referring to the benchmark values for individual
contributions given in Table 4.3, I will first discuss the coordination process in
the repeated game treatments, in which all groups play an identical number of
rounds.
test for this comparison. An overall test comparing the frequencies in all six treatments also
reveals significant differences (p ă 0.05).
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Figure 4.2: Average individual contributions over ten rounds for the repeated-
game (RHOM, REND, and RCOST) treatments, differentiated by player type.
The“good”player type refers to players with high endowments or low marginal
costs, respectively in the REND and RCOST treatments, whereas the “bad”
type refers to players with low endowments or high marginal costs, respectively.
Figure 4.2 displays the development of average individual contributions over
time in the repeated-game (R) treatments. Individual contributions are close
together in the case of heterogeneous endowments (REND), with the “good”
type (high endowments) contributing slightly more on average over all ten
rounds,24 but significantly different for heterogeneous marginal costs, where
it is also the “good” type (low marginal costs) that contributes more.25 The
graph for the homogeneous treatment, which is located in the middle of the
others, conveys the notion that these type-related differences are symmetric
around a strict application of the equal-contributions norm. Accordingly, the
observed difference is caused merely by the way in which an otherwise efficient
total contribution is allocated among the individual players. The differences
244.51 CU (G) vs. 3.62 CU (B). Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each
group the averages of individual contributions (average over all rounds) of players with high
endowments (G) and low endowments (B) in REND treatments: W “ 28, ns{r “ 8, p ą 0.05.
255.77 CU (G) vs. 2.23 CU (B). Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each
group the averages of individual contributions (average over all rounds) of players with low
marginal costs (G) and high marginal costs (B) in RCOST treatments: W “ 45, ns{r “
9, p ă 0.05.
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in the statistical results are even more pronounced for Round 10, that is, the
final round of the experiment.26
In comparing average individual payoffs using only rounds in which a group
successfully reaches the threshold,27 we can establish a similar statistical type-
related difference, now for high and low endowments.28 Groups with hetero-
geneous marginal costs, in contrast, appear to divide payoffs almost equally
between player types, given that the average contributions shown in Figure 4.2
are close to the equal-payoff benchmarks, but the difference in individual pay-
offs is still statistically significant.29
Although this analysis is insufficient to conclude that players with hetero-
geneous endowments indeed prefer equal contributions or that players with
heterogeneous costs prefer equal payoffs, we can at least rule out that the re-
spectively other most focal allocation plays a significant role in the contribution
choice. Accordingly, we can reject Hypothesis 4.3b as well. In Section 5.4.3 of
the next chapter, I will further demonstrate that the RCOST groups do not
coordinate on welfare-maximizing outcomes.
Finally, by examining individual behavior in the first round of the experi-
ment (as shown in Table 4.6), we can see that the distribution norms which
prevail in the end seem to be already present before the players start their
interactions.30 Specifically, the difference due to the decision rule for hetero-
geneous endowments may be related to an initial focus of low-endowment (B)
players on equal contributions, which is chosen by 12 of 18 or 66% of these
players in the repeated game (REND), but not a single low-endowment (B)
player in voting groups (VEND).31 In contrast, players with high endowments
26Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the averages of individ-
ual contributions (only Round 10) of good (G) and bad (B) player types:
REND: W “ 8, ns{r “ 4, p ą 0.05 (average contributions: 4.47 CU (G) vs. 3.61 CU (B))
RCOST: W “ 45, ns{r “ 9, p ă 0.05 (average contributions: 5.71 CU (G) vs. 2.08 CU (B)).
27Remember that groups that do not reach the threshold in a given round receive a
predetermined payoff for this round which therefore does not reflect fairness preferences.
However, individual contributions are determined before the group’s success or failure is
known and are therefore equally meaningful in either case. This is why unsuccessful rounds
are excluded from an analysis related to payoffs, but not to contributions.
28Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the averages of individ-
ual payoffs (average over all rounds in which the public good is provided, nine observations
each) of players with high endowments (G) and low endowments (B) in REND treatments:
W “ 45, ns{r “ 9, p ă 0.05 (average payoffs: 26.10 ExCU (G) vs. 21.48 ExCU (B)).
29Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the averages of individ-
ual payoffs (average over all rounds in which the public good is provided, nine observations
each) of players with low marginal costs (G) and high marginal costs (B) in RCOST treat-
ments: W “ ´39, ns{r “ 9, p ă 0.05 (average payoffs: 23.92 ExCU (G) vs. 23.09 ExCU
(B)).
30An overall comparison of treatments with respect to the frequencies listed in Table 4.6
using a chi-squared test proves highly significant: Pearson Chi-squared = 99.4058 (10 d.f.),
p ă 0.001.
31This difference is also statistically highly significant (p ă 0.001), measured using Fisher’s
exact test to compare the absolute frequency of type B players in Round 1 of treatment
REND (n “ 18) who contributed 4 CU with the absolute frequency of type B players in
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Table 4.6: Absolute frequency by player type (G or B) of own individual contri-
bution choices (actual for repeated game or as part of proposed contribution
vector for unanimous vote) in Round 1 that are compatible with a particu-
lar distribution norm – equal contribution (EC), equal payoff (EP), both, or
neither.
Equal contributions Equal payoffs Both EC and
EP
Neither EC or EP
VHOM all n.a. n.a. 26 6
VEND
G 4 5 n.a. 9
B 0 5 n.a. 13
all 4 10 n.a. 22
VCOST
B 2 12 n.a. 4
G 2 7 n.a. 9
all 4 19 n.a. 13
RHOM all n.a. n.a. 26 10
REND
G 8 5 n.a. 5
B 12 3 n.a. 3
all 20 8 n.a. 8
RCOST
B 2 7 n.a. 9
G 0 8 n.a. 10
all 2 15 n.a. 19
(G) are not significantly more likely to choose equal contributions in the first
round of the repeated game (REND) compared to under a unanimous vote
(VEND).32 The initial choices for players with heterogeneous costs are not
significantly different between the decision rules regardless of type.33
However, a series of OLS regressions of final individual contributions (vot-
ing outcome or contribution in Round 10) with standard errors clustered at
the group level (see Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9) suggests that it is the decision
rule, not the players’ own initial contributions, that drives the results in the
heterogeneous treatments. Explanatory variables in each regression model are
the players’ own individual contributions (actual or proposed) in Round 1 of
the experiment, as well as a measure for individual fairness preferences, which
is described and discussed in Section 4.6.2 below. In addition, the models con-
Round 1 of treatment VEND (n “ 18) who propose a contribution vector that assigns
themselves a contribution of 4 CU.
328 of 18 (or 44%) of type G players in repeated game vs. 4 of 18 (or 22%) of type G
voting players. Fisher’s exact test comparing the absolute frequency of type G players in
Round 1 of treatment REND (n “ 18) who contributed 4 CU with the absolute frequency of
type G players in Round 1 of treatment VEND (n “ 18) who propose a contribution vector
that assigns themselves a contribution of 4 CU: p “ 0.321.
33Fisher’s exact test comparing the absolute frequencies of EC or EP choices (actual or
proposed) for both player types combined under either decision rule (VCOST vs. RCOST,
n “ 36 each): p “ 0.379.
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tain dummy variables for the decision-making procedure as well as the player
type (if there is heterogeneity).
Table 4.7: OLS regression for final contributions in END
treatments, with and without interaction term, cluster-
robust standard errors in brackets (18 groups)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Own contribution (Round 1) 0.205: 0.069
(0.107) (0.072)
Vote -0.041 -1.461˚˚
(0.055) (0.272)
Good type 2.042˚˚ 0.783
(0.492) (0.501)
Good type x Vote 2.900˚˚
(0.497)
Individual fairness preference (Q1) -0.259 0.133
(0.262) (0.155)
Intercept 2.595˚˚ 3.135˚˚
(0.634) (0.531)
N 72 72
R2 0.611 0.801
F 17.07 109.19
Significance levels : : : 10% ˚ : 5% ˚˚ : 1%
While the first model for END treatments (Table 4.7) shows that good
types (i.e., high endowment) contribute significantly more in general than bad
types, introducing an interaction term in a second model makes it clear that
this difference only reflects the equal-payoff outcomes in the voting treatment.
The fact that the player type does not significantly affect contributions by
itself is once again compatible with the idea that voluntary contributions in
the repeated game predominantly lead to equal-contribution outcomes.
In the HOM and COST treatments, initial contributions (or proposals) have
a higher influence on the final outcome and are in fact the main explanatory
factor of the variance of contributions in HOM treatments (Table 4.8). The
regression for the COST treatments (Table 4.9), finally, shows that the proce-
dure effect observed for heterogeneous endowments does not appear to apply
to heterogeneous marginal costs of contribution. Although the good player
type (here this means low marginal costs) contributes significantly more in an
overall analysis (Model 1), introducing an interaction term in order to com-
pare individual treatments (Model 2) does not change this result. Quite the
opposite: The regression finds no procedural difference between the two COST
treatments apart from a tendency of low-cost players in the repeated game to
contribute slightly less than an equal-payoff allocation would prescribe. Yet
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Table 4.8: OLS regression for final contribu-
tions in HOM treatments, cluster-robust stan-
dard errors in brackets (17 groups)
Variable Model 1
Own contribution (Round 1) 0.439˚˚
(0.123)
Vote -0.283
(0.372)
Individual fairness preference (Q1) 0.567
(0.402)
Intercept 1.175
(1.031)
N 68
R2 0.243
F 5.08
Significance levels : : : 10% ˚ : 5% ˚˚ : 1%
this is at most an indication for more frequent norm violations in the repeated
game (which is consistent with a reduced success rate) and certainly does not
suggest a change of focal allocations like in the END treatments.
4.6 Explaining the observed procedure effect
The results show a procedure effect for heterogeneous endowments, in which
case the groups favor a different threshold allocation under a unanimous vote
than in a repeated game with voluntary contributions. Although this effect
becomes the most pronounced towards the end of the experiment, presumably
after the subjects have learned to coordinate their behavior, differences appear
already in the initial choices which are still unaffected by player interactions.
What is the explanation of this procedure effect? I consider the following
three options:
1. Contextual differences between the procedures
2. Differences in the subjects’ individual fairness preferences
3. Strategic differences between the procedures
4.6.1 Contextual differences
The first alternative, namely that there are contextual differences between the
procedures, suggests that particular expressions used in the experimental in-
structions have triggered the observed distribution norms. There certainly is
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Table 4.9: OLS regression for final contributions in COST
treatments, with and without interaction term, cluster-
robust standard errors in brackets (18 groups)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Own contribution (Round 1) 0.436: 0.446:
(0.220) (0.221)
Vote 0.279˚ 0.017
(0.114) (0.162)
Good type 2.448˚˚ 2.152˚
(0.787) (0.879)
Good type x Vote 0.531
(0.312)
Individual fairness preference (Q1) -0.118 -0.123
(0.226) (0.145)
Intercept 1.030˚ 1.146˚
(0.473) (0.457)
N 72 72
R2 0.839 0.843
F 351.53 306.42
Significance levels : : : 10% ˚ : 5% ˚˚ : 1%
a contextual difference between a unanimous vote and a series of individual
choices. Speaking of “proposals, votes, and unanimous agreement” may evoke
a more cooperative and egalitarian mind-setting than speaking merely of “in-
dividual contributions.” So the “procedure effect” could actually be a “framing
effect” that then causes the observed procedural differences for heterogeneous
endowments.
This conjecture finds some support in the concept of “institutional fram-
ing” which is stipulated by Isaac et al. (1991) to cause a similar contextual
difference of predominant principles of justice. Elliott et al. (1998) provide
experimental evidence for this concept in a public goods game, finding that
subjects under a “cooperative” framing contribute more than subjects under
an “entrepreneurial” (competitive) framing. A similar framing effect has also
been observed by Loewenstein et al. (1989) for stated preferences over out-
comes of a distributive dispute, in which a “business” framing leads to more
selfish responses. However, all of these studies are primarily concerned with
the contrast between free-riders and cooperators, but not between different
types of fairness. In my experiment, the more cooperative framing of the vot-
ing treatments accordingly should at worst result in higher total contributions,
because contributing zero might be considered free-riding, but the aggregate
contribution levels are almost the same in all treatments.
The findings by Brekke et al. (Unpublished) are a different matter, however,
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because here the framing effect is correlated with individual fairness prefer-
ences, which in turn might affect equilibrium selection. My REND treatment
uses a frame of absolute contributions, which in Brekke et al. (Unpublished)
results in the highest contributions for players with low endowments and, thus,
might be associated with equal contributions. The preference for equal pay-
offs in my treatment VEND would be consistent with a frame that highlights
the payoff domain. The problem is, however, that treatment RCOST also has
an absolute-contribution frame, but results in equal payoffs and unequal con-
tributions. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to replicate the results under a
more neutral framing for both procedures in order to be sure that contextual
differences are sufficiently controlled for.
4.6.2 Self-reported fairness preferences
As the decision rule apparently affects a group’s collective preference for a“fair”
allocation of contributions, one might wonder what these players’ individual
fairness preferences are in similar situations. In order to uncover this, the sub-
jects are presented with a number of questionnaire items after the experiment,
which were previously used by Konow (1996) to measure fairness preferences
of this kind.34
Question 1 (Konow, 1996, Item 1I) Bob and John are identical in
terms of physical and mental abilities. They become shipwrecked on an
uninhabited island where the only food is bananas. 10 bananas per day fall
to their feet on land while others fall into the ocean. They can collect as
many bananas as they want by climbing up a tree, picking them before they
fall into the ocean and throwing them into a pile. In this way Bob picks
7 bananas per day and John picks 3 per day. Thus, there are a total of
20 bananas per day on the island. If you could decide the distribution of
bananas and wanted to be fair, which of the following would you choose?
A. Bob gets 10 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 3 which fell, and John
gets 10, the 3 which he picked plus 7 which fell.
B. Bob gets 12 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 5 which fell, and John
gets 8, the 3 which he picked plus 5 which fell.
C. Bob gets 14 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 7 which fell, and John
gets 6, the 3 which he picked plus 3 which fell.
The first of these items (Item 1I from Konow, 1996, shown below) entails a
direct comparison between different allocations of an output variable (bananas
34The use of questionnaire items that are not directly related to the game the subjects
have just played controls for the possibility that the subjects choose their answers to be
consistent with their contribution choices, and not because this is their actual preference.
This may have been less of a problem for Brekke et al. (Unpublished) where in most cases
the experiment ended after only one round of contributions.
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Table 4.10: Answers to Question 1 by treatment. A: equal sum, B: equal share,
C: proportional share
A B C # observations
Repeated game RHOM 9 (25%) 27 (75%) 0 (0%) 36
REND 12 (33%) 23 (64%) 1 (3%) 36
RCOST 12 (33%) 23 (64%) 1 (3%) 36
Unanimous vote VHOM 9 (28%) 23 (72%) 0 (0%) 32
VEND 16 (44%) 20 (56%) 0 (0%) 36
VCOST 15 (42%) 18 (50%) 3 (8%) 36
Total 73 (34%) 134 (63%) 5 (3%) 212
Konow (1996) 68 (33%) 125 (61%) 12 (6%) 205
received) among two parties that differ in their input variable (bananas picked).
Accordingly, this item can distinguish between different instances of the equity
principle. Option A refers to equality of overall payoffs, as both parties receive
the same total sum of bananas. Option B indicates a different kind of payoff
equality, namely one in which only the “free” earnings (bananas which fell) are
shared equally. Option C represents proportionality of inputs and outputs,
because the share of bananas that fell on the ground is equal to the proportion
of previously picked bananas.
Table 4.10 shows how the subjects answered this question in the six treat-
ments, contrasted with the observed frequencies reported by Konow (1996).
Strikingly, we do not only not see any statistically significant treatment dif-
ferences,35 but also no difference to the original Konow (1996) survey.36 Only
the voting treatments reveal a slight tendency towards Option A, possibly as
a result of the abundance of equal-payoff outcomes in these treatments.
Question 2 (Konow, 1996, Item 2B)
Smith and Jones work in identical office jobs at a large company and
have the same experience, seniority and past performance records. Smith
chooses to work 40 hours per week and gets paid $800 while Jones chooses
to work 20 hours per week and gets paid $400.
1. Very fair 2. Fair 3. Unfair 4. Very unfair
The second and third item are framed in the context of a work environment,
where the input-output comparison from equity theory may be even more
influential. Not surprisingly, proportional outcomes are perceived as the most
35Overall Fisher’s exact test comparing the frequencies of answers to Question 1 in all
treatments: p “ 0.278.
36Chi-squared test comparing total responses to Question 1 over all treatments with total
responses from Konow (1996) sample: Pearson Chi-squared = 3.26 (2 d.f.), p “ 0.196.
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Table 4.11: Answers to Question 2 by treatment.
Very fair Fair Unfair Very unfair # observations
Repeated game RHOM 18 (50%) 14 (39%) 3 (8%) 1 (3%) 36
REND 15 (42%) 13 (36%) 6 (17%) 2 (6%) 36
RCOST 15 (42%) 19 (53%) 2 (6%) 0 (0%) 36
Unanimous vote VHOM 16 (50%) 14 (44%) 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 32
VEND 21 (58%) 14 (39%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 36
VCOST 19 (53%) 11 (31%) 4 (11%) 2 (6%) 36
Total 104 (49%) 85 (40%) 17 (8%) 6 (3%) 212
Konow (1996) 90 (74%) 31 (26%) 121
fair in this context, meaning that most players choose “Very fair” or “Fair”
for Question 2 and Option C for Question 3. Again there is no difference
among treatments,37 nor are the results for Question 3 (Table 4.12) significantly
different from the original survey.38 The responses to Question 2 (Table 4.11)
tend more towards “Fair” judgments than in Konow (1996),39 but this could be
explained with the coarser differentiation between answers in the latter case,
where subjects could only choose between “Fair” and “Unfair”. Overall, we can
conclude that the subjects have more or less similar self-reported preferences
in all treatments, which in turn more or less correspond to what was observed
by Konow (1996) in telephone interviews.
Question 3 (Konow, 1996, Item 5)
Bill and Sam manage a small grocery store at different times and on dif-
ferent days. The manager’s duties are always the same and the days and
times which each work vary pretty much randomly, but Bill works 40 hours
per week while Sam works 20 hours per week. Suppose the manager’s salary
for a 60 hour week is $1200. Which of the following is the most fair divi-
sion of this salary?
A. Bill gets $600 and Sam gets $600.
B. Bill gets $700 and Sam gets $500.
C. Bill gets $800 and Sam gets $400.
There seems to be no correlation between the choices in the experiment and
the individual fairness preferences stated in the subsequent questionnaire. The
37Overall Fisher’s exact test comparing the frequencies of answers in all treatments: p “
0.533 (Question 2), p “ 0.320 (Question 3).
38Fisher’s exact comparing total responses to Question 3 over all treatments with total
responses from Konow (1996) sample: p > 0.1.
39Fisher’s exact test comparing total responses to Question 2 (pooling “Very fair” and
“Fair” as well as “Unfair” and “Very unfair” options) over all treatments with total responses
from Konow (1996) sample: p “ 0.0006.
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Table 4.12: Answers to Question 3 by treatment.
A (600, 600) B (700, 500) C (800, 400) # observations
Repeated game RHOM 1 (3%) 4 (11%) 31 (86%) 36
REND 1 (3%) 6 (17%) 29 (81%) 36
RCOST 1 (3%) 3 (8%) 32 (89%) 36
Unanimous vote VHOM 0 (0%) 4 (13%) 28 (88%) 32
VEND 0 (0%) 4 (11%) 32 (89%) 36
VCOST 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 35 (97%) 36
Total 4 (2%) 21 (10%) 187 (88%) 212
Konow (1996) 6 (2%) 38 (13%) 281 (85%) 295
regression tables 4.8, 4.7 and 4.9 further indicate that Question 1, which is the
closest to exhibiting a treatment effect, does not correlate with the contribution
behavior in the experiment. Yet by contrasting Question 1 with Questions 2
and 3, we can see that the subjects indeed react to contextual differences.
The social norm for the “work” context apparently does not set as much store
in sharing “random earnings” equally as does the one for the “shipwrecked”
context.
4.6.3 Strategic differences
The final option of strategic differences between the procedures, has been con-
trolled for to a certain degree by ensuring that all threshold allocations can
be implemented as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria under either of the two
decision rules. Accordingly, we can say that, if the subjects are assumed to be
rational decision-makers, at least standard non-cooperative game theory does
not reveal any strategic differences.
However, there are nevertheless certain differences between the two proce-
dures that might turn out to be the cause of the procedure effect. One is
the fact that coordination is easier under the voting procedure, because the
players can send a multi-dimensional signal, indicating preferences for the to-
tal contribution and its allocation among the group members via individual
contributions at the same time through different components of their propos-
als. In contrast, the players in the repeated game only have a one-dimensional
signal to convey both preference layers. If these players contribute too little,
but according to their individually preferred distribution norm, they risk that
the total contribution falls short of the threshold. On the other hand, if they
decide to contribute enough to reach the threshold, this may come at the cost
of compromising their own understanding of a “fair” allocation. Furthermore,
the choices of players in the repeated game potentially affect their payoffs right
from the very first round, whereas voting players have less pressure to coordi-
nate their actions, given that only their final agreement counts towards their
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payoff.
It is also possible that the complexity of the voting rule facilitates coordi-
nation on similarly more complex distribution norms, whereas the restricted
action set in the repeated game forces the subjects to stick to more easily
implemented norms. Strikingly, though, players with heterogeneous costs do
not appear to have this problem and predominantly prefer the same distribu-
tion norm under both decision rules. It is therefore unlikely that the varying
degrees of complexity can explain the outcomes in groups with heterogeneous
endowments; or at least they cannot do so entirely. After all, if groups with
heterogeneous costs manage to coordinate on a p2, 2, 6, 6q allocation in the
repeated game in order to achieve equal payoffs, groups with heterogeneous
endowments should be able to do the same thing if they wanted to.
On the other hand, yet another reason to assume a strategic difference be-
tween the two decision-making procedures originates from an analysis involving
concepts of cooperative game theory (e.g., Moulin, 1988), i.e., addressing the
problem from a cooperative perspective. To wit, the characteristic functions
for the two decision rules, specifying the total payoffs that various coalitions of
(rational) players can attain under their own power (that is, if the remaining
players do everything in their power to hamper this coalition’s actions), differ
in all values except those for the “grand coalition” (all players together) and
the singleton coalitions (only individual players). This is because a unanimous
vote requires all players to cooperate in said grand coalition in order to im-
plement any outcome other than q0, whereas a coalition of any two players
suffices to reach the threshold (and thereby increase total payoffs significantly)
if individual contributions are voluntary. Assuming non-transferable utilities,
which makes sense if there are no side-payments among the players, it is then
easy to see that all focal points in both decision rules are consistent with the
NTU core (e.g., Moulin, 1988, p. 102), basically because they are all Pareto
optimal.40 Although the NTU core is also unable to directly capture the treat-
ment differences, because it is too imprecise, it is likely that other concepts for
NTU cooperative games will be more successful.
Finally, the same geometric analysis employed in Chapter 2 can conceivably
be used for a pairwise comparison of two threshold allocations, both of which
are pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the basic game.41 Yet if such an approach
indeed succeeds in explaining the observed procedure effect, another potential
problem arises: Since neither cooperative nor evolutionary game theory assume
other-regarding preferences, even a group of selfish players can be expected to
coordinate on a“fair”allocation of the threshold, reducing seemingly pro-social
behavior to nothing more than a side-effect of what is actually a completely
40Bagnoli and Lipman (1989, 1992) derive a similar result for voluntary contributions in
a threshold public goods game with a refund of contributions if the threshold is missed,
showing that all threshold equilibria are contained in the (TU) core.
41Using pairwise comparisons of equilibria for the purpose of equilibrium selection has
previously been proposed, e.g., by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
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selfish, but nevertheless strategic choice.
4.7 Discussion
How do these results compare to similar experimental studies?
In the unanimous voting treatments, the subjects almost always agree on
a compromise that does not favor individual players or even their varying
fairness preferences. With only a few exceptions, the voting players seem to
be unerringly drawn towards equal payoff shares. As mentioned above, this
outcome is in accordance with the maxi-min criterion (Rawls, 1971), meaning
also that these results run contrary to what Frohlich et al. (1987a,b) and
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990) found in their experiments, where subjects
chose utilitarian allocations.42 On the other hand, the VCOST treatment does
in a way corroborate the findings of Eavey and Miller (1984), because the
players with heterogeneous marginal costs vote for an outcome that is “fair,”
namely the equal-payoff allocation, but does not belong to the (TU) core set
if costs are heterogeneous (as the outcome is not welfare-maximizing in this
case).
Yet also in the repeated game with individual voluntary contributions, the
subjects are apparently forced to compromise their individual notions of fair-
ness. Here the reason may be less the equal bargaining power and more the
difficulty to coordinate, but still only a few allocations result with a high fre-
quency and rarely those consistent with the individual fairness preferences
stated by the subjects afterwards. An alternative interpretation, according to
which different fairness norms “evolve” under different procedures that both
permit learning through repeated interaction has some roots in the theoreti-
cal literature, e.g., by Bester and Gu¨th (1998) who show that other-regarding
preferences may originate in an evolutionary process.
Previous studies involving heterogeneous endowments in games with vol-
untary contributions (van Dijk et al., 1999; Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993;
Bernard et al., Unpublished) support the focus on only a small number of
salient points, although they almost exclusively report that the better endowed
players contribute more, usually in proportion to their endowment share. This
study does not seem to corroborate these findings, since most groups end up
with equal contributions, which is more similar to the observation by Alberti
and Cartwright (2016). However, in the present study, proportional contri-
butions may have simply been dismissed by the subjects as a focal outcome
because this allocation involves non-integer contributions. In fact, equal con-
tributions (q “ 4 CU) are still very close to a proportional allocation of the
threshold if endowments are heterogeneous (qB “ 3.6 CU, qG “ 4.4 CU).
42Earlier studies, like the seminal paper by Fiorina and Plott (1978) do not even per-
mit interpersonal comparisons of payoffs that could lead to an agreement on equal-payoff
outcomes.
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The questionnaire results, finally, are in accordance with Gaertner and
Schokkaert who state that questionnaire studies (as part of empirical social
choice) “derive information about norms” (Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2012, Ch.
2.2.1, p. 21). In other words, self-reported preferences measure what the
subjects think should be chosen, i.e., what is socially acceptable, whereas ex-
periments measure what is chosen by the subjects, i.e., what maximizes their
individual utility. So, if we find that the subjects report a preference for sim-
ilar norms in all treatments, then this does not mean that they are also able
to (or even want to) conform to these norms with their actual behavior in the
experiment. Strategic considerations may lead them to ignore what should
be done and pragmatically stick to what can be done. Still, establishing that
there are no treatment differences with respect to what the subjects think is so-
cially acceptable in a similar context is essential for claiming that the observed
treatment differences in actual behavior are indeed caused by the different
decision-making procedures.
In summary, there are several possible theoretical explanations of parts of
the results reported in this study, but (as yet) no all-encompassing theory that
can explain all of these results in a single model.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed how principles of distributive fairness are related
to equilibrium selection in ThrPGs. An experimental investigation finds that
a unanimous binding vote on contributions in a ThrPG results in equal-payoff
allocations under several kinds of heterogeneity. In contrast, individual vol-
untary contributions in a similar scenario result in equal contributions (and
unequal payoffs) for players with heterogeneous endowments. Although each
result by itself is not very controversial, the combination warrants further in-
vestigation of the consistency (or lack thereof) of collective allocation choices
under various decision rules.
The experiments presented here indicate that the decision rule employed
to bring about a collective choice has an influence on the outcome of this
choice. More strikingly, strategic considerations can apparently overrule in-
dividual preferences for fair cost allocations. Like politicians in real life, the
subjects’ choices are governed by what is feasible; they compromise their indi-
vidual preferences to reach an at least partly favorable agreement, to an extent
that the decision rule is a better predictor of the outcome than the subjects’
preferences.
Real-world communities will usually have a choice in whether to finance a
particular project publicly (e.g., by a vote to increase tax rates) or to leave
the funding to the private sector (i.e., voluntary contributions). In the light
of the findings of this study, this choice becomes even more difficult, because
communal involvement may not merely affect the chances of project being
successful, but may also result in a different allocation of the cost burden.
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Future research should attempt to reproduce the results reported here in
other settings, e.g., in other variants of divide-the-pie games, like the bar-
gaining game described by Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Ch. 8) or ultimatum
bargaining (Gu¨th et al., 1982). Some kind of player heterogeneity seems to be
required, though, in order to separate the various fairness concepts from each
other. This would also complement a strand of the literature (involving, e.g.,
Bolton et al., 2005) that reports a procedural effect for homogeneous players
that reduces the salience of the equality norm, but seemingly without intro-
ducing more salient alternatives. There is certainly a difference between the
observation of norm violations (as in Bolton et al., 2005) and the origin of
altogether different norms as suggested by my experimental results.
Apart from the comparison of cooperative and non-cooperative decision
rules, it might also be interesting to compare various voting rules with respect
to the fairness concept that they relate to. Majority voting will likely lead
to more unequal allocations, but not necessarily so if no player type is in a
minority position.
Another extension of this model, transfer payments among the subjects,
will be discussed in the following chapter. If a redistribution of payoffs is
possible after contributions have been made and the public good has been
successfully provided (or not), the contribution decision can be separated from
fairness considerations, which are then resolved exclusively via the choice of
transfer payments. For heterogeneous marginal costs in particular, this means
that welfare maximization and equalization of payoffs (or other principles that
depend on a comparison of payoffs among the group members) can be satisfied
with the same allocative decision. But players with heterogeneous endowments
might also suddenly display a collective preference for equal payoffs if such
can be achieved at less risk of coordination failure, i.e., via voluntary ex-post
transfer payments.
4.A Inequality aversion in ThrPGs
4.A.1 Equilibrium selection via inequality aversion
I will now argue that the assumption of inequality-averse players by itself is not
sufficient to reduce the equilibrium set to a unique threshold allocation, namely
one resulting in equal payoffs, but at best shrinks the set of efficient equilibria
to allocations close to this outcome. Moreover, zero contributions also remains
a Nash equilibrium. As mentioned above, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) give an
empirical motivation for a contribution vector that results in equal payoffs to
all players.43 Since subjects are known to be “inequality averse,” they can be
expected to react to payoff differences between them and other players caused
by different threshold allocations. As before, a group is defined by a set of
43For a critical discussion of inequality aversion with references to additional literature
see, e.g., Bergh (2008).
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players N , which contains n individual players. For reasons of simplicity, I
will assume that all of these players are identical. Furthermore, corresponding
to the experimental investigation in this chapter, the players face a damage
payment d if the threshold is not reached, but are granted a full refund of their
contribution costs in this case. A player i with Fehr-Schmidt preferences has
the following utility function (β ď α, 0 ď β ă 1):
uippi1pqq, . . . , pinpqqq “ piipqq ´ α 1
n´ 1
ÿ
jPN ztiu
maxtpijpqq ´ piipqq, 0u
´ β 1
n´ 1
ÿ
jPN ztiu
maxtpiipqq ´ pijpqq, 0u (4.1)
This function specifies that player i suffers a disutility for each player j
that has a different payoff than himself, although he cares a little less about
players that earn less than himself. Obviously, unless the marginal costs of
contribution are heterogeneous, a threshold allocation that results in equal
payoffs will be the unique welfare-maximizing outcome for players with Fehr-
Schmidt preferences with a total utility of
Uppi1pqEPq, . . . , pinpqEPqq “
nÿ
i“1
uippiipqEPqq “
nÿ
i“1
piipqEPq “ ΠWM . (4.2)
Any other (feasible) threshold allocation qˆ will result in the same total
payoff ΠWM , but also create disutilities that lower the total utility, meaning
that
@qˆ with
nÿ
i“1
qˆi “ T : Uppi1pqEPq, . . . , pinpqEPqq ě Uppi1pqˆq, . . . , pinpqˆqq. (4.3)
Yet, this at best allows the conclusion that the players should select this
outcome if they feel a moral obligation to maximize the group’s total welfare.
Even this is not certain, if the players have heterogeneous marginal costs,
because the welfare gains from a cost-efficient allocation of contributions may
then outweigh the welfare losses from unequal payoffs.
Furthermore, qEP may still represent only one of many Nash equilibria. To
see this, note that, given a threshold allocation qˆ, even a marginal reduction
of i’s contribution will cause the threshold to be missed. But the damages di
are greater than i’s (refunded or saved) contribution costs (or this allocation
would not have been a Nash equilibrium for standard preferences). So, the total
disutilities from unequal payoffs suffered by i at allocation qˆ must be greater
than d ´ cqi to warrant the deviation. And this does not yet account for the
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disutilities that arise from possibly unequal endowments (minus damages) after
all players have been refunded their contribution costs.
To prove the point, it is sufficient to show that there are some parameter
constellations, under which an inequitable threshold allocation is not elim-
inated as an equilibrium. Due to the assumption of homogeneous players,
equal payoffs result only for the equal contributions outcome. At any other
feasible allocation qˆ there are at least two players who make different contribu-
tions and therefore earn different payoffs. Without loss of generality, label the
player with the highest payoff at qˆ with h (there may be several such players).
Similarly, l denotes the player (possibly one of several) with the lowest payoff
at qˆ. Note that pihpqˆq ě pijpqˆq, for all j P N , also implies qˆh ď qˆj, for all
j P N , meaning that player h makes the lowest contribution at this allocation.
Player h could decrease his disutility from unequal payoffs by increasing
his contribution which in turn would reduce his payoff. However, this is not
individually optimal because β ă 1, meaning that the payoff reduction hurts
the player more than he benefits from the inequality reduction. Yet the same
player could also decrease his contribution to ensure that the threshold is
missed and all players earn the same payoff e ´ d. For this choice to be
individually optimal, given that all other players comply with allocation qˆ, we
must have
e´ d ě e´ cqˆh ´ β 1
n´ 1
ÿ
jPN zthu
pe´ qˆh ´ e` qˆjq (4.4)
or
d´ cqˆh ď β 1
n´ 1
ÿ
jPN zthu
pqˆj ´ qˆhq (4.5)
A similar inequality is derived for player l who has the lowest payoff at qˆ:
d´ cqˆl ď α 1
n´ 1
ÿ
jPN ztlu
pqˆl ´ qˆjq (4.6)
The remaining players will suffer disutilities from other players’ payoffs that
are either higher or lower than their own payoff, but otherwise have inequalities
of a similar form. The left-hand sides of (4.5) and (4.6) are positive or (at
worst) equal to zero, since by assumption d ě cqˆi for all i. The right-hand
sides of (4.5) and (4.6) are strictly positive, as they represent the players’
disutilities from unequal payoffs with allocation qˆ. Whether or not qˆ is (still)
a Nash equilibrium depends mainly on the damage payment d, which can be
arbitrarily large. Accordingly, a threshold allocation will be the less likely to
be eliminated as an equilibrium under Fehr-Schmidt preferences the higher the
damage payments. Furthermore, threshold allocations that are very close to
qEP are unlikely to be eliminated even if d is low, because the disutilities from
payoff differences become infinitesimally small the closer qˆ is to qEP, while the
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participation constraint d ě cqˆi, for all i, is less likely to be binding for more
equally distributed allocations. Even more problematic for inequality aversion
as a selection criterion is the fact that zero contributions remains individually
optimal, as individual players are still incapable of providing the public good
on their own.
4.A.2 The Simplified ThrPG and inequality aversion
Similar to the case of loss aversion discussed in Section 2.A.2, the Simplified-
ThrPG model can be used to compare the predicted success rate for a group
consisting entirely of inequality-averse players with a group consisting only of
selfish players. Once again, I assume that the inequality-aversion parameters α
and β, as well as the payoffs for the different game outcomes, are the same for
all players, so that the game is completely symmetric. Furthermore, as opposed
to the experimental investigation in this chapter, no refund is granted (r “ 0).
Equal contributions of qi “ T{n for all i and zero contributions (qi “ 0 for all i)
will then be equilibrium strategies of two strict symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibria that result in equal payoffs to all players.
Pl. i
Rest of the Group
Q´i “ T ´ Tn 0 ă Q´i ă T ´ Tn Q´i “ 0
qi “ Tn e´ Tn ` v e´ Tn p1` αn´1´mn´1 q e´ Tn p1` αq
qi “ 0 e´ β Tn e´ β Tn mn´1 e
Figure 4.3: A simplified threshold public goods game with two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria if the players are inequality averse. The game matrix shows
the players’ utilities based on their other-regarding preferences and the choices
of the rest of the group, represented by the total contribution Q´i. Each player
can either contribute T{n or 0.
Figure 4.3 displays the payoff matrix of this game from the perspective of
player i, whereby m (0 ď m ď n ´ 1) denotes the number of other cooper-
ating players. As becomes apparent from the figure, the utilities in the two
pure-strategy equilibria (top-left and bottom-right cell) are equal to the pay-
offs in the standard game without inequality aversion. But whenever player
i chooses a different strategy than at least one other player, the outcome is
asymmetric with respect to payoffs and inequality aversion comes into play. If
player i contributes qi “ T{n, but some other players contribute qi “ 0, these
players will earn comparatively more than i because they incur no contribution
costs, causing a disutility for i amounting to the difference in payoffs (i.e., the
contribution costs) weighted by the number of players who contribute nothing
and i’s degree of aversion to earning less than others α. On the other hand, if
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player i contributes nothing, but several other players contribute, these play-
ers will earn comparatively less than i because they now incur contribution
costs whereas i does not, causing a disutility for i amounting to the difference
in payoffs (again the contribution costs) weighted by number of players who
contribute and i’s degree of aversion to earning more than others β.
Player 1
Player 2
q2 “ T2 q2 “ 0
q1 “ T2 e´
T{2` v,
e´ T{2` v
e´ T{2´ αT{2,
e´ βT{2
q1 “ 0 e´ β
T{2,
e´ T{2´ αT{2
e,
e
Figure 4.4: A simplified two-player threshold public goods game with two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria if the players are inequality averse. The game matrix
shows the players’ utilities based on their other-regarding preferences. Each
player can either contribute T{2 or 0.
Instead of calculating the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the more compli-
cated n-player game,44 I will be satisfied with an analysis of the much simpler
case with only two symmetric players displayed in Figure 4.4. Calculating first
the mixed-strategy equilibrium and then the success rate for this game yields
the following:
p 1
2
“ 1´ σ “ 1´
d
1` α
2v
T
` α ` β . (4.7)
In a comparison with a group of two selfish players, for whom α “ β “ 0, we
can see that an aversion to earning more than the other players (expressed by
β ą 0) increases the success rate. The intuition here is that the fear of earning
more than the other players reduces the incentive for a unilateral deviation
from the efficient equilibrium Q1{2. However, an aversion to earning less than
the other players (expressed by α ą 0) has the opposite effect and decreases
success rates, because unilateral deviation from zero contributions becomes
more costly. Given the assumption that α ě β, it is reasonable to expect that
the latter effect is stronger so that, overall, success rates will be lower in groups
consisting of inequality-averse players.
Moreover, a comparison of the theoretical success rate for inequality aversion
with that for loss aversion reveals a peculiar similarity of the two concepts, at
least for this symmetric example: Both formulas are identical except with
44Note that utility values for the different outcomes once again violate the requirements
made by Kim (1996), although this need not necessarily mean that the previously discussed
selection dynamics cannot be applied. After all, the game still has two strict equilibria in
pure strategies, each of which has a basin of attraction of non-zero volume.
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respect to the labeling of the parameters, i.e., α :“ ηλ, β :“ ´η. Inequality
aversion and loss aversion are not one and the same thing, however, because
both β and η are supposed to be positive. Still, the structural similarity is
striking, because a player that appears to contribute zero because he is averse
to losses may instead turn out to be afraid of earning less than the other group
members, or vice versa.45 This equivalence does not hold in larger groups,
though, let alone in games with heterogeneous players, because a loss-averse
player still cares only about his own payoff relative to a personal reference
point. He just happens to act as if he had other-regarding preferences in this
particular situation.
4.B Questionnaire
The questionnaire uses for the most part items from English-language sources
which are translated into German as literally as possible. Here, however, I
reprint the original English version of these items. Question 4 also contains
a number of new items or ones that have been rephrased slightly in order to
better fit the experimental context.
Please answer the following questions completely. As this is about personal
attitudes, there are neither “right” nor “wrong” answers.
Question 1 (Konow, 1996, Item 1I)
Bob and John are identical in terms of physical and mental abilities. They
become shipwrecked on an uninhabited island where the only food is ba-
nanas. 10 bananas per day fall to their feet on land while others fall into
the ocean. They can collect as many bananas as they want by climbing
up a tree, picking them before they fall into the ocean and throwing them
into a pile. In this way Bob picks 7 bananas per day and John picks 3 per
day. Thus, there are a total of 20 bananas per day on the island. If you
could decide the distribution of bananas and wanted to be fair, which of
the following would you choose?
A. Bob gets 10 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 3 which fell, and John
gets 10, the 3 which he picked plus 7 which fell.
B. Bob gets 12 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 5 which fell, and John
gets 8, the 3 which he picked plus 5 which fell.
C. Bob gets 14 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 7 which fell, and John
gets 6, the 3 which he picked plus 3 which fell.
45A similar relation between inequality aversion and individual risk aversion has already
been suggested by Carlsson et al. (2005).
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Question 2 (Konow, 1996, Item 2B)
Smith and Jones work in identical office jobs at a large company and
have the same experience, seniority and past performance records. Smith
chooses to work 40 hours per week and gets paid $800 while Jones chooses
to work 20 hours per week and gets paid $400.
1. Very fair 2. Fair 3. Unfair 4. Very unfair
Question 3 (Konow, 1996, Item 5)
Bill and Sam manage a small grocery store at different times and on differ-
ent days. The manager’s duties are always the same and the days and times
which each work vary pretty much randomly, but Bill works 40 hours per
week while Sam works 20 hours per week. Suppose the manager’s salary
for a 60 hour week is $1200. Which of the following is the most fair division
of this salary?
A. Bill gets $600 and Sam gets $600.
B. Bill gets $700 and Sam gets $500.
C. Bill gets $800 and Sam gets $400.
Question 4 (adapted from Folger and Konovsky, 1989, Table 1)
Please rate the decision mechanism used in this experiment on the provided
scale (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree).
The mechanism . . .
1. . . . gave you an opportunity to express your side.
2. . . . used consistent standards in evaluating your behavior.
3. . . . gave you feedback that led you to reevaluate you decisions.
4. . . . was honest and ethical in dealing with you.
5. . . . was designed to achieve a fair result.
6. . . . led to a result with which you were not satisfied. (own item)
7. . . . allowed personal motives to influence the result.
8. . . . gave you the opportunity to significantly influence the other play-
ers’ payoff. (own item)
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Socio-demographic questions:
• Age:
• Gender (female, male):
• How often did you participate in an economic experiment? (never,
once, two to five times, more than five times)
Chapter 5
Transfer payments in threshold
public goods games
5.1 Introduction
The experiments in the previous chapter have shown among other things that
players in a ThrPG with heterogeneous marginal costs are either unwilling or
unable to coordinate on a threshold allocation that maximizes their group’s to-
tal payoff. Instead, the players favor an allocation that results in equal payoffs
for all player types. Leaving aside possible explanations of this outcome – be
they fairness considerations or merely strategic decision-making of selfish play-
ers – I will now simply take it as an empirical fact that the game as it is leads
to inefficient outcomes, whether or not each player chooses his contribution
individually or the group votes unanimously on a contribution vector. Based
on this premise of inefficiency, it is then worthwhile to consider variations of
the game, mechanisms by which the group’s total payoff, and thus efficiency,
can be increased. This chapter discusses one such mechanism, namely the op-
tional redistribution of payoffs via transfer payments after the contributions
have been made.1
Ever since Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) showed that punishment can increase
contributions in a public goods game, experiments involving sanctioning mech-
anisms, which also include beneficial “sanctions” in the form of rewards of
which transfer payments (as “zero-sum rewards”) are a subgroup, seem to have
focused only on contribution increases induced by reciprocal action:2 Low con-
tributions are punished at a cost to both the offending player and the punishing
player, and consequently the group’s total payoff. High contributions may be
reciprocated in a similar fashion by a reward paid to the exemplary player. In
a recent experimental study, Andreoni and Gee (2015) show that institutional
1Most of this chapter is taken from a joint paper with Karl-Martin Ehrhart under the
title “Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game” (Feige and Ehrhart,
Unpublished).
2See Chauduri (2011) for a review of the literature on sanctions in public goods games.
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punishment can also increase efficiency in ThrPGs, although results from an
earlier study by Guillen et al. (2006) indicate that their“hired-gun mechanism”
is likely to be abolished in a collective decision by all group members. However,
the literature has so far kept mostly silent on a possibly just as interesting sec-
ond aspect of sanctioning mechanisms: the redistribution of payoffs to achieve
a “fair” (as in “socially acceptable”) outcome.
Admittedly, redistribution can play only a minor role in public goods games
if punishment is the only available means of sanctioning, because this option
decreases the payoffs of both sides. For this reason I primarily focus on studies
that allow reward payments, which only reduce the giver’s payoff in favor of
the receiver. In order to make sure that the sanctioning mechanism cannot be
exploited by shifting rewards back and forth among all players, these payments
are restricted to zero-sum rewards (i.e., transfer payments) in most studies
(e.g., Walker and Halloran, 2004; Gu¨rerk et al., 2006; Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter
et al., 2010). Others (e.g., treatment L3 in Sutter et al., 2010) multiply the
initial reward by a given factor similar to the design of a trust game (Berg et al.,
1995), making a maximum reward payment socially (but not individually)
optimal independently of the preceding choice of contributions. The fact that
such a sanctioning mechanism can lead to welfare increases which are then
shared among the players by redistribution has already been briefly discussed
by Andreoni et al. (2003), albeit in the context of a proposer-responder game.
In the present chapter, I therefore investigate the use of transfer payments
(i.e., reward payments) in a public goods context, not as a means of recip-
rocating fair individual choices by possibly reducing social welfare, but as a
mechanism that can actually implement welfare-maximizing outcomes if the
players have heterogeneous productivity. As this type of heterogeneity already
provides a certain leverage to achieve efficiency gains, namely by shifting con-
tributions to more productive players, transfers in the experiment are strictly
zero-sum, an assumption which makes it possible to better separate redistri-
bution from reciprocity as a motive for making such payments.
As discussed before, the heterogeneity among the players opens up a variety
of potential distribution norms – among others welfare maximization, equal
payoffs, and equal contributions – that all manifest in distinct allocations of
the threshold value (the socially and individually optimal outcome). Without
transfer payments, all of these allocations are unique and distinct from each
other. Most importantly, an allocation can be either welfare-maximizing or
result in equal payoffs, but not both at the same time. However, if transfer
payments are possible after the contributions have been provided, payoffs from
implementing a welfare-maximizing allocation can be redistributed to achieve
equal payoffs as well, possibly increasing this allocation’s attractiveness in the
process.
The experiment simulates two different scenarios in which transfer payments
can occur: First, if the ThrPG is played repeatedly, an incentive to pay trans-
fers can be created by threatening to play an inefficient equilibrium strategy in
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subsequent rounds. Benoit and Krishna (1985) show that equilibria involving
such trigger strategies are subgame perfect in finitely repeated games. Second,
if transfer payments are negotiated at the same time as individual contribu-
tions, specifically in a binding unanimous vote, a redistribution of payoffs can
be implemented even in a one-shot situation.
In practice, the first scenario with voluntary contributions and reciprocal
transfer payments resembles reward-based crowdfunding. Here, the initiator of
the crowdfunding campaign represents a (group of) player(s) with an idea for
an interesting project, but high opportunity costs for risking their own money.
Involving other contributors in the project spreads the risk over many people.
With a fixed minimum amount of funding to realize the project, this is already
a typical case of a ThrPG. However, most crowdfunding campaigns go a step
further and promise rewards proportional to the contribution if the project is
successful. This is common practice at internet platforms.3 These platforms
usually collect contribution pledges which are only redeemed if the specified
funding goal is reached. In other words, these ThrPGs grant a full refund of
contribution costs (r “ 1). The second scenario, a combined negotiation of
contributions and transfer payments, can be observed in the ongoing climate
negotiations, where emissions trading is employed as a transfer mechanism
between industries that can cheaply reduce greenhouse gas emissions and those
capable only of costly abatement.4
There also exists a few other experimental studies that deserve mentioning
in this context. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) find that voting behavior to
redistribute payoffs from “rich” to “poor” subjects is consistent with Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) preferences of inequality aversion. Cabrales et al. (2012) study
a coordination game in which the players can first choose between a costly high
effort and a costless low effort to earn payoffs and then vote on a redistribution
of their earnings. Interestingly, the authors observe redistribution mostly in
groups that predominantly choose low efforts, indicating that this device is
unable to increase efficiency levels in this experiment.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The theoretical
model and its solutions are described in Section 5.2, followed by the experi-
mental design and procedure in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the results of
the experimental investigation, which are further discussed in Section 5.5. Sec-
tion 5.6 concludes with suggestions for future research and possible practical
implications of this work.
3See Mollick (2014) for an empirical study on crowdfunding platforms.
4Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) show theoretically that transfer payments can increase
the size of stable coalitions of countries reaching international environmental agreements.
However, they find the largest potential increase in efficiency not in the case of heterogeneous
abatement costs, but heterogeneous damages from global warming.
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5.2 Theoretical Model
5.2.1 Transfer payments in the underlying game
The basic version of a ThrPG introduced in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 is now
extended to a two-stage decision process as follows:
1. As before, the players simultaneously choose their individual contribu-
tions.
2. If the threshold is reached, the players now also simultaneously choose
individual transfer payments to bestow upon their fellow players.
Just as in the previous chapter, I assume that a group of four players choose
their contributions to a public goods game with a threshold T . Each player
i “ 1, . . . , 4 has the same endowment e and suffers the same damages d if the
threshold is missed, but the players have heterogeneous marginal costs. There
are two player types – one with high marginal contribution costs, ci “ cH , and
the other with low marginal costs, ci “ cL. Each group contains two players
of each type. I assume cH ě cL ą 0 and 4d ą cHT . So far, this is the same
parameter setting as in the COST treatments discussed before.
In addition, if the total contribution reaches the threshold, each individual
player i can now use his remaining endowment, i.e., e´ ciqi, to make bilateral
transfer payments tij to each and every other player j, who then increases his
final payoff by the transferred amount. Although individual players i can make
(or receive) “net” transfer payments ti :“ řjPN ztiu rtji ´ tijs that are different
from zero, all net transfer payments sum to zero, i.e.,
ř4
i“1 ti “ 0. This means
that (unlike in punishment games) no welfare is lost in the process.
Player i’s payoff piipq, tiq is therefore given by:
piipq, tiq “
"
e´ ciqi ` ti if Q ě T
e´ d if Q ă T (5.1)
Since, in this variant of the basic (one-shot) game, transfer payments to
other players just decrease one’s own payoff, all subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
ria of this game have tij “ 0 for all i and j. Apart from that, any feasible vector
of individual contributions q that exactly reaches a total contribution of Q “ T
in the first stage can obviously still be implemented as a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium if it is the result of a strategy that makes zero transfer payments
in the second stage. In fact, the set of allocations that can be implemented as
equilibria is identical to that in the game without transfers.
Similar to the approach in Chapter 4, I consider three distribution norms
in order to significantly reduce the number of equilibria to the presumably
most focal ones: welfare maximization (WM), equal payoffs (EP), and equal
contributions (EC). As explained in Section 4.3.1 of that chapter, low-cost
players must provide T in its entirety in order to maximize welfare. They will
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only do so if this is individually rational, i.e., if cLqi ă d for each contributing
player i.
The previously motivated EP and EC outcomes, with associated contri-
bution vectors qEP and qEC, are both feasible and unique in this experi-
ment. Furthermore, note that, due to the heterogeneity of marginal costs,
all three distribution norms result in distinct contribution vectors, meaning
that qWM ‰ qEP ‰ qEC. So, in this set-up there is in particular a conflict
between maximizing welfare (WM) and distributing the earned payoff equally
(EP).
5.2.2 Transfer payments in a repeated game with indi-
vidual contributions
What about a potential redistribution by means of transfer payments, though?
If high-cost players were able to make a credible promise to share their earnings
from the WM outcome, welfare maximization and equality of payoffs could be
achieved at the same time. Such a credible promise can be made, for example,
if the basic game is played repeatedly with the same group of players.
Transfer payments can give low-cost players an additional incentive to con-
tribute according to qWM, if they expect high-cost players to reciprocate their
high contributions with generous transfers. However, as mentioned above, if
the basic game is played only once, it is not individually optimal to pay a
positive ex-post transfer, because there are no repercussions for not doing so.
Such payments just reduce the transferring players’ payoffs.
Yet matters are different if the players interact repeatedly. Using the
RCOST treatment from the previous chapter as a benchmark, an “RTRANS”
treatment therefore adds the option of ex-post transfers, which are paid vol-
untarily as described above, but only if the threshold has been reached in that
particular round.5 The optional transfer payments create additional equilib-
ria to those arising by simply playing the game repeatedly, in which transfer
payments are used to redistribute payoffs. Assuming that the goal of redistri-
bution is to achieve equality of payoffs, the following subset of equilibria is of
particular interest:
Proposition 5.1. In a finitely repeated threshold public goods game with trans-
fer payments, all feasible threshold allocations can be implemented as subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria that assign equal payoffs to all players if the damage
payment d is sufficiently large.
Proof: In order to equalize the payoffs which the players earn from contribut-
ing an arbitrary threshold allocation, it is usually6 necessary to redistribute
5This is not a critical assumption for the theoretical result. It is only intended to reduce
the complexity of the subsequent experiment.
6The only exception is the unique equal-payoff allocation.
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payoffs by means of transfer payments. Using backward induction and start-
ing in the final round, we notice that transfer payments are not individually
optimal in this round (just like in the one-shot game). However, there are
multiple equilibria in this round and therefore multiple outcomes to which this
subgame may be reduced in the subsequent analysis of the preceding round,
making it possible to condition this final choice on the actions taken in earlier
rounds (cf. Benoit and Krishna, 1985).7
Payoff-equalizing transfer payments can accordingly be implemented by us-
ing q0 (zero contributions) as a threat point in a trigger strategy. This requires
that, for every player i who has to make a positive transfer payment in order
to balance payoffs, this player’s cumulative transfer payment is less than the
payoff reduction suffered if q0 is triggered. It is sufficient to consider the last
two rounds of the game and any feasible threshold allocation qˆ to find a con-
dition for d which satisfies the proposition: Player i faces the choice between
paying the transfer payment in the second-to-last round, which results in the
same threshold allocation qˆ in the final round without this transfer payment,
or not paying the transfer payment, which triggers the status quo in the final
round. Player i chooses to pay the transfer ifÿ
jPN ztiu
tij ă piipqˆq ´ piipq0q “ d´ ciqˆi, (5.2)
which is fulfilled for all players i if the damage payment d is sufficiently
large.
This immediately gives us the following result for the special case of a
welfare-maximizing (WM) threshold allocation.
Corollary 5.1. In a finitely repeated threshold public goods game with transfer
payments, any welfare-maximizing threshold allocation can be implemented as
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that assigns equal payoffs to all players if
the damage payment d is sufficiently large.
Admittedly, it is a rather harsh threat to contribute nothing at all, because
the low-cost players may be worse off under q0 than if WM were played without
transfers. But equal contributions or even equal payoffs may be plausible
alternative threats, with their credibility depending on the actual choice of
parameters. If payoff-equalizing transfers in a “WM & EP” outcome (an equal-
payoff version of WM)8 satisfy nLtHL ă piHpqWMq´piHpqEPq, where nL is the
number of low-cost players in the group, then even a single round with qEP and
zero transfer payments as a threat-point equilibrium is a sufficient deterrent to
withholding transfer payments after socially optimal contributions have been
made.
7Compare also the equilibrium analysis in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.
8There are actually many possible outcomes that are both welfare-maximizing and involve
equal payoffs after transfers, but only a single one in which all low-cost players make the
same contribution and (as a consequence) receive the same transfer payment.
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With respect to the experiment, these results yield the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.1. Transfer payments will be used in the repeated game to im-
plement a welfare-maximizing allocation with equalized payoffs.
5.2.3 Transfer payments under a unanimous vote
A second approach to incentivize transfer payments takes into account the
fact that public good provision is often decided cooperatively, e.g., by a joint
decision of the members of a committee representing the involved stakeholders.
This committee may negotiate contributions and transfer payments at the same
time, fixing the outcome in a binding contract. As long as compliance with
this contract is ensured (a standard assumption in cooperative game theory),
positive transfer payments and the associated redistribution of payoffs are now
an optimal outcome.
The binding unanimous vote described in Section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3 can
be extended so that the group negotiates a vector of net transfer payments
t “ pt1, . . . , t4q, which must be zero-sum, i.e., ř4i“1 ti “ 0, at the same time as
the vector of individual contributions q “ pq1, . . . , q4q. In every voting round,
each player then makes a proposal pq, tq for a contribution vector q and (if
these contributions exceed the threshold) a transfer vector t. Following the
same reasoning as in the equilibrium analysis in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3,
we realize that all threshold allocations can still be implemented as subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria. However, there are now also equilibria in which the
payoffs that result from these allocations are redistributed among the players,
so that, in addition to the previously motivated focal points – i.e., WM, EP,
and EC – “WM & EP”, a welfare-maximizing outcome with equal payoffs can
be attained as well. Accordingly, I postulate a hypothesis similar to that for
the repeated game:
Hypothesis 5.2. Transfer payments will be used in the voting game to imple-
ment a welfare-maximizing allocation with equalized payoffs.
5.3 Experimental design and procedure
The two new treatments, RTRANS and VTRANS, use the same parameter set-
ting as the benchmark treatments RCOST and VCOST, that is e “ 30 ExCU,
q¯ “ 10 CU, T “ 16 CU, cH “ 3 ExCU{CU and cL “ 1 ExCU{CU, d “ 25 ExCU. Ta-
ble 5.1 displays the relevant treatments for this analysis (RCOST and VCOST
are reprinted to facilitate the comparison).9
In order to simplify matters for the subjects, transfer payments are possible
only from high-cost to low-cost players. This reduces complexity mostly in
the repeated game, where high-cost players can now directly determine their
9The participant instructions to all treatments are included in Appendix A.1.
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Table 5.1: Investigated treatments. For each treatment the number of inde-
pendent observations (groups) is given in brackets.
Decision rule
Vote (V) Repeated Game (R)
No Transfer (COST) VCOST (n = 9) RCOST (n = 9)
Transfer (TRANS) VTRANS (n = 9) RTRANS (n = 9)
Table 5.2: Expected outcomes for individual contributions
qH , qL in CU and total group payoffs Πpqq in ExCU by
player type (H or L) and focal point (WM, EP, EC).
qH qL Πpqq
Welfare maximization (WM) 0 CU 8 CU 104 ExCU
Equal payoffs (EP) 2 CU 6 CU 96 ExCU
Equal contributions (EC) 4 CU 4 CU 88 ExCU
net transfer and accordingly their final payoff for a given round. In the voting
treatment with transfers, proposals with a total contribution of 16 CU or
more, i.e., those that reach the threshold, can be extended by four additional
numbers (one for each player) indicating the net transfer this player is to
receive. This number is a deduction for high-cost players (who pay the transfer)
and an addition for low-cost players (who receive the transfer). In the repeated
game, the two high-cost players in each group wait until after the individual
contributions have been made and can then transfer part of their earnings
to each of the low-cost players separately, but again only if the threshold is
reached.
Similar to the procedure described in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, proposals,
votes, individual contributions, and transfer payments are all publicly dis-
played immediately after the choice has been made, together with the IDs of
the associated players (e.g., “Player C”). Furthermore, after the first round the
subjects can again call up the results from past rounds whenever they have to
make a decision.
In line with the theory presented above, all treatments are expected to
lead to the same (optimal) total contribution of QWM “ 16 CU. For all three
focal points in terms of contributions – welfare maximization (WM), equal
payoffs (EP), and equal contributions (EC) – Table 5.2 contains the numerical
predictions for individual contributions by cost-type as well as the associated
total group payoffs.10 Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2 then imply that allocation WM is
chosen if transfers are available and that the resulting total payoff of 104 ExCU
10This is an expected value for the repeated game where only a single randomly chosen
round is paid.
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Table 5.3: Average subject payoffs in investigated treatments in ExCU (ex-
change rate: 2 ExCU = e1) and cluster-robust standard errors (in brackets)
by player type.
Player type Vote (V) Repeated (R) All
(only rounds paid)
COST
both 24.00 (0.00) 19.20 (1.72) 21.60 (1.04)
cL “ 1 24.00 (0.00) 19.33 (1.79) 21.66 (1.07)
cH “ 3 24.00 (0.00) 19.06 (2.22) 21.53 (1.28)
TRANS
both 25.67 (0.23) 21.62 (1.36) 23.64 (0.84)
cL “ 1 25.67 (0.23) 23.46 (1.08) 24.56 (0.62)
cH “ 3 25.67 (0.23) 19.78 (2.25) 22.73 (1.35)
All 24.83 (0.23) 20.41 (1.14) 22.62 (0.69)
is redistributed equally among all players for individual payoffs of 26 ExCU.
5.4 Results
A total of 144 subjects (4 x 9 groups with four members each) were recruited
via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a student pool at the Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology. All sessions took place in December 2014. The computerized
experiment, which used essentially the same procedures as those described
in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, including the post-experimental questionnaire, was
conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Together with a show-up fee of
e3, the subjects earned on average e14.32 (roughly US$19.5 at the time of
the experiment) in all four treatments. Table 5.3 shows the average payoffs by
treatment in ExCU. The subjects spent between one hour and one and a half
hours in the laboratory.
5.4.1 Total contributions, total payoffs, and success rates
A first step in this analysis will be to show that transfer payments do not
significantly affect total contributions or success rates compared to the COST
benchmarks. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference compared to the no-
transfer benchmark with respect to total payoffs. This allows the conclusion
that transfers are not (or at least not primarily) used as a means of sanctioning,
that is, to reciprocate contribution behavior in earlier rounds.
Just like in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.1, the comparison of total contributions
is based on the agreed-upon total contribution in the voting treatments. For
the groups in the repeated game, we use either average values over all rounds
or the results from Round 1 and Round 10, as these represent the start and end
points of the coordination process, respectively. Because of the large number of
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Table 5.4: Absolute frequency of equal-contribution (EC), equal-payoff (EP),
and welfare-maximizing (WM) outcomes (with associated total payoffs in
ExCU), as well as “Other” threshold allocations in groups that successfully
reach the threshold value. For voting treatments the respective group’s final
agreement is used.
EC EP WM Other Unsuccessful Success rates
(88 ExCU) (96 ExCU) (104 ExCU)
VCOST 0 9 0 0 0 9 of 9 (100%)
VTRANS 0 1 7 1 0 9 of 9 (100%)
RCOST
Rd 1 0 1 0 6 2 7 of 9 (77.8%)
Rd 10 0 3 0 4 2 7 of 9 (77.8%)
All Rds 0 23 0 49 18 72 of 90 (80.0%)
RTRANS
Rd 1 0 0 0 7 2 7 of 9 (77.8%)
Rd 10 0 1 4 4 0 9 of 9 (100%)
All Rds 0 6 14 58 12 78 of 90 (86.7%)
ties in our data, we again mostly perform a categorical analysis using Fisher’s
exact test for pairwise comparisons of treatments.11
When comparing the number of groups that exactly match the threshold
value towards the end of the experiment, we find a clear advantage for voting
groups, but no significant effect due to transfer payments. All voting groups
(with and without transfers) manage to reach the threshold value of 16 CU
exactly, resulting in success rates of 100%. Subjects in Round 10 of the re-
peated game exactly reach the threshold in only four out of nine groups without
transfers (RCOST) and in six out of nine groups with transfers (RTRANS).12
Overall, average success rates are also only slightly higher in RTRANS than
in RCOST (86.7% and 80.0%), see Table 5.4. In the following analysis of to-
tal payoffs, we restrict our sample to these successful groups, because transfer
payments to redistribute these payoffs are only possible if the threshold value
has been reached.
Figure 5.1 shows average total payoffs for successful groups on a round-by-
round basis. For voting groups, the data are average proposals in early rounds
until agreement is reached. Afterwards the agreed-upon contribution vectors
are used instead where possible. Groups that use transfer payments clearly
earn higher total payoffs in voting treatments. In the repeated game this
difference takes a few rounds to develop. In any case, we observe the predicted
efficiency increase. Statistically, this effect is supported by the OLS regression
of average total payoffs given in Table 5.5, according to which the transfer
treatments result in significantly higher total payoffs both in the repeated
game with voluntary contributions (dummy variable “Transfer”) and under a
11In each case, we have first checked for differences among all treatments with the same
test, which proved significant (Fisher’s exact: p ă 0.05), unless stated otherwise.
12Fisher’s exact test comparing the number of groups in RCOST and RTRANS treatments
(n “ 9 in each case) for which the final contribution is equal to Q “ 16 CU: p “ 0.637.
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Figure 5.1: Average total payoffs of groups who successfully reach the threshold
value. Welfare-maximizing (WM), equal payoff (EP), and equal contribution
(EC) benchmarks are included as reference points. Data for voting treatments
are average proposed contributions in early rounds, replaced with final contri-
butions in later rounds once a group reaches agreement.
binding unanimous vote (dummy variable“Vote x Transfer”). The highest total
payoffs are in fact achieved by a combination of voting and transfer payments.
5.4.2 Collectively preferred threshold allocations
Since total contributions do not vary among treatments with and without
transfer payments, the observed differences in total payoffs must reflect in the
choice of individual contributions and thus the threshold allocation on which
the players (at least tacitly) agree. Table 5.4 shows the absolute frequency
of equal-contribution (EC), equal-payoff (EP), and welfare-maximizing (WM)
allocations as defined in Table 5.2. Note that, for the sake of this comparison,
we ignore any redistribution by means of transfer payments, focusing only on
the choice of contributions. Remember that, without any redistribution via
transfer payments, a threshold allocation achieves equal payoffs (EP) if and
only if both high-cost players contribute 2 CU and both low-cost players con-
tribute 6 CU. This momentarily disregards the possibility of ex-post achieving
outcomes with identical payoffs by means of payoff redistribution, which is
discussed in Section 5.4.4.
110
Table 5.5: OLS regression for total payoffs. The re-
gression is based on round averages in the repeated
game (R) treatments, counting only rounds in which
the threshold is reached successfully.
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Vote 1.983: 1.039
Transfer 3.636˚˚ 1.039
Vote x Transfer 3.031˚ 1.469
Intercept 94.017˚˚ 0.735
N 36
R2 0.704
F 25.36
Significance levels : : : 10% ˚ : 5% ˚˚ : 1%
Looking again to the end of the coordination process (i.e., Round 10 in the
repeated game and the final choice in the unanimous vote), we can now more
clearly identify the effect of transfer payments on total payoffs that has al-
ready become apparent from the average values displayed in Figure 5.1. While
voting groups without transfers (VCOST) all agree on the equal-payoff out-
come EP with a total payoff of 96 ExCU, voting groups with transfer payments
(VTRANS) predominantly maximize social welfare by choosing WM outcomes
(104 ExCU).13 This supports the prediction of Hypothesis 5.2.
Similarly, while three out of seven successful groups in the repeated game
without transfer payments (RCOST) coordinate on the equal-payoff outcome
by Round 10, only one of the groups with transfers (RTRANS) does so, whereas
four others instead manage to maximize welfare. Although this difference is
not significant in this categorical analysis,14 mainly due to the large number
of “Other” results, a coarser, but exhaustive, categorization by payoff intervals
does the trick: All seven successful groups in the RCOST treatment earned
a total payoff of at most 96 ExCU, while seven out of nine groups in the
RTRANS treatment made use of the transfer mechanism and earned more
than 96 ExCU.15 These results corroborate Hypothesis 5.1.
13Fisher’s exact test comparing the frequency distribution of chosen allocations by dis-
tribution norm in successful groups of VCOST and VTRANS treatments (n “ 9 for each
treatment): p ă 0.001.
14Fisher’s exact test comparing the frequency distribution of chosen allocations by distri-
bution norm in Round 10 in successful groups of RCOST (n “ 7) and RTRANS (n “ 9)
treatments: p “ 0.119.
15Fisher’s exact test comparing the number of outcomes with a total payoff higher than
96 ExCU in Round 10 in successful groups of RCOST (n “ 7) and RTRANS (n “ 9)
treatments: p “ 0.0032.
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Figure 5.2: Average individual contributions over ten rounds for the repeated-
game (R) treatments, differentiated by player type (high (H) or low (L)
marginal contribution costs). Welfare-maximizing benchmarks (WMH , WML)
are included as reference points.
5.4.3 Individually preferred threshold allocations
Although Table 5.4 also includes the results from the repeated-game treat-
ments, preferences for equality of payoffs and welfare maximization are ob-
viously more difficult to reveal in these treatments, as we can only observe
individual contribution choices directly. In the following statistical analysis,16
we always use a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-tailed, unless stated otherwise)
for within-treatment comparisons and refer to Table 5.2 for the individual con-
tribution benchmarks.
Average individual contributions of 8 CU by low-cost players can be taken
to indicate a preference for welfare maximization (WM). In contrast, welfare-
maximizing high-cost players will contribute nothing at all (0 CU). Both bench-
marks are also displayed in Figure 5.2 which shows the development of average
individual contributions by player type (high-cost vs. low-cost) over all ten
rounds of the repeated game.
First note from the differences in contributions between player types in
Figure 5.2 that groups in neither treatment display a preference for equal con-
tributions (EC), which would entail individual contributions of 4 CU for both
16The sample for this analysis again includes only successful groups.
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player types. In both treatments, average contributions in the final Round 10
are significantly higher for low-cost players.17 The OLS regression for individ-
ual contributions in Round 10 given in Table 5.6 gives additional support for
this result. Model 1 shows that players with low marginal contribution costs
contribute significantly more on average in the final round of the experiment
(dummy variable “Low-cost player”), ruling out equal contributions as a fo-
cal outcome. In addition, the regression demonstrates that the transfer option
does not affect average individual contributions if both player types are consid-
ered jointly (dummy variable “Transfer”), again corroborating the result that
total contributions, as well as the resulting success rates, are not significantly
affected by transfer payments in this game. Introducing an interaction term
into the regression (Model 2) reveals an effect of transfer payments on individ-
ual contributions, however. We can now see that high-cost players contribute
significantly less if transfer payments are possible (dummy variable “Trans-
fer”), whereas low-cost players contribute significantly more (dummy variable
“Low-cost player x Transfer”).
Another non-parametric comparison using Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test, this
time of individual contribution costs, shows that low-cost players also face sig-
nificantly higher average contribution costs in Round 10 of the treatment with
transfers,18 but not in the same round of the treatment without transfers.19
As individual contribution costs in successful groups can be viewed as a proxy
for payoffs (before transfer payments),20 we can rule out a preference for the
equal-payoff allocation in the treatment with transfer payments, but not in the
one without.
Tests against the respective welfare-maximizing benchmarks show that by
Round 10 contributions in groups without the transfer option (RCOST) are
significantly different from these values.21 In contrast, groups in the trans-
fer treatment do not differ that clearly from the WM benchmarks towards
the end of the experiment, as four groups exactly match these values by this
point, leaving us unable to reject the claim that contributions are equal to this
17Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the average contributions by player
type in Round 10:
RCOST: W “ 28, ns{r “ 7, p ă 0.05; average contributions: 5.86 CU (L) vs. 2.16 CU (H).
RTRANS: W “ 45, ns{r “ 9, p ă 0.05; average contributions: 7.02 CU (L) vs. 1.02 CU (H).
18Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the average contribution costs by
player type in Round 10 of RTRANS treatment (9 successful groups):
W “ 34, ns{r “ 8, p ă 0.05; average contribution costs: 7.02 ExCU (L) vs. 3.07 ExCU (H).
19Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the average contribution costs by
player type in Round 10 of RCOST treatment (7 successful groups):
W “ ´10, ns{r “ 4, p ą 0.05; average contribution costs: 5.86 ExCU (L) vs. 6.49 ExCU
(H).
20Compare also Figure 5.3, a) below.
21Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the average contribution of one
player type (low-cost or high-cost) in Round 10 of RCOST treatment against the respective
welfare-maximizing contribution (qH “ 0 CU, qL “ 8 CU): W “ 45, ns{r “ 9, p ă 0.05 in
both cases.
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Table 5.6: OLS regression for final contributions in successful
groups, with and without interaction term. Standard errors
are cluster robust (34 groups).
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Own contribution (Round 1) 0.317˚ 0.223
(0.123) (0.136)
Vote 0.210˚ 0.086
(0.079) (0.052)
Transfer 0.043 -1.333˚˚
(0.064) (0.223)
Vote x Transfer 0.120
(0.140)
Low-cost player 4.185˚˚ 3.144˚˚
(0.590) (0.500)
Low-cost player x Transfer 2.600˚˚
(0.425)
Individual fairness preference (Q1) 0.062 0.095
(0.137) (0.109)
Intercept 0.423 1.335˚˚
(0.347) (0.347)
N 136 136
R2 0.873 0.921
F 68.24 678.78
Significance levels : : : 10% ˚ : 5% ˚˚ : 1%
benchmark in a statistical test.22
The above statistical analysis allows us to rule out two of the three can-
didates for a focal allocation in each of the two repeated-game treatments.
Remarkably, the availability of transfer payments creates a difference between
the two treatments here, because in groups with transfer payments welfare
maximization is the only remaining focal allocation, whereas players in groups
without transfer payments predominantly choose contributions in accordance
with the equal-payoff allocation.
22Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing for each group the average contribution of one
player type (low-cost or high-cost) in Round 10 of RTRANS treatment against the respective
welfare-maximizing contribution (qH “ 0 CU, qL “ 8 CU):
Low-cost players (two-tailed): W “ ´15, ns{r “ 5, p ą 0.05
High-cost players (one-tailed): W “ 15, ns{r “ 5, p “ 0.05.
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5.4.4 Individual payoffs, transfer payments, and payoff
redistribution
In this section, we compare the payoffs of the two player types on an individual
level in order to investigate the extent of payoff redistribution. In the voting
treatment with transfer payments, a preference for redistribution is rather
obvious. All groups that agree on an outcome with a total payoff higher than
96 ExCU (the social optimum without transfers) also agree on a redistribution
of this outcome by means of transfer payments that achieves equal payoffs.
Seven of the nine groups in the voting treatment with transfers (VTRANS)
choose a WM & EP outcome. Compared to the voting treatment without
transfers (VCOST), where all groups vote for an EP allocation, individual
payoffs are at least as high in all cases for both player types (and usually
strictly higher).
In the repeated game with transfers (RTRANS), the greater variance of
outcomes makes it slightly more difficult to discover a redistribution effect.
Figure 5.3 shows average individual payoffs by player type in successful groups
in the repeated-game treatments, before and after transfer payments in trans-
ferring groups. In a comparison of payoffs that is only based on contributions
(Subfigure a)), we first note the difference in payoffs between high-cost and
low-cost players in the transfer treatment (RTRANS), which is statistically
different when comparing group averages of successful groups.23 This is con-
sistent with the difference in contribution costs established in the previous
section. Including transfer payments (Subfigure b)), however, the payoff dif-
ferences between high-cost and low-cost players disappear.24
The high-cost players in treatment RTRANS start out on a payoff level
similar to their RCOST counterparts, but quickly achieve a relative improve-
ment of their average payoffs. The average individual payoff over all rounds
of 24.29 ExCU for high-cost players in treatment RTRANS is accordingly sig-
nificantly higher than the 23.09 ExCU earned by the same player type in the
treatment without transfer payments.25 The average improvement of individ-
ual payoffs due to transfer payments is less pronounced for low-cost players,
with averages of 23.92 ExCU (RCOST) and 24.53 ExCU (RTRANS), but still
statistically significant.26
23Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing average individual payoffs before redistribution
(on average over all ten rounds, using only successful rounds) of high-cost (H) and low-cost
(L) players in the same group in treatment RTRANS: z “ 2.192, p “ 0.0284. Average
payoffs (excluding transfers) over all rounds: 25.82 ExCU (H), 23.00 ExCU (L).
24Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing average individual payoffs after redistribution (on
average over all ten rounds, using only successful rounds) of high-cost (H) and low-cost (L)
players in the same group in treatment RTRANS: z = -1.362, p “ 0.1731. Average payoffs
(including transfers) over all rounds: 24.29 ExCU (H) vs. 24.54 ExCU (L).
25Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the individual payoffs of high-cost (H) players (group
averages over all successful rounds) in RTRANS and RCOST treatments: z “ 2.693, p “
0.0071.
26Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the individual payoffs of low-cost (L) players (group
115
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A
ve
ra
ge
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
 p
ay
o
ff
s 
(i
n
 E
xC
U
) 
Rounds 
no transfer H
no transfer L
transfer H
transfer L
(a) before transfer payments
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A
ve
ra
ge
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
 p
ay
o
ff
s 
(i
n
 E
xC
U
) 
Rounds 
no transfer H
no transfer L
transfer H
transfer L
(b) after transfer payments
Figure 5.3: Average individual payoffs before and after trans-
fer payments over ten rounds for the repeated-game (R) treat-
ments, differentiated by cost type (H and L) and using only
successful groups.
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Figure 5.4: Total transfer payments from high-cost to low-cost players over ten
rounds (averaged over all groups in each round) in the RTRANS treatment.
The benchmark assumes that a group coordinates on a WM outcome in each
round and transfers a total of 8.8 ExCU each round in Rounds 1 to 9 to achieve
equality of payoffs only in regard to the expected payoff over all ten rounds.
Finally, Figure 5.4 displays the average amount of transfer payments over
time in the RTRANS treatments. Although positive, transfers are on average
clearly below the benchmark specified by a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
which leads to equal expected payoffs for all players. Interestingly, transfers are
paid by several subjects even in the final round of the game, though the pay-
ments experience decrease at this point (from an average of about 4.00 ExCU
in Round 9 to only 2.28 ExCU in Round 10). It is unclear, however, if these
high-cost players want to reciprocate the (from their perspective) beneficial
actions of low-cost players, who carried the major contribution burden, or if
these players are motivated by inequality aversion and feel the need to equalize
payoffs even in this final round.
averages over all successful rounds) in RTRANS and RCOST treatments: z “ 2.075, p “
0.0380.
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5.5 Discussion
How do these results relate to other experimental studies? As voluntary sanc-
tions have so far only been investigated in the context of linear public goods
games, in which the unique Nash equilibrium involves contributing nothing,27
a comparison to these studies based on total or individual contributions, even
if only comparing relative changes, is meaningless. Instead, I therefore use
relative changes in total and individual payoffs as a measure of comparison.
Voluntary reward payments in linear public goods games also appear to
increase total payoffs (e.g., Figure 3 in Sefton et al., 2007). Whereas in the
RTRANS treatment, transfer payments increase in later rounds, however, re-
wards are used less frequently over time in the treatments studied by Sefton
et al. (2007), indicating that this instrument is used myopically, for reasons
of reciprocity instead of redistribution and wears out its use as an incentive
after some time. Sutter et al. (2010) furthermore do not find an increase of
total payoffs due to rewards in their zero-sum treatment (L1), unless this rule
is chosen endogenously. Walker and Halloran (2004) do not find any effect at
all on average earnings in their one-shot setting.
As none of these studies report payoff distributions to indicate relative pay-
off differences on the group level, incidences of possible redistribution can at
best be inferred from cases in which a particular player makes a lower than
average contribution and follows this with a reward payment directed at play-
ers who have contributed more than average before. This occurs, for example,
in the study by Sutter et al. (2010) who observe a higher likelihood of being
rewarded if the rewarding player has contributed relatively little (cf. Sutter
et al., 2010, the two rightmost columns in Figure 3). Due to their lower-than-
average contributions, the rewarding players face higher than average earnings,
which they are apparently willing to share with the rest of the group.
In order to observe redistribution more clearly, we must turn to trust games
(Berg et al., 1995) and similar set-ups. Andreoni et al. (2003), for example,
report a large share of equal payoff outcomes, if the initial payment is matched
with a positive return payment (reward). In their opinion this is a remarkable
result, because the original trust game does not usually result in equal splits.
In the view of the experiments described in this chapter we can interpret
transfers or rewards that equalize payoffs as an indicator of redistribution (from
rich to poor). Unequal payoffs in the trust game may in turn indicate that
reciprocity, not redistribution, is the primary motivation behind the responder
payments. Accordingly, the players in these games do not primarily care about
how much the other player earns, only that he deserves a reward. And without
the necessity of using reciprocating transfers as a coordination device, the
responding players can make deviations from equal payoffs that are to their
own advantage without having to fear a breakdown of cooperation.
27At least I am unaware of studies on sanctioning in public goods in which this is not the
case.
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In summary, although increases of efficiency due to sanctioning mechanisms
are a well-known phenomenon in the experimental literature, redistribution
effects are rarely as obviously discerned as in this experiment.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that ex-post transfer payments are able to increase effi-
ciency in a ThrPG with heterogeneous marginal contribution costs by merg-
ing two formerly conflicting principles of distributive fairness, to wit, welfare
maximization and equalization of payoffs. Furthermore, this result holds for
both tested decision rules, unanimous voting and voluntary contributions in
a repeated game, although groups in the latter setting have more difficulties
employing transfer payments efficiently.
I should, however, also point out a few possible limitations of this work. In
order to attain comparability between voting and repeated-game groups, we
have restricted the experiment to (up to) ten rounds of interactions. While
this may have already been too long for some of the voting groups, ten rounds
is rather short to achieve coordination just by repeated interaction. Conse-
quently, some players in the repeated-game treatment with transfer payments
may not have been able to understand this mechanism well enough to employ
transfers efficiently. Nevertheless, the results at least provide proof of concept,
since most groups indeed increase their total payoffs.
Moreover, the results in the voting treatments are driven by the decision
process, which requires the agreement of all group members and therefore
favors equal-payoff outcomes because all players have the same bargaining
power. However, using a variation of a unanimity rule is rather common in
international negotiations, because this (or rather the “consensus” rule) is the
default procedure until other rules can be agreed upon (Buchanan and Tul-
lock, 1962). Furthermore, because the welfare-maximizing outcomes with and
without transfers are individually optimal under this voting rule, we do not
face the problems of Bo¨s and Kolmar (2003), in whose model an agreement
between the players to share their earnings must be exogenously enforced by
a “Constitution.” Of course, an attempt to reproduce these results under dif-
ferent voting rules may be worthwhile. If anything, one might criticize the
choice of the non-agreement outcome or “status quo.” A different choice of this
fallback outcome than q0 (i.e., zero contributions) may make agreement much
harder, if not impossible, if a former equilibrium outcome is now no longer
Pareto superior to the status quo.
Additional experiments might attempt to better separate intentions of reci-
procity and redistribution in the use of reward payments in linear public goods
games with heterogeneous players. An example for such an experiment is
Dekel et al. (Unpublished), in whose case a minority of players, who is actu-
ally harmed by the provision of the public good, can be compensated through
redistribution. However, in their case the players receive an additional en-
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dowment just for transfer payments, which may be a reason why the authors
report that minority players do not contribute more if they are compensated.
In regard to practical implications of this investigation, I have already men-
tioned that a threshold public goods game with transfer payments appears to
have some similarities to a crowdfunding campaign. Crowdfunded projects re-
quire a certain amount of seed money (a threshold sum) which the initiators of
the campaign cannot provide on their own. However, they are able to attract
other investors by promising them part of the earnings (or some other reward)
if the project is successful, creating a win-win situation for all participants. Al-
though crowdfunding is mostly used to finance commercial products (see, e.g.,
Mollick, 2014, for a recent empirical study), the same principle can also be em-
ployed to support communal undertakings, like funding a public library, which
create positive externalities and can therefore be considered public goods.
Crowdfunding campaigns usually address much larger groups than can be
brought together under laboratory conditions, most projects having thousands
of backers. It seems likely, though, that with an increasingly larger variety of
players (as a side-effect of larger group size) finding an allocation that equalizes
payoffs will become increasingly more difficult. Let alone the fact that eval-
uating the exact payoff or utility that results from a provision of the public
good for each player is an all but impossible task in itself.
As a consequence, transfer payments in real life will usually not result in a
redistribution with completely equal payoffs, but even small transfers may be
enough to improve the efficiency of public good provision and raise efficiency
in doing so. While there is no doubt that transfer payments are observed
in real life, field studies in cooperation with crowdfunding platforms may be
necessary to measure the actual amount of redistribution in real-life situations
by investigating, for example, if higher transfer payments (per contributed
dollar or euro) indeed make a project’s success more probable.
Finally, the Ocean Cleanup, a current project to remove plastic garbage
from the Pacific Ocean, is an example for crowdfunding on an international
level.28 At this level, political negotiations among the affected countries are
another way to bring about such projects of public interest, whereby individ-
ual contributions and transfer payments can be negotiated at the same time.
For example, international negotiations to prevent climate change use emis-
sions trading as a transfer mechanism, aiming to reward industrial companies
for producing fewer greenhouse-gas emissions. An attempt to model climate
negotiations in a controlled laboratory experiment is presented in the next
chapter.
28See www.theoceancleanup.com, last accessed on June 15, 2015.
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Chapter 6
Modeling climate negotiations:
top-down voting and threshold
uncertainty
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with a practical application of the findings discussed
in the rest of this thesis to the ongoing international negotiations to prevent
global warming.1 Here, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord specifies a threshold
value of an acceptable temperature increase of 2°C. This value is said to con-
stitute a “tipping point” beyond which any damages to the climate will be
irreversible.2 A particular challenge for the negotiations is, however, that the
global abatement quantity of greenhouse gas emissions that is necessary to
reach this threshold cannot be precisely determined due to the complexity of
the system. Accordingly, the exact threshold value is uncertain. In contrast
with the model used in Chapters 4 and 5, there is also no refund of contribu-
tions, meaning here the costs for emission reductions, if the global abatement
quantity does not reach the target. This significantly increases the risk in-
volved in the contribution decision compared to the models analyzed in the
preceding chapters.
Furthermore, the collective contribution decision in the negotiations is split
into two parts: The total (global) contribution has more or less already been
determined by setting the 2°C target, leaving only the decision on how this to-
tal is allocated among the individual contributors, i.e., the countries. In order
to find out if this “top-down” procedure is indeed the best course of action, this
chapter presents an experimental comparison of this procedure with two other
ways of determining contributions to a threshold public good, to wit, the deci-
1Most of these results stem from a joint paper with Karl-Martin Ehrhart and Jan Kra¨mer
under the title “Voting on contributions to a threshold public goods game – an experimental
analysis” (Feige et al., Unpublished).
2See the 2007 IPCC report (Meehl et al., 2007, p. 775) and Hansen et al. (2008).
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sion rules discussed in previous chapters. The unanimous voting rule described
in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 corresponds to a “bottom-up” procedure, by which
only national abatement efforts are negotiated and then simply aggregated to a
total abatement quantity. Individual voluntary contributions, the standard de-
cision rule for public goods games, instead represents the “worst-case scenario”
of failed negotiations and uncoordinated abatement efforts.
Modeling climate negotiations in a computer-based laboratory experiment
requires a number of simplifying assumptions. Most importantly, the vague
consensus rule3 employed in the free-form negotiations of the COP meetings4,
which in any case leads to an outcome that cannot be legally enforced due to
the lack of an international authority to do so,5 is approximated by a binding
unanimous voting procedure in which the communication between the subjects
is restricted to making proposals and casting votes. However, we can justify
the unanimity rule as a representation of consensus agreement with arguments
in favor of the similarity of these procedures by Buchanan and Tullock (1962,
particularly Ch. 7) and To¨rnudd (1982). In addition, due to the theoretical
properties of ThrPGs, in which all Pareto-optimal outcomes can be imple-
mented as Nash equilibria (see in particular Section 6.3.3 below), a lack of
compliance with collective decisions should not be a problem.
Apart from the decision rule, the model is quite realistic for several rea-
sons: In addition to a randomly distributed threshold value, the players face
a negative payment for missing this target, comparable to the environmental
damages associated with climate change. Moreover, having different marginal
contribution costs for two player types, similar to the COST treatments dis-
cussed in the preceding chapters, accounts for the technological differences in
marginal abatement costs in the real world. For example, emerging economies
like China and India can conceivable reduce their greenhouse gas emissions at
much lower marginal costs than industrialized countries like the U.S. or Ger-
many. The findings presented in this chapter should therefore also be relevant
to the real climate negotiations.
The rest of this chapter begins with a literature review in Section 6.2,
followed by Section 6.3 which describes the theoretical model. The subse-
quent sections are concerned with the experimental design and procedure (Sec-
tion 6.4), as well as the experimental results (Section 6.5) and their discussion
(Section 6.6). Section 6.7 concludes the chapter with a number of implications
3“Consensus” has been found to mean anything from a unanimous decision with or with-
out abstention to absolute or only simple majority (D’Amato, 1970, p. 106), extending oc-
casionally even to simple judgment calls like the one made by Mohamed Nasser al Ghanim,
acting as chairman for the 2012 ITU conference in Dubai, who only asked for an infor-
mal vote (and apparently even emphasized later that “no, it was not a vote”) in order
to get “a feel for the room” and then declared a decision based on this feeling (see e.g.,
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/?tag=mohamed+nasser+al+ghanim, last accessed on Jan-
uary 15, 2015).
4“COP” is an abbreviation of “Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).”
5This problem is discussed in more detail, e.g., by Finus (2001).
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of these results and those presented in earlier chapters for policy-makers in this
context.
6.2 Literature review
Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) suggest that the lack of success of climate
negotiations so far is actually a failure to coordinate (and not to cooperate),
precisely because there is already a global consensus on reaching the threshold,
i.e., the 2°C target. In two recent experimental studies, Barrett and Dannen-
berg (2012, 2014) therefore investigate individual contributions to a ThrPG
for the purpose of modeling international efforts to prevent global warming.6
The authors report that, by making coordination on the threshold value more
difficult, “threshold uncertainty” (or more precisely: a randomly distributed
threshold value) reduces total contributions substantially, despite the possi-
bility of pre-play communication via contribution pledges. A similar negative
effect of a randomly distributed threshold value on success rates has also been
observed by Suleiman et al. (2001) and McBride (2010), the latter being con-
cerned with binary contributions. Our experimental design complements these
studies by using a binding unanimous vote on the one hand, and voluntary
individual contributions in a repeated game on the other. Moreover, we also
run treatments with heterogeneous marginal contributions costs, thereby ex-
tending the previous focus on symmetrical players to a more general case.
Preferences for fairness principles also play a rule in climate negotiations,
where they appear in the form of burden-sharing principles. For instance,
Gampfer (2014) discusses principles of “causal responsibility” (according to
which the most severely polluting countries should carry the heaviest burden
of emissions reduction), “ability to pay” (the richest countries contribute the
most), and “vulnerability” (the most vulnerable countries are granted relief
from their cost burden).7 In a subsequent experimental analysis using a vari-
ant of an ultimatum game, Gampfer (2014) then observes that only the first
two principles are reflected in the proposed allocations, meaning that a dif-
ference in damages (incurred if a proposal is rejected) is less relevant to the
subjects’ choices. Our own experimental design is insensitive to distinctions of
responsibility for, or vulnerability towards, damages. And although we also do
not assume that some players are richer than others (all have the same endow-
ment), it could be said that the more productive players (with lower marginal
costs of contribution) are able to carry a larger share of the contribution bur-
den.
6The studies by Milinski et al. (2008), Tavoni et al. (2011), and Dannenberg et al. (2015)
are also concerned with this topic but, unlike our approach, employ sequential and not
simultaneous contributions. Another study (Bosetti et al., Unpublished) has simultaneous
contributions, but the uncertainty refers to whether or not the remaining endowment is lost
if the threshold is missed.
7See also Gallier et al. (forthcoming).
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The distinction between top-down and bottom-up decision rules originally
stems from budget negotiations. In this context, there is a widespread belief
(see Ehrhart et al., 2007, for more details) that a top-down procedure, which
determines the size of the total budget first and the allocation of this total
to individual projects only afterwards, is more efficient than simply negotiat-
ing the budgets for the individual projects in sequence, i.e., with a bottom-up
procedure. Ehrhart et al. (2007) simulate top-down and bottom-up budget
negotiations in a laboratory experiment, finding that, depending on the pa-
rameter setting, either procedure can result in higher budgets and thus be less
efficient than the other. This also conforms to the theoretical work by Ferejohn
and Krehbiel (1987). Consequently, if the total abatement quantity is to be
treated as the “total budget” for climate negotiations, there is no reason to
believe that the current top-down process with a 2°C target is superior to the
alternative of negotiating national abatement efforts without such a global tar-
get. Following the reasoning in Chapter 2, Section 2.A.2, the fact that in our
model (just like in climate negotiations) the players face a negative (damage)
payment if they fail to reach the threshold (instead of a positive reward if they
succeed) should not matter in the players’ contribution decisions, even if they
are loss averse.
6.3 Theoretical Model
6.3.1 Basic game
The basic game is by and large the same as that used in previous chapters:
It assumes that the players have homogeneous endowments and damage pay-
ments, but have heterogeneous marginal costs in some treatments, in which
case there are then again only two player types with costs cH ě cL ą 0.
However, no refund of contribution costs is granted, if the threshold is missed
(r “ 0). A second new element is that the threshold T is randomly dis-
tributed over all natural numbers between (and including) Tmin ă Tmax. Each
of these numbers can result with an equal probability of 1{pTmax´Tmin`1q.8 We
set q¯ ă Tmin and Tmax ă nq¯, so that it is always possible to reach the actual
threshold value, but only if multiple players make contributions. Furthermore,
we assume nd ą cHTmax to make sure that reaching the threshold is collectively
profitable.
Similar to before, player i’s payoff piipqq is given by:
piipqq “
"
e´ ciqi if Q ě T
e´ ciqi ´ d if Q ă T (6.1)
8This corresponds to the assumptions made in the experimental investigation by Suleiman
et al. (2001), although their theoretical investigation assumes a continuous probability dis-
tribution.
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6.3.2 Ex ante social optimum
With our choice of parameters, the (ex ante) social optimum of this game is
reached with a total contribution of Q˚ “ Tmax,9 which is the highest possible
threshold level. A vector q˚ “ pq1˚ , . . . , qn˚q that maximizes the expected total
payoff ErΠpqqs “ E rřni“1 piipqqs is called the (ex ante) social optimum. We
refer to Q˚ “ řni“1 qi˚ as the socially optimal total contribution. In order to
find q˚, we first need to know Q˚. However, please note that, if marginal
contribution costs are heterogeneous, there are contribution vectors that sum
to Q˚ without maximizing the expected total payoff. This is because the same
total contribution may lead to different contribution costs, depending on how
the contributions are allocated among the player types (see below).
Proposition 6.1. The (ex ante) socially optimal total contribution Q˚ of the
considered public goods game with n players and a threshold value T that
is distributed uniformly over the natural numbers between (and including)
Tmin ă Tmax is equal to the maximum threshold level, i.e., Q˚ “ Tmax.
Proof: Following a similar proof by Suleiman et al. (2001), we realize that
for Tmin ´ 1 ď Q ă Tmax an increase of the total contribution by 1 leads to a
similar increase of the probability of reaching the threshold, ProbpT ď Qq, by
1{pTmax´Tmin`1q. Accordingly, in this interval, an increase of the total contribu-
tion that is large enough to increase the probability of reaching the threshold
can also lead to an increase of the expected total payoff, if the marginal costs of
contribution c are sufficiently small or if the damage payment d for missing the
threshold is sufficiently large. Formally, this is the case if c ă nd{pTmax´Tmin`1q,
or equivalently, if cpTmax ´ Tmin ` 1q ă nd for c P tcL, cHu. Since by as-
sumption nd ą cHTmax and Tmin ą q¯, this condition is satisfied,10 resulting in
Q˚ “ Tmax.
Note, however, that an ex ante socially optimal contribution vector is not
necessarily welfare-maximizing. Next, we therefore consider the optimal way
of allocating Q˚ among the individual players, i.e., the welfare-maximizing
contribution vector q˚.
If the marginal costs of contribution are homogeneous (c “ cH “ cL), any
allocation of Q˚ leads to the same total costs of contribution cQ˚ and, con-
sequently, the same expected total payoff. So q˚ P tq|řni“1 qi “ Q˚u. But
if the marginal costs of contribution are heterogeneous (cH ą cL), the total
costs decrease if the low-cost players provide a larger share of the total con-
tribution. Thus, low-cost players should provide either Q˚ in its entirety, or
9There is slight conceptual difference to the welfare-maximizing total contribution QWM
used in the preceding chapters that warrants this changed notation. Since the value of T is
now uncertain, Q˚ refers to the best choice of total contribution that the group can make in
this uncertain condition if the players are risk-neutral. Once the group learns the true value
of the threshold, it may realize ex post that the actual welfare-maximizing total contribution
would have been lower, so that QWM ď Q˚.
10Technically, we also need to assume q¯ ą 1.
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nLq¯ if this is smaller than Q
˚. Moreover, ciqi ď d has to be satisfied for each
individual player i to make this contribution individually rational. Assume
that NL Ă N and NH Ă N refer to the subgroups of low-cost and high-cost
players, respectively. Then the following characterization of q˚ results:
q˚ P
#
q
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ ÿ
iPNL
qi “ mintQ˚, nLq¯u ^ p@i P NL : cLqi ď dq
^
ÿ
jPNH
qj “ Q˚ ´
ÿ
iPNL
qi ^ p@j P NH : cHqj ď dq
+
(6.2)
According to (6.2), in order to find q˚, we first assign a share of Q˚ to
the low-cost players (top line). This share must be technologically possible
(
ř
iPNL qi ď nLq¯), but otherwise should be as large as possible. Furthermore,
each individual low-cost player may not be assigned contribution costs higher
than the damage payment, i.e., @i P NL : cLqi ď d. Any remaining share of Q˚
is then allocated among the high-cost players (bottom line) in an individually
rational manner, i.e., @j P NH : cHqj ď d. All ex ante social optima are also
Nash equilibria in expected payoffs of the basic game, if cHpTmax´Tmin`1q ă d,
i.e., if the damage payment is high enough to prevent even individual players
from reducing their contributions if this entails reducing the total contribution
below the socially optimal value of Q˚ “ Tmax.
For the purpose of treatment comparison, we also define an efficiency mea-
sure ηpqq11 as follows:
ηpqq :“ ErΠpqqs
ErΠpq˚qs (6.3)
As derived above, maximizing the expected total payoff ErΠpqqs requires
a total contribution of Q˚. However, the ex ante socially optimal total pay-
off ErΠpq˚qs also depends on the allocation of this total contribution among
the individual players, so that the groups with heterogeneous marginal costs
achieve the highest expected total payoff – for which ηpq˚q “ 1 (or 100%) –
if the low-cost players contribute as much as possible. The measure is there-
fore normalized by ErΠpq˚qs to account for this advantage over homogeneous
groups, which receive the same expected total payoff for every allocation of the
total contribution. Since q˚ is a Nash equilibrium in expected payoffs whether
the players have heterogeneous costs or not, we also should not see a difference
in normalized efficiency levels due to player heterogeneity.
11Margreiter et al. (2005) use a similar measure.
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These theoretical results provide the following hypothesis for our experi-
ment:
Hypothesis 6.1. Player heterogeneity in regard to marginal contribution costs
does not affect the levels of a) total contributions and b) relative efficiency
compared to groups with homogeneous players.
6.3.3 Voting treatments
In our experiment, we compare two voting rules to the case of a non-cooperative
game without voting. In the voting treatments, the group needs to reach a
unanimous agreement on a vector of individual contributions q “ pq1, . . . , qnq
as before. However, instead of the “bottom-up” voting rule employed in pre-
vious chapters, in which the total contribution results automatically as an
aggregate of the accepted contribution vector, some of the treatments will fol-
low a top-down voting procedure, in which the total contribution is negotiated
first and the proposals in the subsequent vote on individual contributions are
then restricted to contribution vectors that result in the same total.
These top-down treatments consist of two parts of up to five rounds each,
ten rounds in total, just as with bottom-up voting. In the first part the players
vote on their group’s total contribution Q. In the second part another vote
is used to divide this total contribution among the players. If there is no
agreement among the players in either the first or the second part, the zero-
contribution vector q0 is used as the group’s choice. The second part does not
take place unless a positive total contribution (Q ą 0) is chosen in the first
part.
From the analysis in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2, we know that any feasible
threshold allocation is a socially optimal equilibrium under the bottom-up
procedure if the threshold is known with certainty. But if the threshold is
distributed uniformly as in the treatments investigated here, the ex ante so-
cially optimal choice of contributions, namely Q˚ “ Tmax, also leads to a
certain payoff. Accordingly, the reasoning from that section can be applied
to feasible allocations of Tmax, which here constitute a set of socially optimal
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in expected payoffs.
It follows immediately that both voting rules can be expected to lead to
comparable contribution vectors, although the strategic characterizations of
the corresponding subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are, of course, slightly dif-
ferent. For top-down voting, a proposal of qˆ in the second part will be tied
to a particular total contribution Qˆ “ řni“1 qˆi determined in the first part.
Otherwise, the reasoning is the same: If Qˆ results in allocations qˆ that are
Pareto improvements to q0, any feasible combination pQˆ, qˆq is implemented
in a voting equilibrium, whereby Qˆ is chosen in the first round of the first
part and qˆ in the first round of the second part. Again, proposing or voting
for q0 is an equilibrium, but not a strict equilibrium. In addition, note that
the socially optimal set of feasible threshold allocations is a subset of these
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voting equilibria and in fact constitutes this game’s NTU core (Moulin, 1988,
p. 102) (see also Chapter 4, Section 4.6.3). These results are summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 6.2. In both voting games, i.e., top-down and bottom-up proce-
dure, the set of feasible ex-ante socially optimal contribution vectors charac-
terized by Q˚ “ Tmax can be implemented as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
with respect to expected payoffs.
Accordingly, the equilibrium analysis gives no reason to expect differences
in contribution behavior between the two voting procedures. Noting further
that q0 is not likely to result in the experiment, because it is not a strict
equilibrium, we postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.2. Both top-down and bottom-up voting will lead to a) ex-ante
socially optimal total contributions and, subsequently, b) to the same relative
efficiency.
6.3.4 Repeated game treatments
By assuming a binding vote and a predetermined fallback outcome in the case
of no agreement, we have made two necessary simplifications to keep the game’s
complexity within the bounds suitable for an experimental investigation. It
would be more realistic, of course, to allow the players to renege on their
agreements and contribute as they want. And this is also likely to happen
instead of a predetermined fallback outcome: If there is no agreement, each
country will decide individually about only its national abatement efforts.
Instead of trying to incorporate these elements in a single, and accordingly
complex, treatment, we present additional groups of test subjects with some-
thing like a “worst-case scenario” for climate negotiations, which at the same
time relates to the more traditional decision procedure in ThrPGs. The players
are only able to make individual contributions to the public good, and cannot
propose contribution vectors, let alone vote on their fellow players’ contribu-
tions. Moreover, accounting for the possibility of learning from past contribu-
tion choices in similar situations, the players will be required to play the basic
game repeatedly, i.e., in several separate rounds with new endowments and
new (randomly drawn) contribution thresholds.
At a first glance, learning from repetition may present the players with an
opportunity to cooperate by coordinating their contributions efficiently, but
in the light of the decreasing contributions over time commonly observed in
linear public goods games (e.g., Kroll et al., 2007) and also occasionally in
ThrPGs (e.g., Isaac et al., 1989) the opposite is even more likely: In later
rounds, the players may come to realize that they are better off accepting the
damage payment and contributing nothing than being once more disappointed
by the lack of contribution efforts of their fellow players and paying the damage
payment in addition to their wasted contribution costs.
129
We conduct two repeated-game treatments (homogeneous and heteroge-
neous costs) in which the basic game is played ten times in a row with the
same group of players (partner setting). This provides the subjects with the
same number of interactions as the maximum in the voting treatments. In
each round a new threshold value is randomly determined. At the end of the
experiment, a single randomly selected round is paid to each player. In both
treatments, the participants are given complete information on past decisions
(contributions and threshold values). Provided that cHpTmax ´ Tmin ` 1q ă d,
which is a stricter assumption on the size of the damage payment than for the
collective solution, we can also derive the following proposition:
Proposition 6.3. In the repeated-game treatments the set of feasible ex ante
socially optimal contribution vectors characterized by Q˚ “ Tmax can be imple-
mented as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria with respect to expected payoffs.
Similar to the reasoning in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2, the set of subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria with respect to expected payoffs can be determined via
backward induction, i.e., by solving the final round of this game first. The Nash
equilibria with respect to expected payoffs of this final round can be calculated
in a similar fashion as the ex ante socially optimal total contribution, but
maximizing individual (not total) expected payoffs. In addition, contributing
nothing in the final round (i.e., q0) is a strict equilibrium in both repeated-
game treatments, which serves as an indicator that this contribution vector is
more likely in the repeated game than under a unanimous vote. Since the final
subgame contains multiple equilibria, the least preferable one of these, to wit
q0, can again be used as a threat in a trigger strategy which can implement
any one of a large set of contribution outcomes in earlier rounds. Similar to the
unanimous voting rule, these outcomes must be Pareto improvements to the
status quo q0. Again, all feasible threshold allocations, meaning all feasible ex
ante socially optimal contribution vectors, can be implemented as equilibria.
Once more, the equilibrium analysis gives no reason to assume different
contribution behavior compared to the voting treatments. Accordingly, we
postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.3. The repeated-game treatments will lead to a) ex ante socially
optimal total contributions and, subsequently, b) to the same relative efficiency
as the voting treatments.
6.4 Experimental design and procedure
Based on the preceding theoretical sections, we use the following experimental
design:
A group consists of n “ 5 players, each endowed with e “ 25 ExCU (“Ex-
perimental Currency Units”). Every player can convert his endowment into
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up to q¯ “ 10 CU (“Contribution Units”) which are then collected in a public
account (a common project).
In total, we consider six treatments which differ with respect to the voting
rule (top-down, bottom-up, repeated game) and with respect to the marginal
costs of contribution (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous), as displayed in Ta-
ble 6.1.12 In the case of homogeneous marginal contribution costs, all players
have the same costs cH “ cL “ 1 ExCU{CU. In the case of heterogeneous marginal
costs, three of the five players have high costs, cH “ 1.25 ExCU{CU, and the re-
maining two players have low costs, cL “ 0.77 ExCU{CU. Contributions can be
made in steps of 0.01 CU,13 and costs are rounded to 0.01 ExCU.
Unless the sum of contributions reaches the threshold value T , a damage
payment of d “ 10 ExCU is deducted from each player’s payoff at the end of
the experiment. This means that high-cost players should rationally contribute
at most qH “ 10{1.25 CU “ 8 CU. The threshold value takes on a whole number
between (and including) Tmin “ 16 CU and Tmax “ 24 CU, each with equal
probability, yielding k “ 9 possible outcomes, each occurring with a probability
of 1{9.
In line with the theory presented above, all treatments are expected to lead
to the same (ex ante) socially optimal contribution of Q˚ “ 24 CU (the max-
imum possible threshold value). Table 6.1 also contains the maximum total
payoff, Πpq˚q, that can be achieved in the different treatments. For homo-
geneous treatments, this is 101 ExCU which results from any allocation of
Q˚ “ 24 CU, involving total costs of 24 ExCU deducted from the total en-
dowment of 125 ExCU. In the heterogeneous treatments, a higher total payoff
of 104.6 ExCU can be reached if the two low-cost players contribute their
maximum of 10 CU each, with the remaining 4 CU split among the high-cost
players.
The parameter choice for heterogeneous marginal costs ensures that any one
of the nine possible threshold values can be allocated as individual contribu-
tions among the five players in such a way that an equal-payoff contribution
vector can be attained, which is identical in terms of individual payoffs to
that of the homogeneous counterpart. For example, in all treatments a total
contribution of 21 CU can be allocated among players so that every player
receives 20.6 ExCU if the threshold is reached, or 10.6 ExCU if not. This also
makes sure that the optimal contribution vector does not stand out among
the other choices, just because it “looks nice”. However, with these cost pa-
rameters it is not individually optimal for high-cost players in the heteroge-
neous repeated-game treatment to reach the threshold value,14 leaving only
q0 as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in expected payoffs. In contrast,
in all other treatments, i.e., the four voting treatments and the homogeneous
12The participant instructions to all treatments are included in Appendix A.2.
13The three homogeneous treatments were conducted earlier and allowed contributions
only in steps of 0.1 CU.
14Here, this would only be the case for cH ď 10{9 « 1.11.
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Table 6.1: Investigated treatments as well as (ex ante) socially optimal total
payoffs ErΠpq˚qs and resulting individual payoffs Erpiipq˚qs for (type-) sym-
metric allocations. For each treatment the number of independent observations
(groups) is given in brackets.
Decision rule
Marginal contribution costs
Homogeneous (HOM) Heterogeneous (HET)
cL “ cH “ 1 cL “ 0.77, cH “ 1.25
Top-down (TD) TDHOM (n = 8) TDHET (n = 8)
ErΠpq˚qs 101.0 ExCU 104.60 ExCU
ErpiLpq˚qs 20.2 ExCU 17.30 ExCU
ErpiHpq˚qs 23.33 ExCU
Bottom-up (BU) BUHOM (n = 8) BUHET (n = 8)
ErΠpq˚qs 101.0 ExCU 104.60 ExCU
ErpiLpq˚qs 20.2 ExCU 17.30 ExCU
ErpiHpq˚qs 23.33 ExCU
Repeated game (RG) RGHOM (n = 8) RGHET (n = 8)
ErΠpq˚qs 101.0 ExCU 104.60 ExCU
ErpiLpq˚qs 20.2 ExCU 17.30 ExCU
ErpiHpq˚qs 23.33 ExCU
repeated-game treatment, every ex ante socially optimal contribution vector
can be implemented as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with respect to
expected payoffs, i.e., as an individually optimal choice.
The experimental procedure is the same as that used in the preceding chap-
ters with the following exceptions. In order to rule out variations in the results
due to varying individual risk preferences, every treatment is followed by a
Holt and Laury (2002) decision task,15 for which the subjects are given sepa-
rate instructions including a decision sheet for them to fill in.16 The subjects
are asked to copy their decisions into another questionnaire running on their
computer, which also includes questions related to general personal data (age,
gender, experience with experiments) as well as strategies used in the main
part of the experiment.17
15One might argue that this test is not a good measure for “collective risk preferences”.
However, Harrison et al. (2013) find a high correlation between individual and group risk
aversion, which supports our decision for a non-interactive risk measure that is unbiased by
the outcomes in the preceding experiment.
16These instructions are not included here as they are a rather common procedure in
experimental economics.
17The results from both the decision task and the accompanying questionnaire show no
treatment differences and are therefore omitted.
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Table 6.2: Average payoffs in ExCU, cluster-robust standard errors (groups)
in brackets (exchange rate: 2 ExCU = e1)
cost TD BU RG All
HOM c “ 1 19.10 (1.19) 20.20 (0.00) 16.27 (0.94) 18.52 (0.59)
HET
both types 18.50 (1.32) 19.55 (0.65) 17.90 (1.02) 18.65 (0.59)
cL “ 0.77 18.50 (1.32) 19.55 (0.65) 17.54 (1.63) 18.53 (0.72)
cH “ 1.25 18.50 (1.31) 19.55 (0.65) 18.13 (1.29) 18.73 (0.63)
All 18.80 (0.86) 19.88 (0.32) 17.08 (0.70) 18.59 (0.41)
6.5 Results
A total of 240 subjects (6x8 groups with five members each) were recruited via
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a student pool at the Karlsruhe Institute of Tech-
nology. The sessions took place between December 2012 and August 2013. The
computer-based experiment was conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Including a show-up fee of e3 and the payoff from the Holt and Laury (2002)
decision task, the subjects earned on average e14.74 (roughly US$19 at the
time of the experiment) in all six treatments. Table 6.2 shows the average
payoffs by treatment in ExCU. In the case of the repeated-game treatments,
this is the actual payment to the subjects, i.e., the payoff from the randomly
selected round. The subjects spent between one hour and one and a half hours
in the laboratory.
6.5.1 Total contributions and success rates
Our main goal in this section is to show that the voting treatments lead to allo-
cations that are approximately optimal with respect to reaching the threshold,
while the repeated game usually does not. This corresponds to corroborating
Hypothesis 6.2a, but rejecting Hypothesis 6.3a. The analysis is best accom-
plished via a comparison of total contributions and expected success rates in
the various treatments. The expected success rate refers to the probability
with which a given total contribution is expected to reach the threshold.18
The comparison of total contributions is based on the total contribution on
which the groups agree in the voting treatments, which in the top-down treat-
ments is the result of the first part of the voting procedure. For the repeated
game, we use Round 10, because by this point the groups will have had the
highest number of interactions and opportunities for tacit coordination.
Because of the large number of ties in our data, we categorize total con-
tributions as “optimal” (Q ě 24 CU),19 “risky” (16 CU ď Q ă 24 CU), or
18This accounts for the randomness of the threshold value which may positively or nega-
tively affect the actual average success rate of a particular group.
19Since in the repeated game pin-point coordination is much harder, we also count con-
133
Table 6.3: Total contributions by category, as well as on average by treatment
(standard errors in brackets). The last column shows the average probability
of reaching the threshold given these total contributions.
Inferior Risky Optimal Average Prob.
success(0-15.99 CU) (16-23.99 CU) (24-50 CU)
TD
All 0 6 10 23.06 CU (0.3 CU) 89.58%
HOM 0 2 6 23.25 CU (0.5 CU) 91.67%
HET 0 4 4 22.88 CU (0.5 CU) 87.50%
BU
All 1 0 15 22.50 CU (1.5 CU) 93.75%
HOM 0 0 8 24.00 CU (0 CU) 100.00%
HET 1 0 7 21.00 CU (3 CU) 87.50%
RG
(Rd 1)
All 3 9 4 19.27 CU (1.2 CU) 45.83%
HOM 3 3 2 17.93 CU (2.1 CU) 36.11%
HET 0 6 2 20.61 CU (1.1 CU) 55.56%
RG
(Rd 10)
All 8 7 1 11.37 CU (2.6 CU) 32.64%
HOM 6 2 0 5.20 CU (3.2 CU) 12.50%
HET 2 5 1 17.54 CU (2.9 CU) 52.78%
“inferior” (Q ă 16 CU), as displayed in Table 6.3. This table also shows av-
erage total contributions as well as the expected success rates given the range
of total contributions in the respective treatment. The data for Round 1 in
the repeated-game treatments are included as well for an additional analysis
below.
There is no appreciable difference among the two voting rules in terms of
optimal behavior, which is also corroborated by a statistical analysis.20 The
similarities with respect to expected success rates reflect this outcome.21 In
addition to Hypothesis 6.2a, these results also support Hypothesis 6.1a for the
voting treatments.
However, we observe a higher frequency of “inferior” or at least “risky”
choices in the repeated-game treatments, especially in homogeneous groups
(RGHOM), which is also apparent in the reduced probability of success. By
Round 10 half of the groups in the repeated game (and six of eight homogeneous
groups) make“inferior”contributions, compared to just one in all voting groups
combined, leading to average expected success rates of only 32.64% (12.5% in
homogeneous groups) in the repeated game, compared to 89.58% combined
in the two top-down treatments and 93.75% combined in the two bottom-up
treatments. This difference is also statistically significant for both homoge-
neous and heterogeneous groups.22 These results refute Hypothesis 6.3a.
tributions greater than 24 CU as “optimal”.
20Fisher’s exact test comparing absolute frequencies by treatment: p ą 0.05 for the overall
comparison as well as the pairwise treatment comparisons of categorized groups in the four
voting treatments.
21This is not tested statistically due to the large number of ties in the data.
22Fisher’s exact test comparing the number of successful groups: p “ 0.001 for TDHOM
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In the repeated game, most groups display lower than optimal total con-
tributions already in Round 1 (see Table 6.3). As a consequence, after a few
rounds many groups prefer not contributing at all to risking the loss of their in-
vested contributions in addition to the damage payment for missing the thresh-
old. Interestingly though, while six out of eight homogeneous groups converge
to zero contributions in this manner over the course the experiment, only two
out of eight heterogeneous groups exhibit a similar decline (see Figure 6.1).
By the end of the experiment, total contributions are accordingly significantly
higher in treatment RGHET than in treatment RGHOM (also Table 6.3),23
thus allowing us to reject Hypothesis 6.1a for the repeated game.
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Figure 6.1: Average total contributions repeated-game (RGHOM, RGHET)
treatments on a round-by-round basis.
vs. RGHOM, p “ 0.152 for TDHET vs. RGHET, p ă 0.001 for BUHOM vs. RGHOM,
p “ 0.004 for BUHET vs. RGHET. An overall comparison with the same test involving all
six treatments also shows a significant difference among these treatments (p ă 0.001).
23Two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U-test: z “ 2.318, p “ 0.0204. The test compares the total
contribution in Round 10 in each group of treatment RGHET with those in treatment
RGHOM.
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Table 6.5: Average efficiency levels in percentage of socially optimal expected
payoffs, standard errors in brackets.
TD BU RG TD & BU All
HOM 96.62 (2.22) 100 (0) 75.30 (1.63) 98.31 (1.16) 90.64 (2.44)
HET 89.09 (3.35) 93.45 (3.11) 79.97 (4.46) 91.27 (2.27) 87.50 (2.34)
All 92.85 (2.17) 96.73 (1.73) 77.63 (2.37) 94.79 (1.41) 89.07 (1.69)
The higher average number of voting rounds in HET treatments – 4.75 vs.
4.875 rounds for TDHOM vs. TDHET and even 3.125 vs. 5.75 rounds for
BUHOM vs. BUHET (see Table 6.4) – suggests that the negotiation was more
difficult for heterogeneous voting groups than for their homogeneous counter-
parts, but this difference cannot be statistically confirmed in this small sample.
However, as the top-down procedure lasted only marginally longer on average
in treatment TDHET, there is no reason to assume that more data would
prove any different. After all, by splitting the negotiation into two separate
dimensions, top-down voting is designed to lower decision costs (i.e., number of
rounds) in more complex situations. Bottom-up voting, on the other hand, is
quicker than top-down in the less complex situation with homogeneous players
who can all contribute the same, but slower when negotiating an asymmetric
allocation in the case of heterogeneity.
6.5.2 Total payoffs and efficiency
After having established that both voting procedures lead to approximately
optimal total contributions, while voluntary contributions in the repeated game
usually do not, we now show that heterogeneous voting groups nevertheless
contribute inefficiently with respect to how the contribution is allocated among
the group members. The following analysis makes use of the efficiency measure
ηpqq defined in Section 6.3.2. The reference values for (ex ante) socially optimal
total payoffs that are used to normalize this measure are displayed in Table 6.1.
While the average efficiency levels by treatment shown in Table 6.5 already
indicate the presence of differences among the decision rules, an additional
analysis is necessary to verify their statistical significance. For this purpose,
Table 6.6 shows OLS regressions of the efficiency levels, which are based on the
total contribution that the groups agreed on in the voting treatments and the
total contributions of Round 10 in the repeated game. Model 1 contains all
six treatments and shows that heterogeneous groups are less efficient than ho-
mogeneous groups. Furthermore, the groups in the repeated-game treatments
achieve lower levels of efficiency than those under either of the voting rules,
thus rejecting Hypothesis 6.3b. When restricting the sample to only the four
voting treatments (Model 2), we still observe the same heterogeneity effect.
It should be pointed out, though, that in this experiment this effect does not
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result from actual differences in total costs or payoffs, but is due to the un-
used potential in heterogeneous groups to increase welfare levels beyond those
achievable under homogeneity. The subjects place more weight on equalizing
individual payoffs than on maximizing their total gains. Moreover, we find that
bottom-up voting leads to more efficient results than the top-down procedure,
even though the total contributions in both treatments are not significantly
different. This rejects Hypothesis 6.2b.
Table 6.6: OLS regressions for efficiency based on expected total payoffs given
actual choices of total contributions. For the repeated game treatments the
efficiency values are calculated based on the expected total payoffs for Round 10
contributions. The values are normalized with respect to the socially optimal
expected total payoff. Whereas Model 1 applies to all six treatments, Model 2
uses only data from the voting treatments. Standard errors in brackets.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Heterogeneous Costs -5.589˚˚ -5.059˚˚
(1.868) (1.797)
Repeated Game -7.703˚˚
(2.485)
Total Contribution 0.821˚˚ 1.172˚˚
(0.137) (0.213)
Bottom Up Rule 4.531˚
(1.765)
Intercept 71.09˚˚ 68.36˚˚
(2.269) (5.318)
N 48 32
R2 0.728 0.646
F 39.25 17.01
Significance levels : : : 10% ˚ : 5% ˚˚ : 1%
A non-parametric analysis of the relative efficiency of each group along
the treatment dimensions using two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests also sup-
ports these results.24 Furthermore, we can also establish the heterogeneity
24Voting (n “ 32) vs. RG (n “ 16): z “ 4.403, p ă 0.001; HOM vs. HET (all rules,
n “ 24 each): z “ 2.201, p “ 0.028; HOM vs. HET (only voting, n “ 16 each): z “ 4.066,
p ă 0.001.
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Table 6.7: Summary of hypothesis tests
Hypothesis Verdict
6.1a (no heterogeneity effect on total contributions) supported (BU, TD), rejected (RG)
6.1b (no heterogeneity effect on relative efficiency) rejected (BU, TD), supported (RG)
6.2a (same total contribution in TD and BU) supported
6.2b (same relative efficiency in TD and BU) inconclusive
6.3a (same total contribution in RG and voting) rejected
6.3b (same relative efficiency in RG and voting) rejected
effect in a pairwise comparison for each voting rule,25 but not for the repeated
game,26 where the heterogeneous groups are actually more efficient on average.
However, a non-parametric comparison of the two voting rules (excluding the
repeated-game treatments) does not lead to significant differences,27 meaning
that the final verdict for Hypothesis 6.2b is inconclusive.
Table 6.7 summarizes our verdict for the tested hypotheses.
6.6 Discussion
In the study by Margreiter et al. (2005), which involves extractions from a
common-pool-resource game, an analogous heterogeneity to ours, namely of
marginal extraction costs, can be exploited to increase efficiency levels as well.
Yet, while the authors also report lower efficiency for groups with heteroge-
neous players, this is due to a lack of agreement, and not due to an inefficient
allocation. In fact, almost all adopted proposals appear to be socially optimal
(cf. Margreiter et al., 2005, Table V). While we cannot confirm the findings
of Margreiter et al. (2005) that heterogeneous groups are less likely to reach
an agreement, we nevertheless observe a significantly higher number of voting
rounds in heterogeneous treatments, which equally indicates that negotiations
in these groups are more difficult. Walker et al. (2000) in their unanimity
treatment (part of Design II) with homogeneous players also observe a high
percentage of efficient symmetric proposals, but a significantly lower proportion
of actual agreement implementing such a proposal (only 60% adoption rate).
Having only a single paid round instead of twenty separate chances of earning
money as well as being able to negotiate several rounds before the choice is
implemented compared to only one round are probably the two reasons for the
higher adoption rates in our voting treatments.
The predominance of equal-payoff outcomes we observe again contrasts with
other experimental studies that involve committee voting.28 Equal-payoff out-
25BUHOM vs. BUHET: z “ 3.771, p ă 0.001; TDHOM vs. TDHET: z “ 2.162, p “
0.031.
26RGHOM vs. RGHET: z “ ´0.853, p “ 0.394.
27TD vs. BU (n “ 16 each): z “ ´1.295, p “ 0.1952.
28See the discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
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comes also do not seem to play a role in the study by Margreiter et al. (2005),
likely due to the accumulated payoff from multiple paid rounds. The proposers
in the study by Gampfer (2014) do not try to equalize payoffs as well, although
here the reason may be that this would have required a very asymmetric allo-
cation.
In terms of total contributions and (expected) success rates, our homoge-
neous treatments are most closely related to the studies by Barrett and Dan-
nenberg (2012, 2014). Of the four treatments with threshold uncertainty that
these authors report, three almost exclusively result in coordination failure
with total contributions below or at best at the bottom end of possible thresh-
old values. Only the “145/155” treatment has comparable results to ours, with
40% choices that we would classify as “optimal” and the remaining 60% in
the “risky” range. Since all of these treatments are one-shot voluntary contri-
bution games with homogeneous players, these results can best be compared
to Round 1 of the RGHOM treatment, which has only slightly worse results
(25% optimal, 37.5% risky, 37.5% inferior; cf. Table 6.3). Of course, our
homogeneous voting treatments, which are essentially also one-shot, perform
much better in terms of optimality (BUHOM: 100% optimal, TDHOM: 75%
optimal, 25% risky; cf. Table 6.3), but do not involve voluntary contributions.
Remarkably, although Barrett and Dannenberg (2012, 2014) use larger groups
of ten players, this does not seem to impede successful contribution in the
“145/155” treatment.
The decrease of contribution levels in the homogeneous repeated-game treat-
ment can be directly attributed to the fact that contribution costs are lost if the
threshold is missed (no refund). Isaac et al. (1989) observe a similar decline
in contributions over time. Strikingly, we observe higher contribution levels
in non-voting groups with heterogeneous marginal contribution costs, despite
the fact that reaching the threshold is not individually optimal for high-cost
players. Unlike homogeneous groups, most heterogeneous groups manage to
keep total contributions on a level that is almost comparable to that of voting
groups.
A possible explanation for this result is the presence of multiple and con-
flicting behavioral norms in the RGHET treatment (as suggested also by the
experiments discussed in Chapter 4). Whereas in the homogeneous treatment
reducing one’s contribution is a clear signal of an unwillingness to reach the
threshold, the same reduction of contributions in the heterogeneous treatment,
if caused by a high-cost player, may equally be an attempt to move to a more
efficient allocation of the current total, benefiting all players in the long run.
Furthermore, as it is initially unclear what particular allocation rule the group
should follow, which could involve maximizing expected welfare just as well
as equalizing payoffs, the players in the heterogeneous treatment may just
have been more tolerant towards violations of this allocation rule. In contrast,
those players who contribute less than average in the homogeneous treatment
are likely to provoke other players into lowering their contributions as well. On
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the other hand, ten rounds of voting may have just been too little for a clear
verdict on convergence patterns.
6.7 Conclusion
We show that the top-down procedure currently in use in the international
negotiations to prevent global warming has a good chance of reaching this
goal. However, given that the countries involved in these negotiations are
heterogeneous with respect to the marginal abatement costs of green-house
gas emissions, any agreement is unlikely to be cost-efficient. In the light of
the efficiency-increasing effect of transfer payments reported in Chapter 5,
promoting emissions trading may be a logical political step.
The procedure effect that was established in Chapter 4 is also very rele-
vant to climate negotiations. What if some countries deliberately sabotage an
agreement reached under the consensus rule, hoping that subsequent attempts
to prevent global warming via strictly national abatement efforts or at best
regional agreements will be no less successful? It is very unlikely then, that
exactly the same allocation of the abatement burden results under both proce-
dures, meaning that some countries will indeed profit from a procedural change
under these circumstances. On the other hand, there is still the possibility that
a failure of negotiations leads to the collapse of abatement efforts stipulated in
this experiment’s choice of no-agreement outcome. I should point out, though,
that reaching an agreement of any kind would be more difficult, if not im-
possible, if said no-agreement outcome did not allow Pareto improvements to
occur in the negotiations. Considering that the Middle East (as oil-producing
countries) and Russia (with its large areas of currently still frozen soil) may
have little, if anything, to gain from successful negotiations, a collective effort
to prevent global warming may not be feasible in any case.
6.A The Simplified ThrPG and adaptation mea-
sures
In this section, I will extend the Simplified ThrPG from Chapter 2 in a way
that is applicable in the context of climate change, with which the present
chapter has been concerned. More precisely, I will use the model to contrast
the trade-off between investing in emissions reductions (mitigation) and in-
vesting in measures to decrease only the national damages a country expects
to suffer due to global warming (adaptation). This topic has been of interest
to environmental economists for at least fifteen years (e.g., Kane and Shogren,
2000) and has recently also been investigated experimentally (e.g., by Blanco
et al., Unpublished). By including adaptation in the model, I will derive the
(to my knowledge) novel prediction that the mere anticipation of adaptation
efforts already reduces the probability that climate change will be prevented.
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The readiness to prepare for impending damages may therefore create a self-
fulfilling prophecy, because other players may take this expectation as a signal
for mistrust in the attempted cooperation.
In order to show this result, it is unnecessary to assume a randomly dis-
tributed threshold value or heterogeneous players, which is why I focus again
on the game with homogeneous players, no refund, and contribution costs of
c “ 1 that was also used in the previous model extensions. The new element in
this variant is that, in addition to investing their endowment in contributions,
the players can now also invest in preventive adaptation measures at a cost of
a ă e, which decreases damages d by a fraction of a{e, but does not affect the
probability of taking damages in the first place. In other words, mitigation to
prevent climate change and adaptation to reduce individual climate-change-
related damages are independent investments. I will assume that adaptation
is a binary choice, meaning that the players can choose between no adaptation
(a “ 0) and adaptation at a specific positive level of 0 ă a.29 With the addi-
tional assumption of a ď e´q¯, I furthermore rule out that the decision between
mitigation and adaptation is governed by restricted resources, meaning that
a player can only afford either to contribute or to reduce damages, but not
both at the same time. This is not a critical assumption, however. A player’s
strategy now takes the form pqi, aq, where qi is player i’s contribution and a is
the player’s adaptation effort.
This modifies player i’s payoff piipq, aq as follows:
piipq, aq “
"
e´ qi ´ a if Q ě T
e´ qi ´ a´ p1´ ae qd if Q ă T
(6.4)
If the threshold value T is reached, adaptation is unnecessary and therefore
optimally set equal to zero. In all other cases, adaptation at a level of a ą 0
increases player i’s payoff if and only if
e´ qi ´ a´ p1´ a
e
qd ą e´ qi ´ d (6.5)
or equivalently
d ą e. (6.6)
This inequality is true if damages d are sufficiently large, meaning that a
player will usually prefer adaptation to no adaptation if the threshold is not
reached. This also means that contributing nothing, but spending money on
adaptation, i.e., strategy p0, aq, is a best response if all other players also do
not contribute. In theory, adaptation could work so well that it turns p0, aq
into a strictly dominant strategy, to be preferred, for example, even if all other
players contribute a fair share of the threshold. This means that a player rather
29This is a simplification of the approach by Blanco et al. (Unpublished) who model the
interaction of mitigation and a range of possible adaptation choices in a linear public goods
game.
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spends his money on a cheap adaptation measure instead of a costly reduction
of his emissions. This would be the case if
e´ T
n
ă e´ a´ p1´ a
e
qd (6.7)
or equivalently
d ă
T
n
´ a
1´ a
e
. (6.8)
However, for this condition to be satisfied, damages would have to be smaller
than endowments (d ă e) which contradicts condition (6.6). We can conclude
from this that adaptation does not affect the game’s pure strategy equilibria
with respect to contributions. Furthermore, only the zero-contributions equi-
librium will entail positive adaptation levels, meaning that the players sub-
stitute mitigation (contributions) for adaptation. Figure 6.2 shows the subse-
quently simplified game – with strategies qi,1{np0q :“ pT{n, 0q and qi,0paq :“ p0, aq
– from the perspective of player i playing against the rest of the group (again
assuming only equal contributions as a focal threshold allocation).
a) Player i
Rest of the Group
Q´i “ T ´ Tn Q´i ă T ´ Tn
qi,1{np0q e´ Tn e´ Tn ´ d
qi,0paq e´ a´ p1´ ae qd e´ a´ p1´ ae qd
Figure 6.2: A simplified threshold public goods game with two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria if the players can invest their endowment in adaptation in
addition to contributions. The matrix shows the payoffs of player i playing
against the rest of the group, whose decisions are represented by the total
contribution Q´i.
The theoretical success rate resulting from this game is equal to
p 1
n
paq “ 1´ n´1
c
T
nd
` ap1
e
´ 1
d
q. (6.9)
It is then easy to see that p1{npaq ă p1{np0q if
d ą e, (6.10)
that is to say, whenever a positive level of adaptation is individually optimal
under the expectation that the threshold is not reached. These findings are
consistent with the theoretical analysis by Kane and Shogren (2000), who also
predict that mitigation efforts are adversely affected by adaptation efforts.
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However, in contrast with their model, the Simplified ThrPG can yield this
prediction even if there is no conflict of resources that forces a government
to decide between either reducing their emissions or preparing for a potential
climate catastrophe.
Given these results, let us imagine now that the same group of players
meets twice to discuss their individual contribution strategies (in an informal
manner that does not lead to a binding agreement, but allows the group to
single out a specific threshold allocation as a focal point). In the first meeting
the groups talks only about emission reductions and basically analyzes the
game in the case of a “ 0. The group realizes the potential benefit of an equal
split of T , but also recognizes zero contributions as a safe choice, as well as
also a threat point against non-compliance in a possible cooperative solution
to the problem. When the group meets for the second time, however, some
players declare that they have considered adaptation measures to reduce any
individual damages that they could suffer if climate change is not prevented.
These players assure their fellow group members that they can still contribute
their assigned share of T , but that they would rather be safe than sorry should
reaching the threshold prove unlikely. As a result, the aforementioned threat of
zero contributions looses much of its teeth, because adaptation severely reduces
the damages suffered by non-contributors in this event. So, any players that
have not yet considered adaptation will likely do so after the second meeting
in order to maximize their payoffs when the game is finally played.
This example shows that, even though not a single contribution has yet
been made, the mere anticipation of failing to reach the threshold, of suffering
damages due to climate change, can already lower the chances of reaching
this goal. Just by considering adaptation measures, the group creates a self-
fulfilling prophecy which makes it all the more likely that these measures will
actually have to be implemented. What is particularly insidious here is that
a player’s adaptation plans have no direct impact on his mitigation efforts
(assuming no conflict of resources), but instead affect his contribution choice
only indirectly through an adjusted reaction to the other players’ (expected)
mitigation efforts.
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Chapter 7
Summary and outlook
Most of the results presented in this thesis are still work in progress, meaning
that this is ultimately only a snapshot of my current research. This concluding
section of the thesis therefore serves as much as an outlook on future research
possibilities as it summarizes the main findings from the preceding chapters.
The theoretical model of success rates in ThrPGs discussed in Chapter 2
appears to fit rather well with the existing experimental literature. However, it
still needs to prove its predictive power in a direct empirical test. One way to
do this is to conduct a new meta-analysis similar to Croson and Marks (2000),
testing the model on a general level. At this time, I have collected most of the
necessary data, but am still looking for the best methodological approach for
using this data to test my model against competing predictions, e.g., those by
impulse balance theory (Alberti et al., Unpublished). Another approach is to
derive predictions for specific parameters, e.g., that success rates decrease in
groups with more players, and conduct a series of experimental tests.
Aside from the empirical corroboration of the model, additional theoretical
work is necessary to extend the model beyond the “primary dimension” of
choosing between one focal threshold equilibrium and zero contributions to
the “secondary dimension” of choosing between multiple focal equilibria. I
am quite optimistic that a geometric analysis of the entire ThrPG can succeed
here. However, doing so will likely require expressing the total number of Nash
equilibria of this game as an explicit function of parameters like the proportion
of the threshold value to total endowments as well as the number of players.
The apparent effect that different decision rules have on the selection of
focal equilibria in ThrPGs described in Chapter 4 needs to be reproduced in
an additional experimental analysis. For this purpose, it may be sufficient to
conduct a one-shot ThrPG with different decision rules, possibly including the
variations employed by Alberti and Cartwright (2016), and to analyze only
the difference of individual contribution behavior (by player type). A more
refined method of measuring stated fairness preferences, possibly based on
social value orientation (e.g. Murphy et al., 2011), should complement these
additional experiments. A very simple test (at least based on what has already
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been discussed in this thesis) of the hypothesis that the subjects (individually)
prefer equal payoffs also in the repeated game with heterogeneous endowments,
but find this too difficult to implement, is to give these players the option to
redistribute the resulting payoffs via transfers, similar to the experiment with
heterogeneous marginal costs that Karl-Martin Ehrhart and I have already
conducted.
On the other hand, having established the usefulness of transfer payments
for efficiency increases in a controlled setting in Chapter 5, future research
could focus more on the application of this idea in practice, e.g., in the context
of reward-based crowdfunding. Here, an initial step is to extend the model to
sequential contributions in “large” groups (in the sense that individual players
are rarely pivotal to reaching the threshold). Transfer payments (or rewards)
then become more of an incentive to contribute instead of a means of redis-
tribution. In this scenario, the collective value of reaching the threshold may
fall behind the personal interests of the contributors, leading to excessive over-
contribution, which here means that contributions are made even after the
threshold has already been reached.
Modeling international negotiations, as has been done in Chapter 6, will
obviously continue to be a meaningful undertaking in the future. The fact
that the outcome of these negotiations depends so strongly on the status quo
scenario, to the extent that real-life climate negotiations may very well fail on
a global scale, because some countries stand to benefit from global warming,
gives rise to the question whether this threat point can be manipulated by the
negotiating parties or by a higher authority (if such exists). Given that unani-
mous agreement requires a Pareto improvement over this status quo situation,
decreasing a competitor’s reference payoff, for example through economic sanc-
tions or even a military attack, may be seem like a good idea if the negotiations
are stuck. On the other hand, such a hostile behavior may be just as likely to
provoke countermeasures instead of facilitating agreement.
All in all, threshold public goods games still offer many opportunities for
future research. My thesis will hopefully provide an additional impulse in that
respect.
Afterword
“The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discov-
eries, is not ‘Eureka!’, but ‘That’s funny . . . ” – Isaac Asimov
Contrary to the structure presented in the following introductory section,
my thesis actually started with an attempt to model the ongoing climate nego-
tiations in a laboratory environment. This was meant as a contribution to the
project “Cooperative Regimes for a Future Climate Policy” (CORE), funded
by the German Federal Ministry for Research, which provided the means to
conducting the (relatively expensive) experiments that form the backbone of
this work.
The results of this initial research, which have been summarized in the fi-
nal chapter of this thesis, were on the one hand surprisingly consistent with
what we (that is, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Jan Kra¨mer, and me) had theoreti-
cally predicted. In fact, in the first two series of experiments (a top-down vs.
bottom-up comparison with uniform vs. truncated normal threshold distribu-
tions) we did not find any statistically significant effects at all, even though
the results were very consistent. Only by adding first individual voluntary con-
tributions and then player heterogeneity did we finally obtain some testable
results. These results were surprising in another sense, because now we could
not explain them at all with our theoretical model: Why should groups with
heterogeneous marginal contributions costs focus so much on equal-payoff out-
comes, and not so much on welfare maximization? And why is it that the
same heterogeneous groups, when employing only individual contributions to
coordinate their behavior, are so much more successful than their homogeneous
counterparts – at least if the threshold is uncertain and/or the contributions
are not refunded if the threshold is missed?
The earlier chapters in this thesis came about in response to these “funny”
outcomes. First was the idea (originally brought forward by Karl-Martin
Ehrhart) of using transfers payments as a means for redistribution, which,
at least in theory, should make welfare-maximizing outcomes more attractive,
because the welfare can now be shared equally. This worked quite well, actu-
ally, both theoretically and experimentally. Second was the idea (now entirely
my own) to introduce a different kind of heterogeneity in order to possibly
replicate our previous results and to better contrast them with the rest of
the experimental literature. Although the results for each of the two deci-
sion rules were by themselves again pretty much in concordance with previous
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experiments, in combination they created another of those “that’s funny” mo-
ments that Isaac Asimov was apparently talking about: Why should a group
negotiating under a unanimity rule focus on equal payoffs (and unequal con-
tributions), but a similar group relying on individual voluntary contribution
focus on equal contributions (and unequal payoffs)? Although the theoretical
work presented at the very beginning of this thesis helped me understand some
of the connections between unanimous voting and voluntary contributions (for
example, both are essentially coordination games), everything written down
here is still pretty much work in progress. I’m not sure if this research will
actually amount to something worth calling a “new discovery”, but the initial
funny feeling has definitely inspired me to do additional studies in this field.
Appendix A
Experimental instructions
The following experimental instructions were translated from German. Please
note that the instructions are only translations for information; they are not
intended to be used in the lab. The instructions in the original language
were carefully polished in grammar, style, comprehensibility, and avoidance of
strategic guidance.
A.1 Instructions to Chapters 4 and 5
A.1.1 Treatment VEND
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e5 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e16.50. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
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Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment.
THE PROJECT Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow
players’ contributions to a project. Your decision consists in a vote on the individ-
ual contributions of all players in a group. The contributions of all players in a
group are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful,
your group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. If
the project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as
if nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then
must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players vote on the individual contributions of all group players to a
project. This happens in up to ten voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
3. Result: project successful?
If there is no unanimous agreement, Steps 1. and 2. are repeated, i.e.,
new proposals are made and new votes are cast. After the tenth unsuccessful
voting round, the status quo is implemented, which means that nobody contributes
anything.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
At the beginning of the experiment, each player has an endowment which
is measure in Experimental Currency Units (ExCU). The exact
amount of this endowment differs among the players:
Players A and B Endowment of 27 ExCU
Players C and D Endowment of 33 ExCU
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
Each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units by investing Exper-
imental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s total contribution
can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution Units.
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The costs per provided Contribution Unit are the same for all play-
ers:
Players A, B, C, D 1 Contribution Unit costs 1.5 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 1.5 ExCU)
Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the
same time. In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0
and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). The individual contribu-
tions from each proposal are automatically summed up to a total
contribution.
By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display the
total contribution, as well as each player’s contribution costs and earnings in
Experimental Currency Units.
The proposals (that is, contribution costs, total contribution, and resulting
earnings) are shown to all players in a list (see Table A.1). Among these is also
a proposal called “status quo”. This proposal means that each player makes
a contribution of 0 Contribution Units (total contribution 0 CU). Next to
each proposal there is a list of the player(s) who made this proposal. Identical
proposals are displayed only once, together with all players who made this
proposal. Including the status quo, there can accordingly be up to five different
contribution proposals.
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player
casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a
proposal please click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the
proposal. Each player then learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of
votes for each proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative.
(a) Unanimous decision (all four players vote for the same proposal):
The experiment ends with the calculation of earnings and payoffs.
(b) No unanimous decision:
Rounds 1 to 9: New proposals are made (see above, 1.), on which new
votes are then cast.
Round 10: The status quo (each player makes a contribution of 0
Contribution Units, total contribution of 0 Contribution Units, individ-
ual earnings of 2 or 8 Experimental Currency Units) is used for the
calculation of payoffs.
3. Result: project successful?
In the experiment the provided contributions must reach a minimum con-
tribution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached, each player must make a payment in Experimental Currency
Units, which is deducted from his endowment. The provided contributions
are refunded in this case, so that except for the payment not additional costs
are incurred.
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The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his contribution costs.
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the exper-
iment, the obtained earnings are converted into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added
to your show-up fee (e5).
Example for the procedure of a voting round:
A total of five proposals for the group players’ individual contributions:
(See Table A.1)
The proposal “1 CU, 3 CU, 4 CU, 2 CU” with a total contribution of 10 CU
has been made twice, but only counts as a single alternative. As the minimum
contribution is missed with this proposal, each player must make a payment of 25
ExCU instead of contribution costs.
The proposal “8 CU, 3 CU, 4 CU, 2 CU” with a total contribution of 17 CU
exceeds the minimum contribution of 16 CU. Each player must therefore pay his
contribution costs.
All four players vote for “B”. The other three different proposals (“Status quo”,
“A, C”, “D”) do not receive any votes this time.
The voting procedure ends in this example with the selection of proposal “B” and
a total contribution of 17 CU.
Examples for the calculation of earnings:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 10 CU:
• Player A: 1 CU with costs of 1.5 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
154
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, each
player receives earnings of 5 ExCU. Accordingly, Players A and B (endowment 27
ExCU) receive earnings of 2 ExCU, whereas Players C and D (endowment of 33
ExCU) receive earnings of 8 ExCU.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 17 CU:
• Player A: 8 CU with costs of 12 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Accordingly, Player
A for example receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 12 ExCU “ 18 ExCU. In contrast,
Player C receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 6 ExCU “ 24 ExCU. Accordingly, Player
A (endowment 27 ExCU) for example receives earnings of 27 ExCU ´ 12 ExCU
“ 15 ExCU. In contrast, Player C (endowment 33 ExCU) receives earnings of 33
ExCU ´ 6 ExCU “ 27 ExCU.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second voting round, you may recall
the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back to
Decision” you can return to the current voting round.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
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Figure A.1: Experimental procedure of treatment VEND.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
A.1.2 Treatment REND
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e5 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e16.50. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
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Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment, that is, in all ten rounds.
THE PROJECT Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contri-
bution to a project. At the same time, all other players in your group also choose
their own contributions to this project. The contributions of all players in a group
are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful, your
group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. If the
project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as if
nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then
must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players each choose your own contribution to a project. This occurs re-
peatedly in a total of ten decision rounds, which all proceed as follows:
1. Choice of contributions to the project
2. Result: project successful?
The experiment consists of a total of ten such independent decisions in a
total of ten rounds. Only one of these rounds is relevant for your payoff,
however. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined at the end of the
experiment, individually for each player. In doing so, each of the ten rounds has the
same probability of being chosen.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Choice of contributions to the project
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment which
is measure in Experimental Currency Units (ExCU). The exact
amount of this endowment differs among the players:
Players A and B Endowment of 27 ExCU
Players C and D Endowment of 33 ExCU
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
In every single round, each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units
by investing Experimental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s
total contribution in each round can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution
Units.
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The costs per provided Contribution Unit are the same for all play-
ers:
Players A, B, C, D 1 Contribution Unit costs 1.5 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 1.5 ExCU)
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player chooses his own contribution to the project. In order to do so,
he chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01
CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display
the corresponding amount in Experimental Currency Units, as well. The
individual contributions of all players are automatically summed up
to a total contribution.
2. Result: project successful?
In each round the provided contributions must reach a minimum contribu-
tion of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not reached
in a particular round, each player must make a payment in Experimen-
tal Currency Units, which is deducted from his earnings in the respective
round. The provided contributions are refunded in this case, so that except
for the payment not additional costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his individual contribution costs.
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution
costs (in ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
After all players in your group have made their contribution choice, all players
are shown the total contribution of their group as well as the resulting earnings
of all players. The contributions and contribution costs of the other players
in the group are displayed, too.
YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the ex-
periment, one of the ten rounds is selected at random. All rounds have the same
probability of being selected. This means that you receive only the final earn-
ings of a single round. The results of the remaining rounds are no longer relevant
for your payoff, no matter whether or not the minimum contribution was reached in
these rounds. The earnings obtained in the randomly selected round are converted
into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added to your show-up fee (e5).
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Example for the procedure of a round:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 10 CU:
• Player A: 1 CU with costs of 1.5 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, Play-
ers A and B (endowment 27 ExCU) receive earnings of 2 ExCU, whereas Players C
and D (endowment of 33 ExCU) receive earnings of 8 ExCU in this round.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 17 CU:
• Player A: 8 CU with costs of 12 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Accordingly, Player A
(endowment 27 ExCU) for example receives earnings of 27 ExCU ´ 12 ExCU “ 15
ExCU. In contrast, Player C (endowment 33 ExCU) receives earnings of 33 ExCU
´ 6 ExCU “ 27 ExCU.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second round, you may recall the
results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back
to Decision” you can return to the current round. After choosing your contribution
(Button“Confirm Choice”) you have one additional opportunity to correct this choice
if necessary. As soon as you click the button “Confirm Choice and Continue”, your
choice is final.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
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Figure A.2: Experimental procedure of treatment REND.
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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A.1.3 Treatment VHOM
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e5 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment.
THE PROJECT Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow
players’ contributions to a project. Your decision consists in a vote on the individ-
ual contributions of all players in a group. The contributions of all players in a
group are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful,
your group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. If
the project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as
if nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then
must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players vote on the individual contributions of all group players to a
project. This happens in up to ten voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
3. Result: project successful?
If there is no unanimous agreement, Steps 1. and 2. are repeated, i.e.,
new proposals are made and new votes are cast. After the tenth unsuccessful
voting round, the status quo is implemented, which means that nobody contributes
anything.
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DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
At the beginning of the experiment, each player has an endowment which
is measure in Experimental Currency Units (ExCU). The exact
amount of this endowment is the same for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Endowment of 30 ExCU
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
Each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units by investing Exper-
imental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s total contribution
can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit are the same for all play-
ers:
Players A, B, C, D 1 Contribution Unit costs 1.5 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 1.5 ExCU)
Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the
same time. In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0
and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). The individual contribu-
tions from each proposal are automatically summed up to a total
contribution.
By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display the
total contribution, as well as each player’s contribution costs and earnings in
Experimental Currency Units.
The proposals (that is, contribution costs, total contribution, and resulting
earnings) are shown to all players in a list (see Table A.2). Among these is also
a proposal called “status quo”. This proposal means that each player makes
a contribution of 0 Contribution Units (total contribution 0 CU). Next to
each proposal there is a list of the player(s) who made this proposal. Identical
proposals are displayed only once, together with all players who made this
proposal. Including the status quo, there can accordingly be up to five different
contribution proposals.
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player
casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a
proposal please click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the
proposal. Each player then learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of
votes for each proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative.
(a) Unanimous decision (all four players vote for the same proposal):
The experiment ends with the calculation of earnings and payoffs.
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(b) No unanimous decision:
Rounds 1 to 9: New proposals are made (see above, 1.), on which new
votes are then cast.
Round 10: The status quo (each player makes a contribution of 0
Contribution Units, total contribution of 0 Contribution Units, individ-
ual earnings of 5 Experimental Currency Units) is used for the calculation
of payoffs.
3. Result: project successful?
In the experiment the provided contributions must reach a minimum con-
tribution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached, each player must make a payment in Experimental Currency
Units, which is deducted from his endowment. The provided contributions
are refunded in this case, so that except for the payment not additional costs
are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his contribution costs.
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the exper-
iment, the obtained earnings are converted into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added
to your show-up fee (e5).
Example for the procedure of a voting round:
A total of five proposals for the group players’ individual contributions:
(See Table A.2)
The proposal “1 CU, 3 CU, 4 CU, 2 CU” with a total contribution of 10 CU
has been made twice, but only counts as a single alternative. As the minimum
contribution is missed with this proposal, each player must make a payment of 25
ExCU instead of contribution costs.
The proposal “8 CU, 3 CU, 4 CU, 2 CU” with a total contribution of 17 CU
exceeds the minimum contribution of 16 CU. Each player must therefore pay his
contribution costs.
All four players vote for “B”. The other three different proposals (“Status quo”,
“A, C”, “D”) do not receive any votes this time.
The voting procedure ends in this example with the selection of proposal “B” and
a total contribution of 17 CU.
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Examples for the calculation of earnings:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 10 CU:
• Player A: 1 CU with costs of 1.5 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, each
player receives earnings of 5 ExCU.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 17 CU:
• Player A: 8 CU with costs of 12 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Accordingly, Player
A for example receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 12 ExCU “ 18 ExCU. In contrast,
Player C receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 6 ExCU “ 24 ExCU.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second voting round, you may recall
the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back to
Decision” you can return to the current voting round.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
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Figure A.3: Experimental procedure of treatment VHOM.
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
A.1.4 Treatment RHOM
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
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For showing up on time you receive an amount of e5 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment, that is, in all ten rounds.
THE PROJECT Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contri-
bution to a project. At the same time, all other players in your group also choose
their own contributions to this project. The contributions of all players in a group
are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful, your
group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. If the
project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as if
nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then
must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players each choose your own contribution to a project. This occurs re-
peatedly in a total of ten decision rounds, which all proceed as follows:
1. Choice of contributions to the project
2. Result: project successful?
The experiment consists of a total of ten such independent decisions in a
total of ten rounds. Only one of these rounds is relevant for your payoff,
however. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined at the end of the
experiment, individually for each player. In doing so, each of the ten rounds has the
same probability of being chosen.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Choice of contributions to the project
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment which
is measure in Experimental Currency Units (ExCU). The exact
amount of this endowment is the same for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Endowment of 30 ExCU
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
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Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
In every single round, each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units
by investing Experimental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s
total contribution in each round can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution
Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit are the same for all play-
ers:
Players A, B, C, D 1 Contribution Unit costs 1.5 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 1.5 ExCU)
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player chooses his own contribution to the project. In order to do so,
he chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01
CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display
the corresponding amount in Experimental Currency Units, as well. The
individual contributions of all players are automatically summed up
to a total contribution.
2. Result: project successful?
In each round the provided contributions must reach a minimum contribu-
tion of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not reached
in a particular round, each player must make a payment in Experimen-
tal Currency Units, which is deducted from his earnings in the respective
round. The provided contributions are refunded in this case, so that except
for the payment not additional costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his individual contribution costs.
Earnings“ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
After all players in your group have made their contribution choice, all players
are shown the total contribution of their group as well as the resulting earnings
of all players. The contributions and contribution costs of the other players
in the group are displayed, too.
YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the ex-
periment, one of the ten rounds is selected at random. All rounds have the same
probability of being selected. This means that you receive only the final earn-
ings of a single round. The results of the remaining rounds are no longer relevant
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for your payoff, no matter whether or not the minimum contribution was reached in
these rounds. The earnings obtained in the randomly selected round are converted
into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added to your show-up fee (e5).
Example for the procedure of a round:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 10 CU:
• Player A: 1 CU with costs of 1.5 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, each
player receives earnings of 5 ExCU in this round.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 17 CU:
• Player A: 8 CU with costs of 12 ExCU
• Player B: 3 CU with costs of 4.5 ExCU
• Player C: 4 CU with costs of 6 ExCU
• Player D: 2 CU with costs of 3 ExCU
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Accordingly, Player
A for example receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 12 ExCU “ 18 ExCU. In contrast,
Player C receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 6 ExCU “ 24 ExCU.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second round, you may recall the
results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back
to Decision” you can return to the current round. After choosing your contribution
(Button“Confirm Choice”) you have one additional opportunity to correct this choice
if necessary. As soon as you click the button “Confirm Choice and Continue”, your
choice is final.
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Figure A.4: Experimental procedure of treatment RHOM.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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A.1.5 Treatment VCOST
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment.
THE PROJECT Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow
players’ contributions to a project. Your decision consists in a vote on the individ-
ual contributions of all players in a group. The contributions of all players in a
group are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful,
your group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. If
the project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as
if nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then
must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players vote on the individual contributions of all group players to a
project. This happens in up to ten voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
3. Result: project successful?
If there is no unanimous agreement, Steps 1. and 2. are repeated, i.e.,
new proposals are made and new votes are cast. After the tenth unsuccessful
voting round, the status quo is implemented, which means that nobody contributes
anything.
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DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
At the beginning of the experiment, each player has an endowment of 30
Experimental Currency Units (ExCU).
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
Each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units by investing Exper-
imental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s total contribution
can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the players:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the
same time. In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0
and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). The individual contribu-
tions from each proposal are automatically summed up to a total
contribution.
By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display the
total contribution, as well as each player’s contribution costs and earnings in
Experimental Currency Units.
The proposals (that is, contribution costs, total contribution, and resulting
earnings) are shown to all players in a list (see Table A.3). Among these is also
a proposal called “status quo”. This proposal means that each player makes
a contribution of 0 Contribution Units (total contribution 0 CU). Next to
each proposal there is a list of the player(s) who made this proposal. Identical
proposals are displayed only once, together with all players who made this
proposal. Including the status quo, there can accordingly be up to five different
contribution proposals.
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player
casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a
proposal please click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the
proposal. Each player then learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of
votes for each proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative.
(a) Unanimous decision (all four players vote for the same proposal):
The experiment ends with the calculation of earnings and payoffs.
(b) No unanimous decision:
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Rounds 1 to 9: New proposals are made (see above, 1.), on which new
votes are then cast.
Round 10: The status quo (each player makes a contribution of 0
Contribution Units, total contribution of 0 Contribution Units, individ-
ual earnings of 5 Experimental Currency Units) is used for the calculation
of payoffs.
3. Result: project successful?
In the experiment the provided contributions must reach a minimum con-
tribution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached, each player must make a payment in Experimental Currency
Units, which is deducted from his endowment. The provided contributions
are refunded in this case, so that except for the payment not additional costs
are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his contribution costs.
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the exper-
iment, the obtained earnings are converted into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added
to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a voting round:
A total of five proposals for the group players’ individual contributions:
(See Table A.3)
The proposal “1.60 CU, 2.20 CU, 4.40 CU, 3.60 CU” with a total contribution
of 11.80 CU has been made twice, but only counts as a single alternative. As
the minimum contribution is missed with this proposal, each player must make a
payment of 25 ExCU instead of contribution costs.
The proposal “5.80 CU, 3.50 CU, 4.60 CU, 2.40 CU” with a total contribution of
16.30 CU exceeds the minimum contribution of 16 CU. Each player must therefore
pay his contribution costs.
All four players vote for “B”. The other three different proposals (“Status quo”,
“A, C”, “D”) do not receive any votes this time.
The voting procedure ends in this example with the selection of proposal “B” and
a total contribution of 16.3 CU.
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Examples for the calculation of earnings:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
• Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, each
player receives earnings of 5 ExCU.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
• Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contribution
costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 5.8
ExCU “ 24.2 ExCU. A payment of 25 ExCU is not incurred in this case, because
the minimum contribution has been reached.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second voting round, you may recall
the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back to
Decision” you can return to the current voting round.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
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Figure A.5: Experimental procedure of treatment VCOST.
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
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A.1.6 Treatment RCOST
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment, that is, in all ten rounds.
THE PROJECT Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contri-
bution to a project. At the same time, all other players in your group also choose
their own contributions to this project. The contributions of all players in a group
are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful, your
group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. If the
project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as if
nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then
must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players each choose your own contribution to a project. This occurs re-
peatedly in a total of ten decision rounds, which all proceed as follows:
1. Choice of contributions to the project
2. Result: project successful?
The experiment consists of a total of ten such independent decisions in a
total of ten rounds. Only one of these rounds is relevant for your payoff,
however. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined at the end of the
experiment, individually for each player. In doing so, each of the ten rounds has the
same probability of being chosen.
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DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Choice of contributions to the project
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment of 30 Ex-
perimental Currency Units (ExCU).
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
In every single round, each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units
by investing Experimental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s
total contribution in each round can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution
Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the players:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player chooses his own contribution to the project. In order to do so,
he chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01
CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display
the corresponding amount in Experimental Currency Units, as well. The
individual contributions of all players are automatically summed up
to a total contribution.
2. Result: project successful?
In each round the provided contributions must reach a minimum contribu-
tion of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not reached
in a particular round, each player must make a payment in Experimen-
tal Currency Units, which is deducted from his earnings in the respective
round. The provided contributions are refunded in this case, so that except
for the payment not additional costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his individual contribution costs.
Earnings“ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
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After all players in your group have made their contribution choice, all players
are shown the total contribution of their group as well as the resulting earnings
of all players. The contributions and contribution costs of the other players
in the group are displayed, too.
YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the ex-
periment, one of the ten rounds is selected at random. All rounds have the same
probability of being selected. This means that you receive only the final earn-
ings of a single round. The results of the remaining rounds are no longer relevant
for your payoff, no matter whether or not the minimum contribution was reached in
these rounds. The earnings obtained in the randomly selected round are converted
into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a round:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
• Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, each
player receives earnings of 5 ExCU in this round.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
• Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contribution
costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings of 30 ExCU´ 5.8 ExCU
“ 24.2 ExCU in this round. A payment of 25 ExCU is not incurred in this case,
because the minimum contribution has been reached.
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Figure A.6: Experimental procedure of treatment RCOST.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second round, you may recall the
results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back
to Decision” you can return to the current round. After choosing your contribution
(Button“Confirm Choice”) you have one additional opportunity to correct this choice
if necessary. As soon as you click the button “Confirm Choice and Continue”, your
choice is final.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
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END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
A.1.7 Treatment VTRANS
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment.
THE PROJECT Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fel-
low players’ contributions to a project. Your decision consists in a vote on the
individual contributions of all players in a group. The contributions of all
players in a group are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be
successful, your group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contri-
bution. In the case of success, transfer payments can be made subsequently.
If the project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just
as if nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players
then must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players vote on the individual contributions of all group players to a
project. Together with the individual contributions, you also vote on transfer
payments between the group players. This happens in up to ten voting
rounds and proceeds as follows:
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1. Proposals for contributions to the project and for transfer payments between
the players
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
3. Result: project successful?
If there is no unanimous agreement, Steps 1. and 2. are repeated, i.e.,
new proposals are made and new votes are cast. After the tenth unsuccessful
voting round, the status quo is implemented, which means that nobody contributes
anything.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Proposals for contributions to the project and for transfer payments between
the players
At the beginning of the experiment, each player has an endowment of 30
Experimental Currency Units (ExCU).
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
Each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units by investing Exper-
imental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s total contribution
can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the players:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
If the minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached, Players C and
D make transfer payments to Players A and B. In doing so, the sum
of transfer payments paid by C and D must correspond to the sum of trans-
fer payments received by A and B. Players C and D may each provide a
maximum of 30 ExCU minus contribution costs as transfer payments.
Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the
same time. In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0
and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). The individual contribu-
tions from each proposal are automatically summed up to a total
contribution.
If the proposed total contribution is greater than or equal to the
minimum contribution of 16 CU, you can also propose transfer pay-
ments between the players. In addition to the four contribution values, the
proposal then contains four additional numbers: the respective transfer pay-
ments paid by Players C and D and the respective transfer payments received
by Players A and B.
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By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display the
total contribution, as well as each player’s contribution costs and earnings in
Experimental Currency Units.
The proposals (that is, contribution costs, total contribution, transfer pay-
ments, and resulting earnings) are shown to all players in a list (see Table
A.4). This proposal means that each player makes a contribution of 0 Con-
tribution Units (total contribution 0 CU) , so that no transfer payments are
possible. Next to each proposal there is a list of the player(s) who made this
proposal. Identical proposals are displayed only once, together with all players
who made this proposal. Including the status quo, there can accordingly be
up to five different contribution proposals.
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player
casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a
proposal please click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the
proposal. Each player then learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of
votes for each proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative.
(a) Unanimous decision (all four players vote for the same proposal):
The experiment ends with the calculation of earnings and payoffs.
(b) No unanimous decision:
Rounds 1 to 9: New proposals are made (see above, 1.), on which new
votes are then cast.
Round 10: The status quo (each player makes a contribution of 0 Con-
tribution Units, total contribution of 0 Contribution Units, no transfer
payments, individual earnings of 5 Experimental Currency Units) is used
for the calculation of payoffs.
3. Result: project successful?
In the experiment the provided contributions must reach a minimum con-
tribution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached, each player must make a payment in Experimental Currency
Units, which is deducted from his endowment. The provided contributions
are refunded in this case, so that except for the payment not additional costs
are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his contribution costs.
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU)
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Players A and B:
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU) ` received transfers (in ExCU
Players C and D:
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your contribution costs (in
ExCU) ´ paid transfers (in ExCU
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
All players:
Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the exper-
iment, the obtained earnings are converted into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added
to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a voting round:
A total of five proposals for the group players’ individual contributions:
(See Table A.4)
The proposal “1.60 CU, 2.20 CU, 4.40 CU, 3.60 CU” with a total contribution
of 11.80 CU has been made twice, but only counts as a single alternative. As
the minimum contribution is missed with this proposal, each player must make
a payment of 25 ExCU instead of contribution costs. Transfer payments are not
possible in this case.
The proposal “5.80 CU, 3.50 CU, 4.60 CU, 2.40 CU” with a total contribution of
16.30 CU exceeds the minimum contribution of 16 CU. Each player must therefore
pay his contribution costs. In addition Players C and D make transfer payments to
Players A and B.
All four players vote for “B”. The other three different proposals (“Status quo”,
“A, C”, “D”) do not receive any votes this time.
The voting procedure ends in this example with the selection of proposal “B” and
a total contribution of 16.3 CU.
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Examples for the calculation of earnings:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
• Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, each
player receives earnings of 5 ExCU.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which add
up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
• Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contribution
costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings of 30 ExCU ´ 5.8
ExCU “ 24.2 ExCU. A payment of 25 ExCU is not incurred in this case, because
the minimum contribution has been reached.
Example for a transfer payment
In the above Example 2, the following transfer payments are now made:
Paid transfers:
• Player C: 2.8 ExCU Sum of paid transfers (C and D) = 6.3 ExCU
• Player D: 3.5 ExCU
Received transfers:
• Player A: 2.4 ExCU Sum of received transfers (A and B) = 6.3 ExCU
• Player B: 3.9 ExCU
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Figure A.7: Experimental procedure of treatment VTRANS.
Player A (contribution costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings
including transfer payments of 30 ExCU ´ 5.8 ExCU ` 2.4 ExCU “ 26.6 ExCU.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second voting round, you may recall
the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back to
Decision” you can return to the current voting round.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
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END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
A.1.8 Treatment RTRANS
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The precise
amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total amount
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment occurs
anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another participant’s
payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment, that is, in all ten rounds.
THE PROJECT Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contri-
bution to a project. At the same time, all other players in your group also choose
their own contributions to this project. The contributions of all players in a group
are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful, your
group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. In the
case of success, transfer payments can be made subsequently. If the project is
not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as if nobody had
made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then must make a
fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment, you and your fel-
low players each choose your own contribution to a project. This occurs re-
peatedly in a total of ten decision rounds, which all proceed as follows:
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1. Choice of contributions to the project and for transfer payments between the
players
2. Preliminary result: project successful?
3. Choice of transfer payments
4. Final result
Attention! Steps 3. and 4. are not carried out, if the project was not
successful (see below).
The experiment consists of a total of ten such independent decisions in a
total of ten rounds. Only one of these rounds is relevant for your payoff,
however. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined at the end of the
experiment, individually for each player. In doing so, each of the ten rounds has the
same probability of being chosen.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE
1. Choice of contributions to the project
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment of 30 Ex-
perimental Currency Units (ExCU).
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
In every single round, each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units
by investing Experimental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s
total contribution in each round can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution
Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the players:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are (A,
B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player chooses his own contribution to the project. In order to do so,
he chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01
CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display
the corresponding amount in Experimental Currency Units, as well. The
individual contributions of all players are automatically summed up
to a total contribution.
2. Preliminary result: project successful?
In each round the provided contributions must reach a minimum contribu-
tion of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not reached
in a particular round, each player must make a payment in Experimen-
tal Currency Units, which is deducted from his earnings in the respective
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round. The provided contributions are refunded in this case, so that except
for the payment not additional costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the same
for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his individual contribution costs.
Earnings before transfers “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ your
contribution costs (in ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU (no transfer payments!)
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Final Earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´ 25 ExCU
After all players in your group have made their contribution choice, all players
are shown the total contribution of their group as well as the resulting earnings
of all players. The contributions and contribution costs of the other players
in the group are displayed, too
3. Choice of transfer payments
If the minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached, Players C and D subse-
quently make individual transfer payments to Players A and B. Players C
and D choose their transfer payments at the same time. Each of the
two players makes two separate payments, one directed at Player A and one
directed at Player B. In doing so, the sum of transfer payments to A and B
by the transferring player (C or D) may not exceed the preliminary earnings
of this player (30 ExCU minus contribution costs) in this round. The sum of
transfer payments paid by C or D, respectively, corresponds to the sum of
transfer payments received by A and B.
4. Final result
After Players C and D have chosen their transfer payments, each player is
informed about these decisions and the resulting final earnings for this round.
Final earnings after transfer payments:
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Players A and B: Final earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU)
´ your contribution costs (in ExCU) ` received transfers (in
ExCU)
Players C and D: Final earnings “ your endowment (in ExCU) ´
your contribution costs (in ExCU) ´ paid transfers (in ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Final earnings “ 30 ExCU ´ 25 ExCU “ 5 ExCU
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YOUR PAYOFF In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the ex-
periment, one of the ten rounds is selected at random. All rounds have the same
probability of being selected. This means that you receive only the final earn-
ings of a single round. The results of the remaining rounds are no longer relevant
for your payoff, no matter whether or not the minimum contribution was reached in
these rounds. The earnings obtained in the randomly selected round are converted
into euros (2 ExCU “ e1) and added to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a round:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
• Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly, each
player receives earnings of 5 ExCU in this round. Transfer payments are not possible
in this case, because the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this round
which add up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
• Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
• Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
• Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
• Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contribution
costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings before transfers of 30
ExCU ´ 5.8 ExCU “ 24.2 ExCU in this round. A payment of 25 ExCU is not
incurred in this case, because the minimum contribution has been reached.
Example for a transfer payment
Assume that the minimum contribution has been reached and the Player C has
earnings before transfers of 16.2 ExCU after paying his contribution costs.
From this amount he pays 0.9 ExCU to Player A and 1.9 ExCU to Player
B. After transfer payments, Player C therefore has 16.2 ExCU ´ 0.9 ExCU ´ 1.9
ExCU “ 13.4 ExCU.
191
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 R
o
u
n
d
 
Choose own contribution  
(0 to 10 CU) 
Choose transfer payments  
(only C and D) 
Round 10 
Announcement of round chosen for payoffs and resulting final payoff 
N
o
 (
R
o
u
n
d
s 
1
 t
o
 9
) 
Contributions in the group and 
resulting earnings are displayed 
R
o
u
n
d
s 
1
 t
o
 9
 
Minimum contribution reached? 
Yes 
N
o
 (
R
o
u
n
d
 1
0
) 
Transfers and final earnings in 
this round are displayed 
Figure A.8: Experimental procedure of treatment RTRANS.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second round, you may recall the
results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the button
“Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button “Back
to Decision” you can return to the current round. After choosing your contribution
(Button“Confirm Choice”) you have one additional opportunity to correct this choice
if necessary. As soon as you click the button “Confirm Choice and Continue”, your
choice is final.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain seated
quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come to your
seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event, you should only
ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies! Furthermore, please
not that the game only continues after all players have made their decisions.
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Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we will ask you to fill
in a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk. Only
then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
A.2 Instructions to Chapter 6
A.2.1 Treatment TDHOM
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3. Over the course
of the experiment you can earn two additional amounts of money. The first amount
of up to e12.50 results from your decisions in the experiment. This amount is in-
fluenced by the decisions of your fellow participants. The second amount ranges
from e0.10 to e3.85 and results solely from your individual decision in a subsequent
questionnaire. The total amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The payment occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no partic-
ipant will known another participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency
“Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with four other players. The composition
of this group will not change throughout the entire experiment (in both parts and in
all rounds). You begin the experiment with an endowment of 25 Experimental
Currency Units.
Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow players’ contri-
butions to a project. Each player can contribute up to 10 Experimental Currency
Units. The group’s total contribution can therefore amount to up to 50 Experimental
Currency Units.
The decision occurs in two parts.
1. First you vote on the total contribution of all players in your group.
2. Then you vote on which share of the total contribution each individual
player has to contribute.
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For the project to be successful, your group’s total contribution must reach
a minimum contribution. Otherwise, the project fails and the amount you con-
tributed to the project (as well as the contributions from your fellow players) are
lost. The exact amount of this minimum contribution is determined randomly. You
are told this information only at the end of the experiment. You know however
that the minimum contribution will take on one of the following nine values in
contribution units, each with the same probability:
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
If the minimum contribution is not reached, each player must make an additional
payment of 10 Experimental Currency Units, which is deducted from his
payoff.
Total contribution <16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >24
Probability that
minimum contri-
bution is reached
(absolute)
0 1/9 2/9 3/9 4/9 5/9 6/9 7/9 8/9 1 1
Probability that
minimum contribu-
tion is reached (%,
rounded)
0% 11% 22% 33% 44% 56% 67% 78% 89% 100% 100%
PROCEDURE OF THE FIRST PART In the first part you and your
fellow players vote on your group’s total contribution. This happens in up to
five voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. At the same time as the other players, each player makes a proposal for
the total contribution. In order to do this, he or she chooses an amount
between 0 and 50 Experimental Currency Units.
2. The proposals are shown to all players in a table (see Table A.5). Among them
is also a proposal called “Status Quo”, corresponding to a total contribution
of 0 Experimental Currency Units. Next to each proposal, there is a
list of the player(s) who made this proposal. If a proposal has been made
multiple times, it is displayed only once, together with all players who made
this proposal. Accordingly, there can be up to six different proposals.
3. Each player casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. All votes are cast
individually and at the same time. In order to vote for a proposal, please click
on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the proposal.
4. Each player learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of votes for each
proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative. If all players
select the same proposal (unanimous decision), the second part of the
experiment begins. Otherwise, Steps 1. to 4. are repeated up to four times.
In every repetition new proposals can be made.
5. If there is also no agreement in the fifth voting round, the Status
Quo (total contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units) is chosen as your
group’s total contribution.
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Table A.5: Reproduction of screenshot for voting decision in the first part of
treatment TDHOM.
Voting round 2 of up to 5
Please accept one of the following proposals!
The minimum contribution takes on one of the following nine values:
16 ExCU, 17 ExCU, 18 ExCU, 19 ExCU, 20 ExCU, 21 ExCU, 22 ExCU, 23 ExCU, 24 ExCU
Back to current round Show later round Show earlier round
Proposal Total Contribution (ExCU)
Player A, B, D (your proposal), E 0 Accept
Player C 5 Accept
Status quo 0 Accept
6. If the first part results in a total contribution of 0 Experimental Cur-
rency Units, no further voting occurs in this group, meaning that the
second part of the experiment is omitted. Each player then automatically
makes an individual contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units and the
experiment ends with the calculation of payoffs.
Example for the procedure of the first part:
• Round 1:
– A total of six proposals for the total contribution (in ExCU): 0 (Status
Quo), 16, 17, 17, 18, 19
– Total contribution “17 ExCU” has been proposed twice, but only counts
as a single alternative.
– Two player vote for “18 ExCU”, three players for “16 ExCU”. “0 ExCU”,
“17 ExCU”, and “19 ExCU” receive no votes at this time.
– There is no agreement, so the procedure is repeated in an additional
round.
• Round 2:
– Again a total of six proposals for the total contribution (in ExCU): 0
(Status Quo), 16, 17, 17, 17, 19
– Total contribution “17 ExCU” has been proposed three times, but only
counts as a single alternative.
– Now all five players vote for “19 ExCU”. “0 ExCU”, “16 ExCU”, and “17
ExCU” receive no votes at this time.
195
– Thus, a total contribution of “19 ExCU” is accepted and chosen for the
second part.
Please note that, starting with the second voting round, you may call up the
results from previous votes whenever you make a decision by clicking the button
“Show earlier round” (see Table A.5). Clicking the button again shows even earlier
rounds. By clicking the buttons “Show later round” or “Back to current round” you
may advance again in the history or, respectively, jump immediately to the current
decision round.
PROCEDURE OF THE SECOND PART In the second part you and
your fellow players vote on how the total contribution determined in the first part
is to be provided by the individual contributions of all group players. This
happens in up to five voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the same time.
In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Experi-
mental Currency Units (in steps of 0.1 ExCU). Caution! The sum of these
contributions must be equal to the total contribution determined in
Part 1!
2. The proposals are shown to all players in a list. Among these is again a
proposal called “Status Quo”. Here, this proposal means that each player
provides a contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units, no matter
what amount has been chosen as a total contribution in Part 1.
Next to each proposal, there is a list of the player(s) who made this proposal.
Identical proposals are displayed only once, together with all players who made
this proposal. Accordingly, there can again be up to six different distribution
proposals.
3. At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player casts a
vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a proposal, please
click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the proposal.
4. Each player learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of votes for each
proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative. If all players
select the same proposal (unanimous decision), the experiment ends with
the calculation of payoffs. Otherwise, Steps 1. to 4. are repeated up to four
times.
5. If there is also no agreement in the fifth voting round, the Status
Quo (each player provides a contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units,
total contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units) is selected to calculate
payoffs. This is the case, even if a different total contribution has
been chosen in the first part.
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Example for the procedure of the second part (total contribution 19
ExCU):
• Round 1:
– A total of six proposals for the allocation of the total contribution:
Individual contributions (ExCU)
Proposal Player A Player B Player C Player D Player E
Player A, C 1 2 4 3 9
Player B, E 3 1 2 6.5 6.5
Player D 9 3 2 1 4
Status Quo 0 0 0 0 0
– The allocation “1 ExCU; 2 ExCU; 4 ExCU; 3 ExCU; 9 ExCU” has been
proposed twice, but only counts as a single alternative.
– The same applies to the allocation“3 ExCU; 1 ExCU; 2 ExCU; 6.5 ExCU;
6.5 ExCU”.
– All five players vote for “A, C”. The other three different proposals (“Sta-
tus Quo”, “B, E”, “D”) receive no votes this time.
• In this example, the voting procedure ends with a total contribution of 19
ExCU and the following individually payable contributions:
– Player A: 1 ExCU
– Player B: 2 ExCU
– Player C: 4 ExCU
– Player D: 3 ExCU
– Player E: 9 ExCU
Please note that, starting with the second voting round, you may call up the
results from previous votes in this part whenever you make a decision by
clicking the button “Show earlier round”. Clicking the button again shows even
earlier rounds. By clicking the buttons “Show later round” or “Back to current
round” you may advance again in the history or, respectively, jump immediately to
the current decision round.
YOUR PAYOFF The payoff of each player calculates as follows:
• Please note that the contributed amount is deducted from your account bal-
ance in any case, even if the total contribution has not reached the minimum
contribution.
• If the group’s total contribution is greater than or equal to the minimum
contribution, then the project is successful and you receive the following payoff:
payoff for reaching the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
contributed amount
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• If the group’s total contribution is less than the minimum contribution, then
the project is not successful and you receive the following payoff:
payoff for missing the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
contributed amount ´ 10 ExCU
In order to determine the total payoff at the end of the experiment, the resulting
amount is converted into euros and added to your show-up fee. The payoff from a
subsequent separate experiment is later added to this amount.
Example for payoffs (total contribution 19 ExCU):
Assume that the minimum contribution amount to 20 ExCU. Then a total contribu-
tion of 19 ExCU fails to reach this minimum contribution. Accordingly, for Player
A from the previous example (contributed amount of 1 ExCU) a payoff of 25 ExCU
´ 1 ExCU ´ 10 ExCU = 14 ExCU results. An amount of 10 ExCU is deducted
here, because the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Assume that the minimum contribution amounts to 18 ExCU. Then a total con-
tribution of 19 ExCU reaches this minimum contribution. Now, for a contributed
amount of 1 ExCU a payoff of 25 ExCU ´ 1 ExCU = 24 ExCU results. In this case
nothing is deducted, because the minimum contribution has been reached.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34). If you have any questions yourself during the experiment,
please remain seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter
has come to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. However,
questions should only be about the instructions and not about strategies! Further-
more, please note that the game only continues when all players have made their
decisions. Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we ask you to fill
in a questionnaire with an additional decision task. When the time has come, we
will distribute separate instructions explaining the procedure. Please remain seated
after filling in the questionnaire until we call up your place number. Take your
instructions with you to the front desk. Only then can you receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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Figure A.9: Experimental procedure of treatment TDHOM.
A.2.2 Treatment TDHET
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
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the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3. Over the course
of the experiment you can earn two additional amounts of money. The first amount
of up to e12.50 results from your decisions in the experiment. This amount is in-
fluenced by the decisions of your fellow participants. The second amount ranges
from e0.10 to e3.85 and results solely from your individual decision in a subsequent
questionnaire. The total amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The payment occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no partic-
ipant will known another participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency
“Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you and four other players form a group of five. The compo-
sition of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and
does not change throughout the entire experiment (in both parts and in all rounds).
You begin the experiment with an endowment of 25 Experimental Currency
Units.
Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow players’ contribu-
tions to a project. Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution
Units (CU). Each player can contribute up to 10 Contribution Units, by invest-
ing Experimental Currency Units from his or her endowment. The decision occurs
in two parts.
1. First you vote on the total contribution of all players in your group. This
total contribution can amount to up to 50 Contribution Units.
2. Then you vote on which share of the total contribution each individual
player has to contribute.
The costs of contributions in Experimental Currency Units differ among
the players:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 0.77 Experimental
Currency Unit (1 CU = 0.77 ExCU)
Players C, D and E 1 Contribution Unit costs 1.25 Experimental
Currency Units (1 CU = 1.25 ExCU)
Which player you are (A, B, C, D, E) is determined randomly at the beginning
of the experiment. You are told who you are before the first decision.
For the project to be successful, your group’s total contribution must reach
a minimum contribution. Otherwise, the project fails and the amount you con-
tributed to the project (as well as the contributions from your fellow players) are
lost. The exact amount of this minimum contribution is determined randomly. You
are told this information only at the end of the experiment. You know however
that the minimum contribution will take on one of the following nine values in
contribution units, each with the same probability:
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16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
If the minimum contribution is not reached, each player must make an additional
payment of 10 Experimental Currency Units, which is deducted from his
payoff.
Total contribution <16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >24
Probability that
minimum contri-
bution is reached
(absolute)
0 1/9 2/9 3/9 4/9 5/9 6/9 7/9 8/9 1 1
Probability that
minimum contribu-
tion is reached (%,
rounded)
0% 11% 22% 33% 44% 56% 67% 78% 89% 100% 100%
PROCEDURE OF THE FIRST PART In the first part you and your
fellow players vote on your group’s total contribution. This happens in up to
five voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. At the same time as the other players, each player makes a proposal for
the total contribution. In order to do this, he or she chooses an amount
between 0 and 50 Contribution Units.
2. The proposals are shown to all players in a table (see Table A.6). Among them
is also a proposal called “Status Quo”, corresponding to a total contribution
of 0 Contribution Units. Next to each proposal, there is a list of the
player(s) who made this proposal. If a proposal has been made multiple times,
it is displayed only once, together with all players who made this proposal.
Accordingly, there can be up to six different proposals.
3. Each player casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. All votes are cast
individually and at the same time. In order to vote for a proposal, please click
on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the proposal.
4. Each player learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of votes for each
proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative. If all players
select the same proposal (unanimous decision), the second part of the
experiment begins. Otherwise, Steps 1. to 4. are repeated up to four times.
In every repetition new proposals can be made.
5. If there is also no agreement in the fifth voting round, the Status Quo
(total contribution of 0 Contribution Units) is chosen as your group’s total
contribution.
6. If the first part results in a total contribution of 0 Contribution Units,
no further voting occurs in this group, meaning that the second part of the
experiment is omitted. Each player then automatically makes an individual
contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units and the experiment ends with
the calculation of payoffs.
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Table A.6: Reproduction of screenshot for voting decision in the first part of
treatment TDHET.
Voting round 2 of up to 5
Please accept one of the following proposals!
The minimum contribution takes on one of the following nine values:
16 CU, 17 CU, 18 CU, 19 CU, 20 CU, 21 CU, 22 CU, 23 CU, 24 CU
Back to current round Show later round Show earlier round
Proposal Total Contribution (CU)
Player A, B, E 17 Accept
Player C (your proposal) 19 Accept
Player D 16 Accept
Status quo 0 Accept
Example for the procedure of the first part:
• Round 1:
– A total of six proposals for the total contribution (in CU): 0 (Status
Quo), 16, 17, 17, 18, 19
– Total contribution “17 CU” has been proposed twice, but only counts as
a single alternative.
– Two player vote for “18 CU”, three players for “16 CU”. “0 CU”, “17 CU”,
and “19 CU” receive no votes at this time.
– There is no agreement, so the procedure is repeated in an additional
round.
• Round 2:
– Again a total of six proposals for the total contribution (in CU): 0 (Status
Quo), 16, 17, 17, 17, 19
– Total contribution “17 CU” has been proposed three times, but only
counts as a single alternative.
– Now all five players vote for “19 CU”. “0 CU”, “16 CU”, and “17 CU”
receive no votes at this time.
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– Thus, a total contribution of “19 CU” is accepted and chosen for the
second part.
Please note that, starting with the second voting round, you may call up the
results from previous votes whenever you make a decision by clicking the button
“Show earlier round” (see Table A.6). Clicking the button again shows even earlier
rounds. By clicking the buttons “Show later round” or “Back to current round” you
may advance again in the history or, respectively, jump immediately to the current
decision round.
PROCEDURE OF THE SECOND PART In the second part you and
your fellow players vote on how the total contribution determined in the first part
is to be provided by the individual contributions of all group players. This
happens in up to five voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the same time.
In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Con-
tribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you
can also display the corresponding values in Experimental Currency Units.
Caution! The sum of these contributions must be equal to the total
contribution determined in Part 1!
2. The proposals are shown to all players in a table (in CU as well as in ExCU).
Among these is again a proposal called “Status Quo”. Here, this proposal
means that each player provides a contribution of 0 Experimental Cur-
rency Units, no matter what amount has been chosen as a total
contribution in Part 1. Next to each proposal, there is a list of the player(s)
who made this proposal. If the same proposal has been made several times,
it is shown only once, with all players who made this proposal. Accordingly,
there can again be up to six different distribution proposals.
3. At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player casts a
vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a proposal, please
click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the proposal.
4. Each player learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of votes for each
proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative. If all players
select the same proposal (unanimous decision), the experiment ends with
the calculation of payoffs. Otherwise, Steps 1. to 4. are repeated up to four
times.
5. If there is also no agreement in the fifth voting round, the Status Quo
(each player provides a contribution of 0 Contribution Units, total contribution
of 0 Contribution Units) is selected to calculate payoffs. This is the case,
even if a different total contribution has been chosen in the first
part.
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Example for the procedure of the second part (total contribution 19
ExCU):
• Round 1:
– A total of six proposals for the allocation of the total contribution:
Individual contributions in CU (costs in ExCU)
Proposal Player A Player B Player C Player D Player E
Player(s) A, C
1 2 4 3 9
(0.77) (1.54) (5) (3.75) (11.25)
Player(s) B, E
3 1 2 6.5 6.5
(2.31) (0.77) (2.5) (8.12) (8.12)
Player(s) D
9 3 2 1 4
(6.93) (2.31) (2.5) (1.25) (5)
Status Quo
0 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
– The allocation “1 CU; 2 CU; 4 CU; 3 CU; 9 CU” has been proposed
twice, but only counts as a single alternative.
– The same applies to the allocation “3 CU; 1 CU; 2 CU; 6.5 CU; 6.5 CU”.
– All five players vote for “A, C”. The other three different proposals (“Sta-
tus Quo”, “B, E”, “D”) receive no votes this time.
• In this example, the voting procedure ends with a total contribution of 19 CU
and the following individual contributions:
– Player A: 1 CU (1*0.77 ExCU = 0.77 ExCU)
– Player B: 2 CU (2*0.77 ExCU = 1.54 ExCU)
– Player C: 4 CU (4*1.25 ExCU = 5 ExCU)
– Player D: 3 CU (3*1.25 ExCU = 3.75 ExCU)
– Player E: 9 CU (9*1.25 ExCU = 11.25 ExCU)
Please note that, starting with the second voting round, you may call up the
results from previous votes in this part whenever you make a decision by
clicking the button “Show earlier round”. Clicking the button again shows even
earlier rounds. By clicking the buttons “Show later round” or “Back to current
round” you may advance again in the history or, respectively, jump immediately to
the current decision round.
YOUR PAYOFF The payoff of each player calculates as follows:
• Please note that you have to pay the costs of your contribution in any case,
even if the total contribution has not reached the minimum contribution.
• If the group’s total contribution is greater than or equal to the minimum
contribution, then the project is successful and you receive the following payoff:
payoff for reaching the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
costs (in ExCU)
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• If the group’s total contribution is less than the minimum contribution, then
the project is not successful and you receive the following payoff:
payoff for missing the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
costs (in ExCU) ´ 10 ExCU
In order to determine the final payoff at the end of the experiment, the resulting
amount is converted into euros 2 ExCU = 1 euro) and added to your show-up fee.
The payoff from a subsequent separate experiment is later added to this amount.
Example for payoffs (total contribution 19 CU):
Assume a minimum contribution of 20 CU. Then a total contribution of 19
CU fails to reach this minimum contribution. Accordingly, for Player A from the
previous example (costs of 0.77 ExCU for 1 CU) this results in a payoff of 25 ExCU
´ 0.77 ExCU ´ 10 ExCU = 14.23 ExCU results. A payment of 10 ExCU is deducted
here, because the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Assume a minimum contribution of 18 CU. Then a total contribution of 19
ExCU reaches this minimum contribution. Now, for a contributed amount of 1 CU
(costs of 0.77 ExCU) a payoff of 25 ExCU ´ 0.77 ExCU = 24.23 ExCU results. In
this case, no additional payment is deducted, because the minimum contribution
has been reached.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34). If you have any questions yourself during the experiment,
please remain seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter
has come to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. However,
questions should only be about the instructions and not about strategies! Further-
more, please note that the game only continues when all players have made their
decisions. Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we ask you to fill
in a questionnaire with an additional decision task. When the time has come, we
will distribute separate instructions explaining the procedure. Please remain seated
after filling in the questionnaire until we call up your place number. Take your
instructions with you to the front desk. Only then can you receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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Figure A.10: Experimental procedure of treatment TDHET.
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A.2.3 Treatment BUHOM
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3. Over the course
of the experiment you can earn two additional amounts of money. The first amount
of up to e12.50 results from your decisions in the experiment. This amount is in-
fluenced by the decisions of your fellow participants. The second amount ranges
from e0.10 to e3.85 and results solely from your individual decision in a subsequent
questionnaire. The total amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The payment occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no partic-
ipant will known another participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency
“Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with four other players. The composition
of this group will not change throughout the entire experiment. You begin the
experiment with an endowment of 25 Experimental Currency Units.
Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow players’ contri-
butions to a project. Each player can contribute up to 10 Experimental Currency
Units. The group’s total contribution can therefore amount to up to 50 Experimental
Currency Units. Your decision consists in a vote on the individual contribu-
tions of all players in the group. These contributions are added up to a total
contribution.
For the project to be successful, your group’s total contribution must reach
a minimum contribution. Otherwise, the project fails and the amount you con-
tributed to the project (as well as the contributions from your fellow players) are
lost. The exact amount of this minimum contribution is determined randomly. You
are told this information only at the end of the experiment. You know however
that the minimum contribution will take on one of the following nine values in
contribution units, each with the same probability:
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
If the minimum contribution is not reached, each player must make an additional
payment of 10 Experimental Currency Units, which is deducted from his
payoff.
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Total contribution <16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >24
Probability that
minimum contri-
bution is reached
(absolute)
0 1/9 2/9 3/9 4/9 5/9 6/9 7/9 8/9 1 1
Probability that
minimum contribu-
tion is reached (%,
rounded)
0% 11% 22% 33% 44% 56% 67% 78% 89% 100% 100%
VOTING PROCEDURE In the experiment you and your fellow players vote
on the individual contributions of all group players. This happens in up to
ten voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the same time.
In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Exper-
imental Currency Units (in steps of 0.1 ExCU). The individual contributions
from each proposal are automatically summed up to a total contribution.
2. The proposals and corresponding total contributions are shown to all players
in a list. Among these is also a proposal called “Status Quo”. This proposal
means that each player provides a contribution of 0 Experimental Cur-
rency Units. Next to each proposal, there is a list of the player(s) who made
this proposal. Identical proposals are displayed only once, together with all
players who made this proposal. Accordingly, there can again be up to six
different distribution proposals.
3. At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player casts a
vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a proposal, please
click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the proposal.
4. Each player learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of votes for each
proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative. If all players
select the same proposal (unanimous decision), the experiment ends with
the calculation of payoffs. Otherwise, Steps 1. to 4. are repeated up to nine
times.
5. If there is also no agreement in the tenth voting round, the Status
Quo (each player provides a contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units,
total contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units) is selected to calculate
payoffs.
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Example for the procedure of the experiment:
• Round 1:
– A total of six proposals for the individual contributions of all players in
the group:
(See Table A.7)
– The allocation “1 ExCU; 2 ExCU; 4 ExCU; 3 ExCU; 9 ExCU” with a
total contribution of 19 ExCU has been proposed twice, but only counts
as a single alternative.
– The same applies to the allocation “6.5 ExCU; 1 ExCU; 2 ExCU; 6.5
ExCU; 0 ExCU” with a total contribution of 16 ExCU.
– All five players vote for “A, C”. The other three different proposals (“Sta-
tus Quo”, “B, E”, “D”) receive no votes this time.
• In this example, the voting procedure ends with a total contribution of 19
ExCU and the following individually payable contributions:
– Player A: 1 ExCU
– Player B: 2 ExCU
– Player C: 4 ExCU
– Player D: 3 ExCU
– Player E: 9 ExCU
Please note that, starting with the second voting round, you may call up the
results from previous votes in this part whenever you make a decision by
clicking the button “Show earlier round”. Clicking the button again shows even
earlier rounds. By clicking the buttons “Show later round” or “Back to current
round” you may advance again in the history or, respectively, jump immediately to
the current decision round.
YOUR PAYOFF The payoff of each player calculates as follows:
• Please note that the contributed amount is deducted from your account bal-
ance in any case, even if the total contribution has not reached the minimum
contribution.
• If the group’s total contribution is greater than or equal to the minimum
contribution, then the project is successful and you receive the following payoff:
payoff for reaching the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
contributed amount
• If the group’s total contribution is less than the minimum contribution, then
the project is not successful and you receive the following payoff:
payoff for missing the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
contributed amount ´ 10 ExCU
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Figure A.11: Experimental procedure of treatment BUHOM.
In order to determine the total payoff at the end of the experiment, the resulting
amount is converted into euros and added to your show-up fee. The payoff from a
subsequent separate experiment is later added to this amount.
Example for payoffs (total contribution 19 ExCU):
Assume that the minimum contribution amount to 20 ExCU. Then a total contribu-
tion of 19 ExCU fails to reach this minimum contribution. Accordingly, for Player
A from the previous example (contributed amount of 1 ExCU) a payoff of 25 ExCU
´ 1 ExCU ´ 10 ExCU = 14 ExCU results. An amount of 10 ExCU is deducted
here, because the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Assume that the minimum contribution amounts to 18 ExCU. Then a total con-
tribution of 19 ExCU reaches this minimum contribution. Now, for a contributed
amount of 1 ExCU a payoff of 25 ExCU ´ 1 ExCU = 24 ExCU results. In this case
nothing is deducted, because the minimum contribution has been reached.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
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12.34 instead of 12,34). If you have any questions yourself during the experiment,
please remain seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter
has come to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. However,
questions should only be about the instructions and not about strategies! Further-
more, please note that the game only continues when all players have made their
decisions. Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we ask you to fill
in a questionnaire with an additional decision task. When the time has come, we
will distribute separate instructions explaining the procedure. Please remain seated
after filling in the questionnaire until we call up your place number. Take your
instructions with you to the front desk. Only then can you receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
A.2.4 Treatment BUHET
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3. Over the course
of the experiment you can earn two additional amounts of money. The first amount
of up to e12.50 results from your decisions in the experiment. This amount is in-
fluenced by the decisions of your fellow participants. The second amount ranges
from e0.10 to e3.85 and results solely from your individual decision in a subsequent
questionnaire. The total amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The payment occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no partic-
ipant will known another participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency
“Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you and four other players form a group of five. The compo-
sition of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and
does not change throughout the entire experiment. You begin the experiment with
an endowment of 25 Experimental Currency Units.
Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow players’ contribu-
tions to a project. Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution
Units (CU). Each player can contribute up to 10 Contribution Units, by invest-
ing Experimental Currency Units from his or her endowment. Your decision consists
in a vote on the individual contributions of all players in a group. These
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contributions are added up to a total contribution of up to 50 Contribution
Units.
The costs of contributions in Experimental Currency Units differ among
the players:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 0.77 Experimental
Currency Unit (1 CU = 0.77 ExCU)
Players C, D and E 1 Contribution Unit costs 1.25 Experimental
Currency Units (1 CU = 1.25 ExCU)
Which player you are (A, B, C, D, E) is determined randomly at the beginning
of the experiment. You are told who you are before the first decision.
For the project to be successful, your group’s total contribution must reach
a minimum contribution. Otherwise, the project fails and the amount you con-
tributed to the project (as well as the contributions from your fellow players) are
lost. The exact amount of this minimum contribution is determined randomly. You
are told this information only at the end of the experiment. You know however
that the minimum contribution will take on one of the following nine values in
contribution units, each with the same probability:
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
If the minimum contribution is not reached, each player must make an additional
payment of 10 Experimental Currency Units, which is deducted from his
payoff.
Total contribution <16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >24
Probability that
minimum contri-
bution is reached
(absolute)
0 1/9 2/9 3/9 4/9 5/9 6/9 7/9 8/9 1 1
Probability that
minimum contribu-
tion is reached (%,
rounded)
0% 11% 22% 33% 44% 56% 67% 78% 89% 100% 100%
VOTING PROCEDURE In the experiment you and your fellow players vote
on the individual contributions of all group players. This happens in up to
ten voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the same time.
In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Contri-
bution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you can
also display the corresponding values in Experimental Currency Units. The
individual contributions from each proposal are automatically summed up to
a total contribution.
2. The proposals and corresponding total contributions are shown to all players
in a table (both in CU and ExCU) (see Table A.8). Among these is also a
proposal called“Status Quo”. This proposal means that each player provides
a contribution of 0 Experimental Currency Units. Next to each proposal,
there is a list of the player(s) who made this proposal. If the same proposal
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has been made several times, it is shown only once, with all players who made
this proposal. Accordingly, there can again be up to six different distribution
proposals.
3. At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each player casts a
vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to vote for a proposal, please
click on “Accept” in the column directly to the right of the proposal.
4. Each player learns the result of the vote, i.e., the number of votes for each
proposal as well as which player has voted for which alternative. If all players
select the same proposal (unanimous decision), the experiment ends with
the calculation of payoffs. Otherwise, Steps 1. to 4. are repeated up to nine
times.
5. If there is also no agreement in the tenth voting round, the Status Quo
(each player provides a contribution of 0 Contribution Units, total contribution
of 0 Contribution Units) is selected to calculate payoffs.
Example for the voting procedure:
• Round 1:
– A total of six proposals for the individual contributions of all players in
the group:
(See Table A.8)
– The allocation“1 CU; 2 CU; 4 CU; 3 CU; 9 CU”with a total contribution
of 19 CU has been proposed twice, but only counts as a single alternative.
– The same applies to the allocation “3 CU; 1 CU; 2 CU; 6.5 CU; 6.5 CU”
with a total contribution of 16 CU.
– All five players vote for “A, C”. The remaining three different proposals
(“Status Quo”, “B, E”, “D”) receive no votes this time.
• In this example, the voting procedure ends with a total contribution of 19 CU
and the following individual contributions:
– Player A: 1 CU (1*0.77 ExCU = 0.77 ExCU)
– Player B: 2 CU (2*0.77 ExCU = 1.54 ExCU)
– Player C: 4 CU (4*1.25 ExCU = 5 ExCU)
– Player D: 3 CU (3*1.25 ExCU = 3.75 ExCU)
– Player E: 9 CU (9*1.25 ExCU = 11.25 ExCU)
Please note that, starting with the second voting round, you may call up the
results from previous votes whenever you make a decision by clicking the button
“Show earlier round”. Clicking the button again shows even earlier rounds. By
clicking the buttons “Show later round” or “Back to current round” you may advance
again in the history or, respectively, jump immediately to the current decision round.
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YOUR PAYOFF The payoff of each player calculates as follows:
• Please note that you have to pay the costs of your contribution in any case,
even if the total contribution has not reached the minimum contribution.
• If the group’s total contribution is greater than or equal to the minimum
contribution, then the project is successful and you receive the following payoff:
Payoff for reaching the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
costs (in ExCU)
• If the group’s total contribution is less than the minimum contribution, then
the project is not successful and you receive the following payoff:
Payoff for missing the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
costs (in ExCU) ´ 10 ExCU
In order to determine the final payoff at the end of the experiment, the resulting
amount is converted into euros 2 ExCU = 1 euro) and added to your show-up fee.
The payoff from a subsequent separate experiment is later added to this amount.
Example for the calculation of payoffs (total contribution 19 CU):
Assume a minimum contribution of 20 CU. Then a total contribution of 19
CU fails to reach this minimum contribution. Accordingly, for Player A from the
previous example (costs of 0.77 ExCU for 1 CU) this results in a payoff of 25 ExCU
´ 0.77 ExCU ´ 10 ExCU = 14.23 ExCU results. A payment of 10 ExCU is deducted
here, because the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Assume a minimum contribution of 18 CU. Then a total contribution of 19
ExCU reaches this minimum contribution. Now, for a contributed amount of 1 CU
(costs of 0.77 ExCU) a payoff of 25 ExCU ´ 0.77 ExCU = 24.23 ExCU results. In
this case, no additional payment is deducted, because the minimum contribution
has been reached.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34). If you have any questions yourself during the experiment,
please remain seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter
has come to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. However,
questions should only be about the instructions and not about strategies! Further-
more, please note that the game only continues when all players have made their
decisions. Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we ask you to fill
in a questionnaire with an additional decision task. When the time has come, we
will distribute separate instructions explaining the procedure. Please remain seated
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Figure A.12: Experimental procedure of treatment BUHET.
after filling in the questionnaire until we call up your place number. Take your
instructions with you to the front desk. Only then can you receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
A.2.5 Treatment RGHOM
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3. Over the course
of the experiment you can earn two additional amounts of money. The first amount
of up to e12.50 results from your decisions in the experiment. This amount is in-
fluenced by the decisions of your fellow participants. The second amount ranges
from e0.10 to e3.85 and results solely from your individual decision in a subsequent
questionnaire. The total amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The payment occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no partic-
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ipant will known another participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency
“Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you and four other players form a group of five. The com-
position of this group will not change throughout the entire experiment, i.e., in all
ten rounds.
Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contribution to a project.
At the same time, every other player in your group chooses his own contribution to
this project. The contributions of all players in a group are added up to a total
contribution. For the project to be successful, your group’s total contribution
must reach a minimum contribution. Otherwise, the project fails and the
amount you contributed to the project (as well as the contributions from your fellow
players) are lost.
The experiment consists of a total of ten independent decisions of this
kind in a total of ten rounds. However, only one of these rounds will matter
for your payoff. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined randomly at
the end of the experiment, individually for each player. For this purpose, each of
the ten rounds has the same probability of being chosen.
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment of 25 Experi-
mental Currency Units. In every individual round, each player can contribute up
to 10 Experimental Currency Units. The group’s total contribution in each round
can therefore amount to up to 50 Experimental Currency Units.
The exact amount of the minimum contribution is determined randomly and
separately for each round. You are told this information only at the end of the
respective round, i.e., after the contributions have been chosen. You know however
that the minimum contribution will take on one of the following nine values in
contribution units, each with the same probability:
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
If the minimum contribution is not reached in a particular round, each player must
make an additional payment of 10 Experimental Currency Units, which is
deducted from his earnings in the respective round.
Total contribution <16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >24
Probability that
minimum contri-
bution is reached
(absolute)
0 1/9 2/9 3/9 4/9 5/9 6/9 7/9 8/9 1 1
Probability that
minimum contribu-
tion is reached (%,
rounded)
0% 11% 22% 33% 44% 56% 67% 78% 89% 100% 100%
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment you and your fellow
players each choose your own contribution to the project. This happens in ten
decision rounds which all proceed as follows:
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1. Each player chooses his own contribution to the project. All players choose
their contributions at the same time. In order to do this, each player chooses
an amount between 0 and 10 Experimental Currency Units (in steps of 0.1
ExCU). The individual contributions of all players in a group are automatically
summed up to a total contribution.
2. After all group members have made their contribution choice, each player is
told the required minimum contribution, his group’s total contribution, as well
as his resulting earnings. The contributions of the other players in the group
are also displayed.
YOUR PAYOFF The earnings of each player in the respective round
calculate as follows:
• Please note that the contributed amount is deducted from your account bal-
ance in any case, even if the total contribution has not reached the minimum
contribution.
• If the group’s total contribution is greater than or equal to the minimum
contribution, then the project is successful and you receive the following payoff:
Earnings for reaching the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
contributed amount
• If the group’s total contribution is less than the minimum contribution, then
the project is not successful and you receive the following payoff:
Earnings for missing the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
contributed amount ´ 10 ExCU
In order to determine the total payoff at the end of the experiment, one
of the ten rounds is chosen randomly. All rounds have the same probability of
being chosen. This means that you receive the earnings from only a single
round. The results from the remaining rounds are no longer relevant to your payoff,
no matter if the minimum contribution has been reached in these rounds or not.
The earnings from the randomly chosen round are converted into euros (2 ExCU
“ e1) and added to your show-up fee (e3). The payoff from a subsequent separate
experiment is later added to this amount.
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Example for the procedure of a particular round
In this round, the players in a given group make the following individual contribu-
tions which add up to a total contribution of 19 ExCU:
• Player A: 1 ExCU
• Player B: 2 ExCU
• Player C: 4 ExCU
• Player D: 3 ExCU
• Player E: 9 ExCU
Assume that the minimum contribution amount to 20 ExCU. Then a total
contribution of 19 ExCU fails to reach this minimum contribution. Accordingly,
Player A (contributed amount of 1 ExCU) has earnings of 25 ExCU ´ 1 ExCU ´ 10
ExCU = 14 ExCU in this round. An amount of 10 ExCU is deducted here, because
the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Assume that the minimum contribution amounts to 18 ExCU. Then a total
contribution of 19 ExCU reaches this minimum contribution. Now, for a contributed
amount of 1 ExCU earnings of 25 ExCU ´ 1 ExCU = 24 ExCU result. In this case
nothing is deducted, because the minimum contribution has been reached.
Please note that, starting with the second decision round, you may call up the
results from previous rounds whenever you make a decision by clicking the
button “Show earlier results”. By clicking the button “Back” you may return to the
current decision round. After having chosen your contribution (by clicking “Confirm
choice”) you have one additional opportunity to correct your decision if necessary.
As soon as you click “Confirm choice and continue”, your decision is final.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34). If you have any questions yourself during the experiment,
please remain seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter
has come to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. However,
questions should only be about the instructions and not about strategies! Further-
more, please note that the game only continues when all players have made their
decisions. Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we ask you to fill
in a questionnaire with an additional decision task. When the time has come, we
will distribute separate instructions explaining the procedure. Please remain seated
after filling in the questionnaire until we call up your place number. Take your
instructions with you to the front desk. Only then can you receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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Figure A.13: Experimental procedure of treatment RGHOM.
A.2.6 Treatment RGHET
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3. Over the course
of the experiment you can earn two additional amounts of money. The first amount
of up to e12.50 results from your decisions in the experiment. This amount is in-
fluenced by the decisions of your fellow participants. The second amount ranges
from e0.10 to e3.85 and results solely from your individual decision in a subsequent
questionnaire. The total amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The payment occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no partic-
ipant will known another participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency
“Experimental Currency Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
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Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you and four other players form a group of five. The com-
position of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment.
It will not change throughout the entire experiment, i.e., in all ten rounds.
Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contribution to a project.
At the same time, every other player in your group chooses his own contribution to
this project. The contributions of all players in a group are added up to a total
contribution. For the project to be successful, your group’s total contribution
must reach a minimum contribution. Otherwise, the project fails and the
amount you contributed to the project (as well as the contributions from your fellow
players) are lost.
The experiment consists of a total of ten independent decisions of this
kind in a total of ten rounds. However, only one of these rounds will matter
for your payoff. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined randomly at
the end of the experiment, individually for each player. For this purpose, each of
the ten rounds has the same probability of being chosen.
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment of 25 Ex-
perimental Currency Units. Each player’s contribution is measured in
Contribution Units (CU). In every individual round, each player can contribute
up to 10 Contribution Units, by investing Experimental Currency Units from
his or her endowment. The group’s total contribution in each round can therefore
amount to up to 50 Contribution Units.
The costs of contributions in Experimental Currency Units differ among
the players:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 0.77 Experimental
Currency Unit (1 CU = 0.77 ExCU)
Players C, D and E 1 Contribution Unit costs 1.25 Experimental
Currency Units (1 CU = 1.25 ExCU)
Which player you are (A, B, C, D, E) is determined randomly at the beginning
of the experiment. You are told who you are before the first decision.
The exact amount of the minimum contribution is determined randomly
and separately for each round. You are told this information only at the end
of the respective round, i.e., after the contributions have been chosen. You know
however that the minimum contribution will take on one of the following nine
values in contribution units, each with the same probability:
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
If the minimum contribution is not reached in a particular round, each player must
make an additional payment of 10 Experimental Currency Units, which is
deducted from his earnings in the respective round.
Total contribution <16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >24
Probability that
minimum contri-
bution is reached
(absolute)
0 1/9 2/9 3/9 4/9 5/9 6/9 7/9 8/9 1 1
Probability that
minimum contribu-
tion is reached (%,
rounded)
0% 11% 22% 33% 44% 56% 67% 78% 89% 100% 100%
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PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION In the experiment you and your fellow
players each choose your own contribution to the project. This happens in ten
decision rounds which all proceed as follows:
1. Each player chooses his own contribution to the project. All players choose
their contributions at the same time. In order to do this, each player chooses
an amount between 0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). By
clicking on “Calculate Values” you can also display the corresponding values
in Experimental Currency Units. The individual contributions of all players
in a group are automatically summed up to a total contribution.
2. After all group members have made their contribution choice, each player is
told the required minimum contribution, his group’s total contribution, as well
as his resulting earnings. The contributions of the other players in the group
are also displayed (in CU and ExCU).
YOUR PAYOFF The earnings of each player in the respective round
calculate as follows:
• Please note that the contributed amount is deducted from your account bal-
ance in any case, even if the total contribution has not reached the minimum
contribution.
• If the group’s total contribution is greater than or equal to the minimum
contribution, then the project is successful and you receive the following payoff:
Earnings for reaching the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
costs (in ExCU)
• If the group’s total contribution is less than the minimum contribution, then
the project is not successful and you receive the following payoff:
Earnings for missing the minimum contribution = 25 ExCU ´ your
costs (in ExCU) ´ 10 ExCU
In order to determine the total payoff at the end of the experiment, one
of the ten rounds is chosen randomly. All rounds have the same probability of
being chosen. This means that you receive the earnings from only a single
round. The results from the remaining rounds are no longer relevant to your payoff,
no matter if the minimum contribution has been reached in these rounds or not.
The earnings from the randomly chosen round are converted into euros (2 ExCU
“ e1) and added to your show-up fee (e3). The payoff from a subsequent separate
experiment is later added to this amount.
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Example for the procedure of a particular round
In this round, the players in a given group make the following individual contribu-
tions which add up to a total contribution of 19 ExCU:
• Player A: 1 CU (1*0.77 ExCU = 0.77 ExCU)
• Player B: 2 CU (2*0.77 ExCU = 1.54 ExCU)
• Player C: 4 CU (4*1.25 ExCU = 5 ExCU)
• Player D: 3 CU (3*1.25 ExCU = 3.75 ExCU)
• Player E: 9 CU (9*1.25 ExCU = 11.25 ExCU)
Assume that the minimum contribution amount to 20 ExCU. Then a total
contribution of 19 ExCU fails to reach this minimum contribution. Accordingly,
Player A (costs of 0.77 ExCU for 1 CU) has earnings of 25 ExCU ´ 0.77 ExCU ´
10 ExCU = 14.23 ExCU in this round. An amount of 10 ExCU is deducted here,
because the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Assume that the minimum contribution amounts to 18 ExCU. Then a total
contribution of 19 ExCU reaches this minimum contribution. Now, for a contributed
amount of 1 CU (costs of 0.77 ExCU) earnings of 25 ExCU ´ 0.77 ExCU = 24.23
ExCU result. In this case nothing is deducted, because the minimum contribution
has been reached.
Please note that, starting with the second decision round, you may call up the
results from previous rounds whenever you make a decision by clicking the
button “Show earlier results”. By clicking the button “Back” you may return to the
current decision round. After having chosen your contribution (by clicking “Confirm
choice”) you have one additional opportunity to correct your decision if necessary.
As soon as you click “Confirm choice and continue”, your decision is final.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS Please think carefully about all of your deci-
sions, because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the right
side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that is, e.g.,
12.34 instead of 12,34). If you have any questions yourself during the experiment,
please remain seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter
has come to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. However,
questions should only be about the instructions and not about strategies! Further-
more, please note that the game only continues when all players have made their
decisions. Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT After the experiment, we ask you to fill
in a questionnaire with an additional decision task. When the time has come, we
will distribute separate instructions explaining the procedure. Please remain seated
after filling in the questionnaire until we call up your place number. Take your
instructions with you to the front desk. Only then can you receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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Figure A.14: Experimental procedure of treatment RGHET.
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